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Introduction
This book is dedicated to the coverage of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict by tra-
ditional Polish media outlets in 2014 and 2015, and presents the results of my 
doctoral dissertation. I wanted to study how the selected media and journalists 
presented and domesticated the events in Ukraine, and also how the parties to 
the conflict were described. Although the presentation of external wars and 
armed conflicts by the covering state should be neutral, the scientific literature 
shows that this is not always the case and that many different factors influence 
it (see Zelizer and Allan, 2002; Shoemaker and Cohen, 2006). Context-oriented 
factors, that is those referring to the relationship between the covering and the 
covered state, as well as event-oriented factors, which are determined by the spe-
cific nature of the event, should be taken into account. It seems that both groups 
of factors might have affected how the Russian-Ukrainian conflict was perceived 
by Polish journalists. The proximity of the dispute and Poland’s ambiguous re-
lations with Ukraine and Russia, as well as the hybrid nature of the event, seem 
like important things to consider. Context-oriented factors can determine if 
the recipients will consider a news story as important and relevant to them – 
whether it is seen as “ours” or “their” event.
The role of the media when covering military actions has been quite widely 
dealt with in the scientific literature (see Eskjaer et al., 2015; Knightley, 2003). 
How to define what “coverage” means seems clear, but it is strongly dependent on 
the nature of the event it concerns. It is associated with how events and entities 
are presented, as well as how much attention the media pays to specific issues, 
which indicates their news value. This definition will be used for the purposes of 
my research. One should take into account the fact that wars and armed conflicts 
are mainly international events (see Cottle, 2009; Ross, 2007), therefore they are 
covered differently than national issues. Furthermore, the intense, brutal and 
generally negative character of the phenomenon (see Święs, 2007; Chang et al., 
1987) may make it harder for journalists to stay impartial (Russ-Mohl, 2013).
How the national media system functions, and the influence of the external 
environment on it (see Dobek-Ostrowska, 2007; McQuail, 2000; Pokorna-
Ignatowicz, 2013), is of considerable importance in the case of the media’s 
coverage. The Polish media system, according to Mancini (2015) and Dobek-
Ostrowska (2012), is characterized by hybridity, which puts it close to both the 
polarized pluralist model and to the liberal model. The way Polish journalists 
approach a given issue can be influenced by market logic and the political 
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parallelism of media outlets, which will be reflected in the news stories they 
present.
An important factor is also how the event is defined. In this book I will refer 
to it as the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The dispute in Ukraine is sometimes 
described as a hybrid war, due to its military and informational nature (Pacek, 
2018). But in my study the term “conflict” will be used, as it covers more than 
only military warfare (see Brown and Stewart, 2015; Bierzanek, 1968). The con-
flict is also defined as an inter-state dispute. Baluk and Doroszko (2017), Bebler 
(2014) and Riabchuk (2016) are some of the scholars that have used this defini-
tion and called it the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
The aim of the study is to describe how the Russian-Ukrainian conflict was 
covered by the Polish media in 2014 and 2015 and to conclude if the fear of 
it spreading to Poland, as well as historical and cultural patterns, influenced 
the coverage. The purpose of the study is also to check if the crisis in Ukraine 
was domesticated by the Polish media. This seems to be interesting, especially 
due to the proximity of the conflict. Both newspapers and television programs 
will be analyzed to see if the Polish media spoke with one voice during the cov-
erage of the conflict in Ukraine. Another possibility would be that differences 
resulting from the medium’s editorial line, the type of media, and the degree of 
relations with political actors affected the perspective of the dispute visible in 
the materials. This study will go a long way in explaining the importance of this 
conflict to the Polish media and society. That is to say, how much space and at-
tention the media paid to the war in Ukraine. This event had a direct impact on 
the military and economic security of Poland. Therefore it seems to be important 
to check what kind of perspective – pro-Ukrainian or pro-Russian – was shown 
in the analyzed materials. It should be noted that Poland’s political and histor-
ical relations with the parties to the conflict are ambiguous. It can therefore be 
expected that the perception of the actors that are involved in the conflict by the 
Polish media will be marked by these patterns.
References to both Polish and foreign scientific publications are included in 
the study. When writing about the role of the media in armed conflicts, I refer 
to Rodgers (2012), Tumber (2004), Nohrstedt and Ottosen (2014), McLaughlin 
(2002), Hallin (1986), Zelizer and Allan (2002) and Piątkowska-Stepaniak and 
Nierenberg (2007). The domestication strategy, which has also been examined 
in my book, has been explained by Taradai (2014), Gomez Rodriguez (2007), 
Olausson (2013) and Joye (2015). When describing the news factors and their 
influence on the coverage, I referred to, for example, publications by Galtung and 
Ruge (1965), Gross and Kopper (2011), Shoemaker and Cohen (2006) and Golan 
et al. (2010). Issues regarding the Polish media and the Polish media system have 
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been described by, among others, Nowak (2014), Dobek-Ostrowska (2007 and 
2012), Jakubowicz (2003), Bajomi-Lazar (2014) and Głowacki (2017). The char-
acteristics of the analyzed dispute have been described by Lakomy (2016) and 
Parulski (2016), among others. 
Although in the scientific literature, albeit to a greater extent in the foreign 
than in the Polish, the role of the media in presenting armed conflicts is quite 
extensively covered, it seems that there is a lack of empirical research, which 
in a comprehensive manner could describe these issues. In particular, studies 
are missing that would take into account the role of various types of media in 
covering a given armed conflict in the same time period, and which would be 
complemented with in-depth interviews with journalists. The state of research 
on the media coverage of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict also seems to be lim-
ited in some ways. There has been little research carried out in the longer per-
spective, and which also takes into account the above-mentioned issues. I noted 
that much more research and publications on this subject have been made 
abroad than in Poland. The number of publications on the role of the Polish 
media in covering this story is rather small, and they usually concern the press 
market.
An initial analysis of the research material and relevant literature made it 
possible to create two research hypotheses and eleven research questions. The 
research hypotheses that will be tested in the study are:
H1: An anti-Russian perspective is dominant in the Polish media coverage of 
the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
H2: Stressing the threat to the economic and military security of Poland was 
the dominant tool of domestication of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict by the 
Polish media.
The research questions with a detailed discussion on the methodological aspects 
of the study are presented in the second chapter.
Three research methods were used in the analysis – quantitative-qualitative 
(hybrid method), qualitative and comparative. These research methods have 
been supplemented by desk research, which is defined as a research technique.
The first research method is a quantitative-qualitative content analysis, 
which was used to analyze 1 726 research units with a code book consisting of 
38 questions. The hybridization of the method, meaning the combination of 
quantitative analysis and frame analysis, allowed for an in-depth look at how 
and through what mechanisms the six Polish media outlets – the most popular 
tabloids, quality newspapers and television news programs – covered the conflict 
from 1st of March 2014 to 31st of March 2015.
Róa Norström - 978-3-631-79027-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 12/03/2020 01:06:53PM by A.Gorlikowski@peterlang.com
via Peter Lang AG and Adam Gorlikowski
Introduction12
The second research method used in the study has a qualitative character 
and was meant to supplement the content analysis. From April 2015 to January 
2018, eleven in-depth interviews were conducted with journalists who cov-
ered the conflict in Ukraine during the selected research period. Ten of those 
journalists were employees of the media analyzed in this book, while one came 
from another medium. It was decided to include him in the list of respondents 
anyway due to his professional experience. The interviews were semi-structured, 
which made it possible to spontaneously ask follow-up questions and bring up 
issues that were not planned.
Comparative analysis is another research method that has found its applica-
tion in the study. By comparing the results of the content analysis, it was possible 
to find similarities and differences in the different media’s approach to covering 
the conflict. Furthermore, the answers given by the journalists were also com-
pared to each other. This was interesting since the respondents came from dif-
ferent media outlets, and also because they covered the conflict from different 
places. Some of them were in Warsaw while others worked on the spot.
Secondary data, such as the Centre for Public Opinion Research’s report on 
the Polish people’s perception of the events in Ukraine, were also put to use in the 
research. It was possible to check if the way the conflict as well as the parties par-
ticipating in it were presented by the media, correlated with the views of Polish 
society.
The choice of methods and techniques is justified by their character and the 
possibilities they offer the researcher. In addition, it seems that together they 
allowed for a comprehensive analysis of the way in which the Russian-Ukrainian 
conflict was covered by the Polish media. The content analysis combined with 
elements of frame analysis resulted in numerical data on the frequency of 
covered issues and sources of information, along with information about the 
attributes given to the actors in the dispute and the contexts used by journalists. 
It seems that using content analysis in this way could, in a sense, minimize its 
limitations, namely how it is mostly quantitative. On the other hand, I realize 
that the qualitative factors of the method are usually characterized by a dose of 
subjectivism, which is why it was necessary to also do in-depth interviews. The 
interviews were used to help further explore the results of the content analysis, 
especially to answer why something was presented in a certain way. This seems 
like an unquestionable advantage of combining in-depth interviews with content 
analysis. The use of the comparative method seemed necessary in turn consid-
ering the diversity of the studied media. The desk research has helped to broaden 
the research perspective and to see if the journalists’ description of the events in 
Ukraine reflected the views of the media organization and perhaps the views of 
Róa Norström - 978-3-631-79027-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 12/03/2020 01:06:53PM by A.Gorlikowski@peterlang.com
via Peter Lang AG and Adam Gorlikowski
Introduction 13
the society to which they belong. I realize that the applied research methods, as 
well as the empirical nature of my study, do not result in a complete reflection of 
reality. However, with the aim of describing the coverage and domestication of 
the Russian-Ukrainian conflict by Polish journalists, as well as the influence of 
context-oriented factors – such as history and security concerns – it seems that 
the selected techniques and research methods, despite their limitations, have 
been chosen and applied properly.
This book consists of four chapters. The first one presents theoretical 
assumptions on the media coverage of wars and armed conflicts. I present a brief 
characteristic of the nature and causes of the conflict, explaining its hybridity 
and significance for Polish national security. Next the Polish media system is 
described. I define the concept of the media system, characterize its structure, 
and point to the role of its external environment and how it could affect the 
media coverage. I refer to Hallin’s and Mancini’s models (2004), and write about 
the hybridity of the Polish media system. The selected theories and strategies 
related to the role of the media in the conflict are also described in the chapter. 
I  outline event-oriented and context-oriented factors in the coverage of for-
eign events. I define the concepts of war and peace journalism, write about the 
problem of journalistic partisanship, and the demonization and dehumanization 
of “the enemy” by the media. Domestication – its definition, typologies, and the 
factors that may determine the effectiveness of this strategy is also discussed in 
this chapter. Finally, the state of Polish and foreign research on the media cov-
erage of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is presented.
The research methodology is described in the second chapter. The theme, 
subject, and aim of the research as well as research hypotheses and research 
questions – divided into main and specific research questions – are described. 
I  further outline the scope of the research and the criteria for selecting the 
research period and the media qualified for the analysis. I also referred to the 
international research project “Ukraine 2014 - media war and the war in media” 
in which I participated and which constitutes an important contribution to the 
empirical part of my research. The research tools and methods used in the study – 
including the way they are constructed and used, as well as their advantages and 
disadvantages – are also presented.
In the third chapter I discuss the results of my content analysis and in-depth 
interviews with journalists. I present a list of the most commonly covered topics 
and most quoted sources of information. The dominant conflict perspective vis-
ible in the media, and how the dispute and actors involved in it were defined, 
has also been analyzed. Moreover, the journalists’ views regarding their role in 
covering the conflict in Ukraine and problems related to it, as well as the impact 
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of prejudices and national stereotypes on how the parties to the dispute were 
perceived, are discussed in the chapter.
The analysis of the domestication of the conflict is presented in the fourth 
and last chapter of the book. The mechanisms of the media’s domestication of 
the dispute are characterized with attention given to the use of frames and his-
torical contexts in bringing the dispute closer to the audience. Attention is given 
to the frequency of historical references, comparisons to historical events and 
comparisons of Vladimir Putin to historical figures. The chapter also presents 
the extent to which the consequences of the conflict for Poland, such as the mil-
itary threat and economic sanctions, were used by journalists when domesti-
cating the dispute in Ukraine.
In the conclusion I  verify the research hypotheses and try to answer the 
research questions. I  refer to the legitimacy of the research techniques and 
methods I used, as well as write about problems that arose during the making 
of my research. I also suggest topics for further study that can complement and 
develop the analysis.
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1  Theoretical perspectives of the conflict 
coverage
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict is one of the most important and disturbing 
events that have taken place in Eastern Europe during the last few years or even 
decades. Few of the disputes that were fought in this part of world after World 
War II, had such a great impact on the states in the region. Therefore, it can be 
expected that the interest of those countries and media that will be affected by 
the dispute will be high, and that journalists might try to domesticate the dispute 
by showing the audience that it concerns them directly. The character of this 
event, sometimes referred to as a hybrid war, may also be an important factor 
that can affect work of journalists. Therefore the conflict and its causes will be 
described in this chapter. It also seems necessary to present the theoretical foun-
dation of war coverage and the media’s domestication of this type of phenomena. 
Describing the Polish media system and how it relates to domestication and the 
coverage of the conflict seems equally important. The media system does not 
function in a vacuum, and elements such as the political and social environ-
ment can affect how content will be presented by journalists. By describing these 
factors it will be possible to show what kind of elements had an influence on 
the media coverage and domestication of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, and its 
perception by society.
1.1  Character of the conflict
The events in Ukraine, which coverage by the Polish media will be analyzed in 
this study, have had a fundamental impact not only on the relations of the parties 
to the conflict, but also on the security of countries that are located in its geo-
graphical proximity, such as Poland. The relations between Russia and the West, 
represented by the European Union, NATO and the United States, are also an 
important element of this dispute. In that way it can also be understood in a 
broader sense – as a cultural conflict. This interpretation has been brought up in 
several scientific publications (see Olchowski, 2017; Lakomy, 2016) and points to 
the event’s multidimensional nature.
The nomenclature itself used to define the events in Ukraine, as a conflict, civil 
war, or hybrid war, shows that the situation can be understood quite differently. 
For this study, it was decided to use the first term, because it covers not only the 
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the political, economic and ideological battles that go on simultaneously. Baluk 
and Doroszko wrote that the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s military aggres-
sion in Eastern Ukraine is the result of the imperial policy of the Kremlin and 
its rebirth, which manifests itself in the need to reinstate Russia’s position in the 
world, especially in Eastern Europe (2017: 8). Although Russia is not officially a 
party to the dispute, through giving economic and military support to the pro-
Russian separatists, the Kremlin plays a significant role. The two-dimensional 
nature of the dispute, being fought at both a military and informational level, is 
a factor in favor of recognizing the situation in Ukraine as a dispute between two 
states – Russia and Ukraine. This way of defining the conflict was also notice-
able in political discourse. The then Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, for 
example, put it forward in a speech in March, 2014 (Kancelaria Premiera, 2014). 
Bronislaw Komorowski  – the former president of Poland (Konflikt..., 2014), 
Radosław Sikorski – the then Minister of Foreign Affairs (Sikorski ..., 2014) as 
well as Joe Biden – the former vice-president of the United States (Brookings 
Institution, 2015) all spoke about the events in Ukraine in this way. Therefore, 
the term “conflict” also often appeared in the media discourse, which meant that 
it was decided to use this wording also for this study.
When talking about the causes of the dispute, first and foremost, attention 
should be paid to events directly preceding the research period. This includes 
the Euromaidan Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity – which is recognized 
as a part of the former – the escape of Viktor Yanukovych from Ukraine, and the 
announcement and later referendum and annexation of Crimea by Russia. The 
annexation, which was not accepted by the international community due to it 
violating the Budapest Memorandum and the Russia-Ukraine inter-state treaty, 
may be considered the direct starting point of the armed operations in Eastern 
Ukraine (Bebler, 2014). However, I realize that the roots of the analyzed dispute 
are much more complex than that, and have to do with events in the distant past.
The outbreak of the conflict resulted from many different causes, which can 
be divided into internal and external ones. Included in these are minor cate-
gories such as history, socio-cultural issues and economic and political factors. 
Regarding historical issues, which together with socio-cultural factors consti-
tute an important element that shapes national identity, it should be noted that 
Vladimir Putin’s ideological policy of the so-called Russian World and its defense, 
is considered to be one of the causes of the hybrid conflict between Russia and 
Ukraine (Gergało-Dąbek, 2017: 99). According to Plokhy, Russia does not recog-
nize Ukraine as a separate nation (2012: 144), which was manifested by the inde-
pendence efforts of Ukrainians in the past being blocked (Serczyk, 2001: 208). 
Riabchuk notes that during his speech at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 
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2008, Putin pointed to the nationality problems of Ukraine, as well as the fact 
that Russians inhabit southern Ukraine, which according to the researcher was 
Putin’s “first territorial claims on what he later termed Novorossiya” (2016: 75). 
Moreover, Riabchuk believes that Russia’s actions toward Georgia and support 
for the independence of South Ossetia were a form of introduction to what later 
happened in Crimea (2016: 75). Russia’s support for the separatists in Moldova 
is also considered as a policy of destabilizing the nations of the former Soviet 
Union (Van Metre et al., 2015: 2). That is why some researchers claim that the 
socio-cultural and later military war against Ukraine began before the Russian 
intervention in the Crimea and the Donbass (Gergało-Dąbek, 2017: 99).
Vladimir Putin has repeatedly referred to the need to protect Russian-
speaking minorities and Russia’s right to defend Russian-speaking populations 
living outside the country (Lally and Englund, 2014). The war in Donbass and 
the annexation of Crimea itself was explained by Putin as necessary to defend 
the Russian population against the so-called Ukrainian fascism (see Riabchuk, 
2016: 80; Zhurzhenko, 2015). According to Parulski, the people of Russian origin 
who live as a majority on Crimea, and the Ukrainians who speak Russian as 
their native language, asked Putin to incorporate the Peninsula to the Russian 
Federation, which then happened after a referendum (2016: 78–79). He claims 
that the Russian ethnic group inhabiting the Crimean Peninsula  – which has 
always been considered an important strategic point in the Black Sea region – 
was used as a tool to externally destabilize Ukraine (2016: 80) and justify a mili-
tary intervention by the Kremlin.
The language issue, which has a significant impact on the national and cul-
tural independence, and thus also on national identity, is a matter of some 
importance in Ukraine and might concern the internal dimension of the dis-
pute. The people who are living in Eastern Ukraine, for example in Donetsk or 
Luhansk, speak mostly Russian and that might influenced them to have strongly 
pro-Russian views. This division resulted from the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the partitions of its territory and the people that inhabit it, which to a lesser 
or greater extent is more pro-Ukrainian or pro-Russian (Lakomy, 2016:  288). 
That was, according to some researchers (see Parulski, 2016), one of the issues 
present during the outbreak of the conflict and also its later development into 
military operations. Self-proclaimed republics – the Luhansk People’s Republic 
and the Donetsk People’s Republic – were then created in Ukraine and were not 
recognized by the state authorities as legitimate entities. However, Boyd-Barrett 
(2017), Mylovanov (2016) and Wilson (2016) question the role of ethnicity 
and language as a key elements of the dispute. A survey carried out by the Kiev 
International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in April 2014 about “Opinions and 
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views of the citizens of Southern and Eastern regions of Ukraine” shows that 
“imposition of one language” was one of the least important factors that made 
the respondents anxious at that time (The Views and…, 2014). The respondents 
more often pointed, for example, to “raging of banditry in the country”, “col-
lapse of Ukrainian economy”, “threat of civil war”, “non-payment of salaries and 
pensions”, and other factors (The Views and…, 2014). Mylovanov (2016) writes 
that economic factors rather than those associated with ethnicity and language 
might be more relevant for explaining the pro-Russian separatists’ actions. 
The different opinions of scientists on the importance of ethnic and linguistic 
causes of the conflict show the complexity of the dispute and how difficult it is 
to investigate.
The Crimean crisis, which has been an important element of the Ukrainian 
conflict, was also caused by political and economic issues. Doroszko argues 
that while the handing over of Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 was not a problem 
since Ukraine was then subordinated to the Soviet Union, after its collapse the 
“Crimean issue” became more important in the Russian-Ukrainian relations 
(2017). Crimea is a region rich in natural resources, including oil. Because of 
the mining potential of the deposits located there it is a very important area. 
That is why it is possible that Russia’s actions were motivated by fear of losing the 
Peninsula and also Ukraine in general from its sphere of influence, especially in 
a situation where Ukraine was coming closer to the European Union. In general, 
the eastern regions of Ukraine, which are inhabited by a Russian-speaking pop-
ulation and ethnic Russians, are geared towards industry, while the central and 
western region of the country is a more agricultural area (Strasheim, 2016: 7–8). 
Therefore, it can be assumed that developmental issues had an important role to 
play in the analyzed dispute.
The interdependence between Russia and Ukraine can be seen both at the 
political and economic levels. The economic dependence of Ukraine to Russia 
was already noticeable in the so-called gas wars and loans granted to Ukraine 
by Russia. Financial issues, such as the guarantee of receiving financial sup-
port from the Kremlin (Valadai Discussion Club, 2014:  28) needed to reduce 
the budget deficit of Ukraine, is said to be the cause of Yanukovych decision to 
suspend the signing of the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement. 
This in consequence led to the anti-government demonstrations known as the 
Euromaidan to intensify (Wittkowsky, 2014: 2). Baluk therefore believes that the 
internal political problems of Ukraine were also the result of Russia’s actions and 
its support for the presidency of Yanukovych and later the separatists (Baluk and 
Doroszko, 2017: 74–75). The internal instability of Ukraine is generally recog-
nized as one of the reasons behind the dispute and its intensification (Van Metre 
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et al., 2015). For example, the weakness of Ukraine’s political structures, which 
led to the so-called Orange Revolution and later to the Euromaidan protests, 
was such a factor. Although progress toward democratization occurred after 
the Orange Revolution and during Yuschenko’s presidency, during Yanukovych 
times it became somewhat stalled. On the other hand, the Orange Revolution 
showed that Ukraine is a divided country, since the southern-eastern parts 
of it, which supported Viktor Yanukovych, sought autonomy and even seces-
sion from the rest of the country (Gromadzki et al., 2004). Moreover, Lakomy 
notes that the agreement from February 21, 2014 on the termination of the 
Euromaidan protests and Yanukovych’s removal from office, did not take into 
account the interests of all groups and regions, which in a sense worsened the 
chaos (2016: 285). He adds that the difficulties of the new government in keeping 
control over the whole country and dealing with economic and political crises, 
as well as its lack of acceptance from the Russian-speaking citizens, led to the 
protests in the Crimea and Donbass (Lakomy, 2016: 285–285). In turn, that led 
to Russia’s military involvement and regular military operations.
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict can also be understood as a geopolitical dis-
pute between Russia and the West, which is expressed by the position of Ukraine 
itself. On the one hand, it seeks to be a part of the European Union and NATO – 
in this way being more brought under the influence of the West, which is difficult 
for the Kremlin to accept. According to Lakomy, this is perceived as jeopardizing 
Russian national security, and it might also be seen as a violation of the Russian 
sphere of influence by the West (2016: 305–306). The geographical location of 
Ukraine and its potential impact on the security of neighboring countries is also 
a feature of this dispute. Olchowski wrote about the erosion of trust between 
Russia and Ukraine as well as Russia and the West, when Russia violated the pri-
macy of international law by acting against Ukraine (2017: 157). This, in turn, 
led to economic and political sanctions which only deepened mutual aversion. 
Moreover, the problem of consensus among members of the European Union 
regarding the legitimacy of imposing sanctions on Russia, and the impact of the 
dispute on NATO’s actions, shows that the conflict was a crisis of great magni-
tude for the international community.
The character of the analyzed conflict is also one of the important issues related 
to its course. The dispute is referred to as a hybrid war, but according to Pacek 
the concept itself is not defined in any universal way (2018: 25), which means 
that researchers who deal with this subject understand it differently. In Nemeth’s 
opinion, a hybrid conflict is characterized by: disinformation and propaganda, 
the use of available technological means, guerilla activities and difficulties in 
distinguishing between civil and military participants of the conflict (2002). It 
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seems that this definition is accurate, because it draws attention to the asym-
metrical character of the relations within the conflict. In particular, hybrid war 
involves “the de-monopolization of the use of force by the state actors” (Pietraś, 
2017: 22) and the possibility of it being used by others, for example, non-state 
actors, which is what has occurred in the case of the conflict in Ukraine.
Pietraś wrote that the fact that Russia has not made a formal declaration of 
war against Ukraine should be seen as a political strategy by the Kremlin and 
their version of hybrid war (2017:  27). This is confirmed by Levchenko who 
refers to the so-called Gerasimov doctrine (2016). This assumes an increase in 
the role of non-military factors like destroying the attacked state’s critical infra-
structure, and thereby reducing its political or economic potential (2016: 25). 
Indeed, so-called soft power was important during the dispute, which according 
to Darczewska was a part of Russia’s bigger strategy toward Ukraine which was 
implemented for several years (2014: 5–6). This involved, for example, spreading 
information about the dispute through the mass media. A significant portion of 
the content created by the parties to the conflict was, however, published on social 
media and blogs (Dougherty, 2014: 2). Szewczenko mentions, among the tools 
of Russia’s information operation, (2017: 134–135): publishing false photos and 
videos, attributing pro-fascist attitudes to the Ukrainian society, spreading the 
ideology of the “Russian World”, and blaming the war on Ukraine. Manipulating 
online discourse using so-called cyber-trolls, and organizing attacks in cyber-
space, were also among the tactics used. Baezner and Robin point to the exis-
tence of pro-Russian hacker groups  – exemplified by “Cyber Berkut” which 
supports the separatists  – but also pro-Ukrainian hacker groups  – including 
“Cyber Hundred”, which removes pro-Russian trolls from Ukrainian websites 
(2017: 10).
The information dimension of the dispute was also about misleading the 
opponent. Military units operated in a flexible and efficient way (Snegovaya, 
2015: 17), which made it difficult to determine their actual position. That is why 
the information campaign also sought to cover up Russia’s military involvement 
in the conflict as well as justify retaliatory action (Snegovaya, 2015: 9). Russia’s 
limited military operations were meant to prevent this state from being defined 
as an aggressor engaged in a war, which was supposed to save it from the interna-
tional sanctions (Skoneczny, 2015: 45). The information campaign was therefore 
also directed to the international community (Szewczenko, 2017: 132).
The actions taken on the information level were supplemented by a military 
invasion (Kofman and Rojansky, 2015:  3) which might be exemplified by the 
Russians taking Crimea. According to Pacek, lacking any legal solutions because 
war had not formally been declared, as well as the so-called “little green men” 
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taking action, led to the Ukrainian authorities being paralyzed and the military 
units not taking adequate measures (2018: 68–69). The economic and military 
support given to separatists  – like transferring weapons, training and intelli-
gence activities (Menkiszak and Konończuk, 2015) – may be an indicator of the 
dispute’s hybridity, and an example of the implementation of Russia’s strategic 
goals. The very strategy of the pro-Russian militants, combining a guerilla war 
with more modern ways of fighting (see Pacek, 2018: 77) is also a hybrid, which 
shows the conflict’s multidimensional character.
According to the Gerasimov doctrine, social destabilization is an important 
element of war, and the anti-government demonstrations in the eastern and 
southern regions of Ukraine, as well as economically weakening Ukraine through 
it being forced to wage war, can be a reflection of that doctrine (see Levchenko, 
2016:  25–27; Pacek, 2018:  93–95). The strategy of information warfare itself 
was aimed at strengthening pro-separatist sentiment among the inhabitants of 
the pro-Russian regions in eastern Ukraine (Dougherty, 2014:  4–5) which in 
turn was one of the causes of demonstrations erupting, and which added to the 
conflict’s hybridity. The threat of limiting or completely cutting off gas supplies 
(see Vasyuta, 2016: 57; Sienkiewicz, 2015) also demonstrates the complexity of 
the Kremlin’s actions toward Ukraine.
The hybrid character of the conflict in Ukraine could also have influenced the 
way it was covered by the media. It may have led, for example, to difficulties in 
accessing sources of information and the conflict area, which in turn affected the 
quality of the news material and its objectivity. It also required the media to be 
much more careful in checking sources. The journalists’ security could also be 
at risk, mainly due to the irregularity of the military operations. Furthermore, 
the disinformation being spread widely could have led journalists to not only 
risk physical harm, but also to be misinformed by propaganda. This propaganda 
threat could have affected both journalists working directly on the spot, as well 
as those reporting from a distance.
1.2  The Polish media system
The way we define and understand media systems has been transforming over 
the years. The factors used to define them have been, inter alia, the nature of 
the political regime (see Siebert et  al., 1956; Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995; 
Hallin and Mancini, 2004) as well as territorial and, for example, technological 
factors (McQuail, 2000). Nowak (2014: 168), and earlier Jakubowicz (2010: 4), 
noted that there is a lack of literature on the factual definition of media sys-
tems, and researchers who deal with this topic usually refer to specific elements 
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or typologies of media systems. One of the general definitions of the phenom-
enon was presented by McQuail, who stated that the media system is a collection 
of mass media functioning in a specific country and in various sectors, such 
as the press, radio and television (2000: 212). The British researcher draws at-
tention to two important elements – that the media system is divided into dif-
ferent sectors – and that these smaller sectors are affected by their geographical 
conditions. Territorial factors in particular, along with political, economic and 
cultural elements, affect how the same event can be presented in different ways 
by different national media. Therefore, it seems interesting to pay attention to 
the factors that might affect the functioning of the Polish media system and sub-
sequently the coverage of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The characteristics of 
the national media system and its relations with the external environment may 
decide how a certain event will be presented.
Dobek-Ostrowska when analyzing the structure of the media system draws 
attention to such elements as the core of the system, including for example the 
press and TV systems – and also lists the primary and the secondary markets 
(2007:  16–17). The markets mentioned by the researcher are in fact a part of 
the external environment of the media system, which determine its functioning 
to a greater or lesser extent. Among the factors that may affect the information 
presented by television, radio, the press and new media, are the mass media 
audience, advertisers (primary market) and regulatory institutions (secondary 
market) (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2007: 17). It seems that these elements are parts of 
the external pressure spheres mentioned by McQuail (2000: 250) – such as eco-
nomic pressure, political and social pressure, the audience and the sphere of cul-
ture – and may influence how specific outlets and journalists work. It is difficult 
to clearly answer which of these factors has the greatest effect on the functioning 
of the media system. Therefore, it seems important to describe the level of polit-
ical parallelism of Polish media and how domestic media organizations are 
influenced by economic and social pressure. Then it will be possible to answer 
the question of why the national journalists covered the Russian-Ukrainian con-
flict as they did.
Hallin and Mancini’s media systems models are based on four variables – press 
development, the level of political parallelism, journalistic professionalism and 
degree of state intervention (2010: 21). However, Central and Eastern Europe is 
not included in these models. But some of its elements may be used to describe 
the functioning of the media from this region as well. Mancini claims that in 
the case of the Central and Eastern Europe, it is necessary to talk about a kind 
of hybridization of his models (2015: 30–35). He notes that journalistic profes-
sionalism in Poland is well-developed, which in his opinion is best exemplified 
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by Gazeta Wyborcza (Mancini, 2015: 30–31). A high level of media profession-
alization is especially characteristic of the liberal model and to a lesser extent 
of the democratic corporatist model (Hallin and Mancini, 2010: 67). Therefore, 
Mancini’s recognition of the presence of this factor in the case of some Polish 
media outlets is a confirmation of the hybrid nature of the media system. On 
the other hand, the market logic or the logic of commercial media is also notice-
able in the case of most Polish media outlets (Smolak, 2016b: 153), which also 
confirms its hybridization, because in this way Poland is approaching to the 
liberal model.
The transformation of the national media market that occurred after the col-
lapse of the communist regime, led to changes in ownership structure and pri-
vatization as well as commercialization. The press now remains mostly in the 
hands of private owners, while in the case of electronic media it is possible to 
talk about a structural dualism of ownership, being divided into commercial/
private media outlets and public media (Szynol, 2011: 236). The changes in the 
ownership structure also led to the emergence of new media outlets and com-
petitiveness. It is noticeable in every national media sector, and it may have 
influenced the emergence of foreign investors (Bajomi-Lazar, 2014: 109), which 
can be considered as something that led to greater media pluralism. Indeed, the 
number of media outlets available in print and on the internet gives the Polish 
recipient access to a significant number of information sources. The most fre-
quently chosen means of receiving information by Poles are television and the 
internet, while newspapers are less popular (Garlicki, 2015: 79), which in this 
respect brings Poland closer to the polarized pluralist model, where newspaper 
readership is low. Furthermore, gossip and lifestyle press titles are listed among 
the most widely read newspapers in Poland (Kurdupski, 2017; Polskie Badania 
Czytelnictwa, 2018/2019). This might indicate that readers are turning away 
from quality press to tabloids, which in turn could affect the development and 
deepening of the tabloidization of the media. Similar tendencies are noticeable in 
the case of the internet (Dziomdziora, 2015: 58) and television markets (Szynol, 
2013: 213), which shows that the Polish media behave in line with market logic. 
Hordecki and Piontek notice the same processes both in the case of a public 
broadcaster – the Polish Television, as well as a private one – TVN, which in 
the their opinion is expressed in the emotionalism of information, as well as in 
the simplification of the language (2010: 30). This is interesting, because both of 
these TV stations were analyzed during this study of the coverage of the Russian-
Ukrainian conflict, and the processes described above could have affected how 
this event was presented. It is especially interesting considering that wars and 
conflicts are hard news.
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The changing nature of the selected media organizations from information to 
more infotainment may help them get a larger audience and increased interest 
from advertisers. It is worth noting that it is the advertising revenues, also in 
the case of public media, that constitute the majority of the media’s revenues 
(Głowacki, 2017: 171). Therefore, it can be expected that the pressure of eco-
nomic factors on the work of journalists will be high, and indeed it is. In the 
results of the international research project “Journalism in Change  – profes-
sional journalistic cultures in Poland, Russia and Sweden” it was noticed that the 
impact of advertisers on topic selection is rather significant (Dobek-Ostrowska, 
2015: 219), as well as the risk of influence by foreign owners or ownership in 
general on the journalistic work (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2015: 225–227). It confirms 
that in the case of domestic media, economic pressure is important and eco-
nomic factors may basically determine the way media organizations behave 
and the nature of the content they make. The struggle for advertising revenues 
and succumbing to economic pressure is understandable, given the fact that the 
level of concentration of media ownership and the cross-media ownership in 
general  – especially on the press and television market  – is relatively high in 
Poland. It may be exemplified in the case of Agora, Ringier Axel Springer Poland 
(Szynol, 2011: 242) and the TVN group and Polsat (Bereźnicki, 2017). This type 
of phenomenon leads to a situation where it is possible to talk about “market 
colonization by internal and external” media owners (Dobek-Ostrowska, 
2015: 215). That is why informational pluralism is not so obvious, when most 
of the consumed news is produced by a few big media companies. On the other 
hand, the recipients’ relative ability to choose their preferred content, as well as 
the media organizations acting in accordance with market logic, makes Poland 
more similar to the democratic corporatist model, or even the liberal model, 
than to the polarized pluralist model. Furthermore, the level of political paral-
lelism in Poland, understood as relations between the media and political actors, 
is still relatively high. The level of state intervention, especially in the area of 
public media, is also strong. Therefore, the polarized pluralist model may also 
have some application in the case of Poland.
Dobek-Ostrowska (2012), when writing about the Polish media system in 
the context of fitting it into one of the models proposed by Hallin and Mancini, 
refers to the concept of Italianization (see Splichal 1994; Goban-Klas, 1997: 40) 
and Mediterraneanization (Jakubowicz, 2008:  47), which describe the media 
systems’ transformation in post-communist countries. Although the concepts 
differ in defining the path that these countries have undergone, each of them 
underlines the strong role of the state in the media system. This is confirmed by 
Dobek-Ostrowska who wrote about the importance of external pluralism and the 
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tradition of commentary journalism in Poland, as well as the instrumentalization 
of public broadcasters by the authorities (2012:  49). Indeed, considering the 
degree of political influence on the appointment of the controlling bodies of the 
public media and thus also the influence on their content, it is possible to talk 
about Poland being close to the polarized pluralist model. On the other hand, 
the financial model of public media, which includes both subscription fees and 
advertising revenues, is not usually something that political actors use to apply 
pressure (Głowacki, 2017). Printed media, which remain in the hands of private 
owners, also cannot count on press subsidies, which is otherwise a feature of the 
polarized pluralist model and the democratic corporatist model. However, the 
state control takes other forms, such as the above mentioned appointment of 
the supervising bodies of public media, and the ability to impose fines on 
electronic media broadcasters. That occurred for example when the National 
Broadcasting Council imposed a 1.5  million Polish zloty fine on TVN for al-
leged violations of 18th article of the Broadcasting Act (1992), which was actually 
related to the fact that the medium was reporting on anti-government protests 
(KRRiT ujawniła…, 2018). Although the penalty was withdrawn, inter alia after 
the critical reactions by representatives of the European Union and the United 
States, it shows that the influence of political actors on the functioning of the 
media, also indirectly through controlling bodies, is significant.
Bajomi-Lazar, when describing the relationship between the media and 
the political system in Poland, wrote about the political party colonization 
of the media (2014). He compared the periods of the centre-left Miller-Belka 
governments (2001–2005) to the conservative Marcinkiewicz-Kaczyński 
governments (2005–2007) and noted two forms of media colonization: multi-
party colonization with one party being dominant (the first period) and one-
party colonization (the second period) (2014:  144). The distinction proposed 
by Bajomi-Lazar does not only apply to the political actors’ relations with public 
media, although the impact on these is in fact the greatest. That is why despite 
the level of relations between public service broadcasters and politicians is 
strong, other media outlets may also show support for certain political forces. 
Moreover, although the typology proposed by Bajomi-Lazar refers to a time 
before the research period of my analysis, some similarities to the former Civic 
Platform governments (2007–2015) and now the Law and Justice government 
(from November 2015) can be noted. The first of these political parties was a 
member of the government during the research period of this study. Therefore, 
in the case of the Civic Platform it was possible to observe the multi-party col-
onization with a dominant party concept. In turn, the Law and Justice party 
behaves in this respect similar as in the 2005–2007 years.
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Despite the changes of the ruling groups, some general patterns remain sim-
ilar – including the political influence on the functioning of the media and the 
media support for certain political actors. But the political system’s control of the 
media system intensified in time. This was noticeable in media freedom indexes. 
For example, according to Reporters Without Borders, Poland was ranked 18th in 
2015, while in 2016 it was 47th, in 2017 54th and in 2018 58th in the ranking (World 
Press…, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018). According to Freedom House, in 2015 (26th 
position) and 2016 (28th position) Poland was described as free in the context of 
press freedom, while in 2017 (34th position) it was only partially free (Freedom of 
the Press, 2015, 2016 and 2017). This shows that changes in the political sphere 
can influence the media and its actions.
Interestingly, according to Polish journalists the political connections of media 
organizations, including the political interests of the media owners and pressure 
from political actors in general, are of little importance (Michel, 2016: 140–146). 
This was less obvious for journalists employed in the Polish Television, who had 
a problem with clearly identifying whether such a relationship was relevant or 
not (Michel, 2016: 140). Therefore, although the level of political parallelism of 
the Polish media may be generally high, the impact of political actors on the 
media is not really so significant, except in the case of public media. Much more 
important is the economic factor, which more strongly than political pressure 
affects the activities of journalists and media owners. On the other hand, in the 
press and in particular the largest national dailies and weeklies, there are likely 
some ideological bonds to political actors. The same applies to the largest tele-
vision stations. However, the level of politicization of private media, especially 
those thought of as quality media in Poland, can be described as medium – a 
conditional support for a given political party  – while in the case of tabloids 
it can be considered low, with unpredictable support for a party – or very low, 
when the medium is fully neutral (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2007: 42–43). Therefore, 
some Polish media outlets are characterized by external pluralism, while others 
have internal pluralism.
Internal pluralism may be particularly noticeable in the case of tabloids 
(Wojdyła, 2011: 23) and the television station Polsat which is one of the most 
popular stations in Poland (Nowak, 2014: 190–195). The pluralism of opinion 
presented by these media can be manifested in a greater variety of political 
viewpoints than in the case of other media. According to Jakubowicz, despite the 
observable changes in the field of media tabloidization or commercialization, and 
thus processes that in a way lead to de-politicizing media coverage, many print 
media in Poland are still acting in an opinion-forming manner, representing spe-
cific groups or political ideas (2003: 238). For example, Gazeta Wyborcza has a 
Róa Norström - 978-3-631-79027-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 12/03/2020 01:06:53PM by A.Gorlikowski@peterlang.com
via Peter Lang AG and Adam Gorlikowski
The Polish media system 27
center-left orientation showing voluntary support for the Civic Platform, while 
Gazeta Polska Codziennie and Nasz Dziennik are right-wing national dailies 
(Bajomi-Lazar, 2014: 110). There is also political polarization in the case of press 
weeklies. For example, Newsweek Polska supports the Civic Platform, while Sieci 
and Do Rzeczy show sympathy for the Law and Justice, which is reflected in the 
content presented by these media. In turn, regional press dailies remain in the 
hands of foreign owners such as Poland Press (Polska Press), which is a part of 
the German media group Verlagsgruppe Passau (Szynol, 2011: 242), and there-
fore it is possible to observe escapism in their content and less interest in politics 
(Sobera, 2017: 97). The fact that media are in the hands of foreign owners does 
not necessarily mean that they will be apolitical, as exemplified by Newsweek 
and TVN which both show support for the Civic Platform. Despite there being 
private and foreign owners on the media market, political- and commentary-
oriented journalism can still be found there.
The diversity of the Polish media system, which on the one hand is fairly 
commercialized (Nowak, 2014: 183), while also being quite strongly politicized, 
makes it describable as a hybrid (see Voltmer, 2008: 23–24; Dobek-Ostrowska, 
2012:  49; Mancini, 2015). The diverse character of the national media system 
may make the coverage of the conflict in Ukraine look different depending on 
the studied medium. Moreover, although the analyzed event has an international 
character, and that the level of political parallelism of the media should not play 
a key role in this case, it is seems that it could in fact have affected how the con-
flict and its parties were described. This is due to the fact that, especially in the 
case of public media, as well as those providing voluntary or conditional support 
to certain political parties (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2007: 42–43), it is possible that 
the discourse of political actors can influence the media coverage and vice versa. 
Consequently, both discourses may complement each other, and one of them 
may play a more dominant role.
The interaction and mutual influence between political and media discourse 
is in some sense quite obvious. The question is rather – how does the content 
presented by the media affect the audience? Of course, certain media target, 
for example ideologically, a given group of recipients to which they direct 
their message. In turn, these recipients, for example by buying a newspaper or 
viewing a given TV station or program, can manifest their interest and support 
for the medium’s perspective. It is worth remembering that the audience tends 
to accept the perspective visible in the media coverage – especially when the 
recipients cannot verify the information in any other way, for example due to 
geographic distance or language differences. Besides, although the described 
results of the international research showed that the impact of political actors 
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on the domestic media may be relatively low, it is possible that in the case 
of events that are relevant to the so-called raison d’état, this impact might 
be higher. Such an event for Poland is undoubtedly the Russian-Ukrainian 
conflict. Moreover, in a time of armed conflict, national interest, patriotism 
and general ethnocentrism seem to exert stronger influence on journalists 
(Sreedharan, 2013: 457). That is why domestic journalists may in this way be 
more subjected to social influence on their work. Analyzes of the journalistic 
culture in Poland showed that among the factors influencing the selection of 
topics presented by the media – “audience interest” and “needs and interests 
of society” are considered by journalists as important (Nygren, 2015:  140). 
Therefore, the newsroom’s consideration of the recipients’ opinions, especially 
in a situation that is socially significant – and the Ukrainian conflict is surely 
that kind of situation – may make the audience’s influence important. It should 
be remembered that the journalists’ work is not only affected by the editorial 
line or the business model of the medium, but also by national or other group 
affiliations. Nygren notes that the audience can have an impact in the sense 
that the media need to adapt their content to market expectations (2015: 140–
141). But in the case of the social environment it seems much more difficult 
than in the case of the economic or political one, to explain to what extent this 
factor actually affects media content. However, it is recognized by journalists 
as one of the most important elements in this respect.
The character of the Polish media system and the external environment’s 
potential influence on it shows that when analyzing the coverage and domes-
tication of an international event by national media, it is necessary to consider 
several different factors. These factors can, to a greater or lesser extent, have an 
impact on the perspective of the Russian-Ukrainian dispute that is presented by 
the media, as well as its general perception.
1.3  The role of the media in the conflict
The media influence on the perception of wars and armed conflicts by the society 
or political actors, as well as the impact of social and political discourse on the 
media discourse has been fairly widely presented in the scientific literature. 
Much attention has been devoted to the presentation of the external disputes by 
journalists, as well as those in which the country of the certain media outlet took 
part or was strongly involved in. Considering the fact that the Russian-Ukrainian 
conflict is an external conflict for Poland, albeit having a strong impact on the 
country’s situation, attention will be paid to the way media present that kind of 
foreign events, as well as the reasons for the journalists’ interest in covering them.
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1.3.1  The media coverage of conflicts
McCombs and Shaw believe that society not only learns about certain issues 
from the media, but is also affected by how much attention the media gives these 
issues (1972). Different variables determine how important and interesting an 
event is for journalists to cover. Taking into account the fact that in most cases 
the covered wars and armed conflicts are foreign events, it seems important to 
pay attention to what affects the value of international situations from the per-
spective of the media.
A distinction between the elements that determine how foreign events are 
presented can be made between event-oriented and context-oriented factors 
(Zerback and Holzleitner, 2018: 367). The first of the concepts refers to the nature 
of the event itself and its newsworthiness, for example its negative consequences, 
sensationalism, relevance, topicality, deviance, and how extraordinary it is (see 
Chang et al., 1987; Shoemaker and Cohen, 2006). In the case of context-oriented 
elements, also defined as relation-oriented factors (see Zerback and Holzleitner, 
2018: 369; Segev, 2015), the most important thing is the relations between the 
covering state and the covered state, which could affect the media’s interest in 
the given event. Political, economic, cultural and social factors as well as eco-
nomic proximity and similarity are taking into account in this aspect (Gross and 
Kopper, 2011: 92). It is assumed that these factors determine, on the one hand, 
the background and the source of the given information, and on the other hand, 
the relationship with the external environment (Golan et al., 2010: 263).
It seems that the context-oriented elements may have a greater significance 
in the case of covering foreign events such as armed conflicts. The context given 
could in this case be the involvement of the covering state in the dispute, both 
directly – for example militarily – and indirectly through territorial proximity 
and support. But the support can also be symbolic, given to the one of the parties 
to the conflict. Furthermore, the perception of the actors in the event may have 
an impact on the media interest in it. However, Cottle notes that the character of 
the armed conflict itself determines whether the media will be interested in it or 
not, and how the coverage will look (2009: 499). He believes that the new armed 
conflicts are characterized by a high level of violence (Cottle, 2009), which in 
the media’s point of view is related to negativity and sensationalism, and thus 
connected to event-oriented factors (Święs, 2007: 283). The brutal character of 
war may therefore be reflected in the brutality of the media coverage, which ac-
cording to Hodalska has been noticeable since the Gulf War (2006).
In Galtung and Ruge’s opinion, events that have negative consequences, for 
instance military operations, are rare and usually unexpected, and can therefore 
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more easily take the form of news (1965: 69–70). This is due to the fact that they 
are not common phenomena. Consequently, the media may be more interested 
in covering them than other issues. The event’s negativity can also be expressed 
by how it is referred to. Cox pays particular attention to the concept of war and 
the use of that term in the context of government actions (2016). One example is 
the so-called war on drugs, which showed that this concept has mostly negative 
connotations (Cox, 2016: 7), and can in turn influence the media coverage and 
the way it is perceived by the society. It seems that in combination with other 
criteria of newsworthiness, for example closeness – territorial, political or cul-
tural – the likelihood that a negative issue appears in the media increases.
Sreedharan notices that in the case of war journalism, the relationship between 
media discourse and political discourse can be strong, especially in the context 
of legitimizing the claims of the authorities and the way the “enemy” is portrayed 
(2013: 462). These types of activities can also be, or perhaps are primarily, notice-
able in the case of the external disputes (Liebes, 1992). The coverage of external 
disputes usually give a lot of focus to the actions of authorities at the national and 
international level. Similarly, the national media usually keep an eye on the cov-
erage by foreign media (Cottle, 2009: 501). Ross also points out that the media 
has an important role to play in international affairs – on the basis of their re-
porting people learn about what is happening in the world (2007), which can 
affect political decisions. In addition, taking into account the influence of the 
aforementioned elements, it is possible to conclude that the coverage of interna-
tional events may be influenced by external factors. That is why Shaw believes 
that modern wars are influenced by media organizations, as well as international 
institutions and society (2005).
The role of the media, as an actor or, in a sense, a participant in the dispute 
may be significant (Nohrstedt and Ottosen, 2014: 74). Taylor even pointed out 
that some wars may be conducted in a two-way manner – by the military and in 
the media (1997) – and thus there are two types of battlefields. The media can 
serve to strengthen the sense of fear in relation to the actions of a given entity, 
and can also be an instrument of the so-called information war, which can be 
exemplified by the conflict analyzed in this book. This way of conducting a war 
on two fronts was also described by Russ-Mohl (2013). The researcher wrote 
about two models of war coverage where two fronts exist at the same time – on 
the real battlefield and in the media (2013: 222–223). Russ-Mohl said that on 
each of these fronts there are two warring parties that compete against each other 
for various gains (2013). On the military front, Russ-Mohl lists such objectives 
as power and domination, while at the media level the warring parties strive for 
social attention and moral support (2013: 222). According to the researcher, the 
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two models for how the journalist can cover the war are as follows: either he re-
mains distanced and non-partisan, or he stays under the influence of his culture 
and community, and thus he takes a biased approach (2013: 223). The researcher 
referred, inter alia, to so-called embedded journalism and the American invasion 
of Iraq in 2003 (Russ-Mohl, 2013), where most of the American correspondents 
were accommodated in barracks, along with the army (Czapnik, 2007: 361). But 
strong relations between journalists and the fighting forces were already notice-
able as far back as World War I and II (McLaughlin, 2002: 58–63). The journalists 
in these conflicts mostly had access to information provided by the army, so the 
government to a large extent controlled what the media covered. As a result, the 
coverage was influenced by entities that were, de facto, parties to the dispute, and 
who could present the event according to their perspective in order to obtain the 
resources assumed in the second model.
The importance of the media in portraying international events means that 
the media who cover wars and armed conflicts could in a way be considered as 
similar to political actors (Szostok et al., 2016). Media outlets can be “directly 
and indirectly” involved in “conflict negotiation and resolution” (2016: 157). By 
presenting information in a specific way journalists can, for example, influence 
the decisions of other entities. According to Ottosen, journalists and the media 
are in fact parts of the “security policy environment” (2005: 12), and have an 
effect on the real world through their messages. The war in Vietnam and the 
so-called war on terror are good examples of how the media can also act as 
propagandists – both in the case of external and internal disputes (see Nohrstedt 
et al., 2000; Zelizer and Allan, 2002). Furthermore, propaganda it is one of the 
factors that, according to Ross, affects the media’s coverage of military operations 
(2007). This is due to the fact that the event may be presented in almost black 
and white way.
Hallin, when analyzing the American media’s coverage of the Vietnam war, 
formulated a theory of three spheres of influence – consensus, legitimate con-
troversy, and deviance  – which also had to do with the relationship between 
political/elite and media discourse (1986). In the first sphere there is a general 
agreement about some issues that are not questioned at all, which manifests 
itself in a passive or even propagandist type of coverage (see Hallin, 1986; Hallin, 
2013: 99). Hallin exemplifies this type of media behavior with how war was cov-
ered up until 1968, when the media supported the authorities’ perspective (1986). 
The sphere of legitimate controversy includes everything that can be subject to 
public debate and disagreement, and journalists take a neutral watchdog role 
(Hallin, 1986). The sphere of deviance covers issues that are deemed unimpor-
tant or unacceptable to be brought up in public debate, and if they are brought 
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up they are usually condemned. Hallin’s spheres are described in reference to an 
international dispute where the national army was involved, but it seems that 
this concept can also be used in cases where the media cover external disputes. 
Moreover, the war coverage proposed by Russ-Mohl (2013) seems to somewhat 
reflect Hallin’s spheres  – especially the first two. Therefore, in the case of the 
sphere of consensus, the mainstream media – despite their internal differences – 
can cover international issues in the same way, for example through the prism 
of national prejudices and the government line. When it comes to the sphere of 
legitimate controversy, the opposite can occur.
Besides the propaganda role of the media, Ross (2007) when referring to inter-
national research on conflict coverage, also mentioned such issues as the pres-
sure and influence of political actors – as well as the foreign policy of the country, 
economic issues  – expressed by the popularity of a given event, social norms 
and emotions (Aslam, 2014: 19). The researcher pointed out that the media may 
cover the conflict in a way that serves the real or hidden goals of the players 
involved in the dispute (see Ross, 2007; Aslam, 2014), which is to some extent the 
result of the factors she mentioned. That is why Galtung believes that the con-
temporary media coverage of armed conflicts is in general war-oriented (2006), 
which therefore coincides with the elements of conflict reporting presented by 
Ross (2007).
Galtung proposed two forms of covering military action – war and peace jour-
nalism – and examined the different behaviors of journalists during the coverage 
of wars (2006). Due to the Polish media’s level of political parallelism, and the 
tendency of some journalists to present messages in line with political discourse, 
as well as the relatively negative way that Russia is perceived, it is assumed that 
the model of war journalism would fit best with the coverage of the dispute. It 
should be noted that the characteristics of Galtung’s concepts of war and peace 
journalism are based on four contrasting points (2006). War journalism is war/
violence-oriented, propaganda-oriented, elite-oriented and victory-oriented, 
while peace journalism is people-oriented, solution-oriented, truth-oriented and 
generally peace-oriented (see Galtung, 2006; Nohrstedt and Ottosen, 2014: 86). 
It could perhaps be assumed that war-oriented journalism is more common than 
the peace-oriented type, especially in the case of mainstream media coverage of 
modern conflicts. This is because large media organizations – for example due to 
connections with national and transnational political actors and organizations, 
the domination of Western standards in war journalism, or simply because of the 
profit motive – are more interested in showing the conduct of the dispute rather 
than investigating its causes and how it could be ended peacefully. It might 
even be the case that the media can have the effect of fueling conflicts instead of 
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finding a way to make peace. For some media that are loyal to the government, 
though, that depends on the solution preferred by the national authorities.
There is no doubt that the media coverage of war determines the way in which 
the event and also the entities participating in it is seen by the recipients, who in 
turn may in some way influence how the dispute will develop and perhaps end 
(Eskjaer et  al., 2015). It is also recognized that the coverage of foreign events 
may be related to the foreign policy of the covering state, which is manifested 
by negative reporting on countries defined as our enemies, and our allies being 
portrayed positively (see Bennett, 1990; Wanta, 2012: 47). This is related to the 
propaganda element of conflict reporting and thus its more war-oriented pur-
pose. Many researchers point out that journalists rarely or very seldom present 
armed disputes in a neutral way (see Gamson et al., 1992; Ross, 2003), which is 
both noticeable in the case of conflicts in which their country takes part, as well 
as where they do not. Zelizer and Allan note that this is most noticeable in the 
first case when the journalists’ state is at war (2002). Therefore, being personally 
involved in a given event can influence the journalist’s actions and the role he 
plays, which in this situation may change from neutral observer to participant 
(see Tumber, 2004: 202; Russ-Mohl, 2013).
According to Rodgers, the journalist should “report the story, don’t become 
it” (2012: 118–119), which means that the reporter should remain independent 
even when he might be a real victim of an event – as in the case of American 
journalists after the terrorist attacks on 9/11 (2012: 107). Being on the spot and 
observing an event and violence from the perspective of an eyewitness can also 
strongly influence the journalists’ behavior (Knightley, 2003: 428), even if their 
country is not in fact at war (Bogdanov and Giergiel, 2007: 325). Barnes writes 
about the trauma of being an eyewitness to conflicts (2013), saying that this is 
one of the real threats not only to the journalist’s own well-being, but also to the 
objectivity of his work. Seeing the research on how journalists are affected by 
conflict reporting and other traumatic events, one indeed gets the impression 
that trauma could have set its mark on the coverage (see Joelving, 2010; Smith 
et al., 2015).
An important factor of conflict reporting is the visual images of the conflict, 
its parties and its consequences. Of course, technological development plays an 
important role in this. Nowadays, more and more content appears first on the 
internet, and it seems like the work of citizen journalists can affect the recip-
ient even more because they are not usually censored in any way (Matheson 
and Allan, 2012: 130). Visual images of war not only say something about what 
the event is about and how it should be understood, but also call out the audi-
ence to take moral responsibility for what is happening (Chouliaraki, 2009: 521). 
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According to Iyengar and Simon, the media coverage of the Gulf War affected 
how people imagined that it could be brought to an end (1993). The survey 
conducted among media consumers showed that the people who often watched 
content involving military activities also opted for a military solution to the con-
flict (Iyengar and Simon, 1993). The coverage of this event took the form of a 
reality show running 24 hours per day, and the journalists decided the image 
of the war that the audience was presented with (Hedges, 2002: 142–143). That 
meant that the recipients were overwhelmed with materials from the battlefield, 
which could have affected how the whole war was perceived. Zelizer points to 
the fact that images can be used to increase sympathy toward the victims of the 
conflict – exemplified by the coverage of the Bosnian war – as well as increasing 
negative feelings toward “enemies”  – like in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars 
(2004: 131). Information can also be manipulated by a dramatic sort of framing 
(Capeloa Gil, 2013: 34) – something that might be connected with sensation-
alism. Framing armed conflicts in a sensational way is commonplace (Yang Lai 
Fong, 2009: 19). However, for the purpose of my study it seems more interesting 
to explore how images can help recipients identify who is the aggressor and who 
is the victim of the conflict.
The demonizing and dehumanizing of the enemy is one of the most impor-
tant elements of the conflict reporting (see Wolsfeld, 2004:  23; Galtung, 
2006). Journalists can take a hostile approach to a perceived enemy not only 
in the case of disputes that concern the reporting country directly, but other 
conflicts as well – as can be seen in the Polish media’s coverage of the Russian-
Ukrainian conflict. It seems that the concept of the enemy in war journalism 
can be defined in a symbolic or more factual way as an opponent on the front. 
However nowadays, for example due to hybrid conflicts, it is not clear how to 
define the front itself. Ottosen, when describing the coverage of four inter-
national disputes by the Norwegian media, refers to the dispositional enemy 
image (1995). This enemy is usually presented through negative national or 
religious stereotypes, and with linguistic and visual mechanisms that lead to 
this actor being demonized (1995: 101). The researcher exemplifies the dis-
positional enemy with the case of martial law in Poland, where Norwegian 
journalists were not critical against sources that confirmed their expecta-
tions – in this case that an invasion by the Soviets was impending (Ottosen, 
1995: 102–103). They were disposed from the start to think that the Soviet 
Union would use military force against Poland, and so they neglected to 
apply proper criticism to those sources that only confirmed this view. McNair 
reached a similar conclusion when he examined the way in which the actions 
of the Soviet Union were portrayed by the British television news (1988). The 
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researcher found that in the media content there was a stereotypical and hos-
tile attitude to the Soviets, as well recognizing their actions as threatening 
(McNair, 1988).
What is presented as hostile and threatening can be strongly marked by 
prejudices and stereotypes, which is noticeable in Poland’s relations with the 
parties to the analyzed conflict, especially with Russia (Błuszkowski, 2003). Taras 
goes so far as to speak about hatred in the Polish-Russian relations, which in his 
opinion is the result of specific historical events (2015). In turn, Zabrowarny 
notes that although there is also hostility in the case of Polish-Ukrainian rela-
tions (2003: 15–17), it is not as bad as in the case of the relations with Russia. 
Therefore, it is possible that usage of hostile schemes by the Polish media in the 
course of presenting a dispute may be noticeable.
Wolsfeld, when writing about the role of ethnocentric factors in the reporting 
of armed conflicts, points out that the main purpose of the media is to bru-
talize one side and to show the suffering of the other, usually our, side (2004: 23). 
Everything depends on how “we” will be defined. It can be defined simply as 
our state, or more symbolically as a larger structure that the state is a part of, for 
example a civilization or an international or regional organization. This does not 
however change the fact that when the media show an armed conflict through 
the prism of “us” versus “them”, it may lead to news bias, which in war reporting 
seems like quite a common occurrence.
Carpentier says that the journalist is always located between two discourses – 
the enemy and the victim  – which means that the parties to the dispute are 
usually evaluated on the basis of a dichotomy (2005). It is assumed that war 
journalism itself is dichotomous, because it presents the event as a zero-sum 
situation, as well as points out that only one side  – usually “we”  – is telling 
the truth (see Galtung, 2006; Ottosen, 2005). Sreedharan wrote about patri-
otism and national interest and its influence on the work of war correspondents 
(2013: 457). Ethnocentrism, which is one of the elements influencing interna-
tional news flow (Galtung and Ruge, 1965:  67) may also affect war coverage 
through the prism of “us/victims” versus “them/enemies” at the national level. 
This is due to the fact that international or generally foreign media may also be 
involved in the nationalization of propaganda discourse, for example through 
overstated negativism towards the “enemy” actions or the personalization of 
threats (Nohrstedt et al., 2000).
The perception of the parties to the dispute in the above mentioned way is also 
something that concerns domestication. Domestication connects the coverage 
with the media system, and its role in war reporting will be elaborated on in the 
next subsection.
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1.3.2  The domestication of conflicts
Domestication is a technique and media strategy relating to the way foreign 
events are covered by the national media (Hjarvard, 2001:  32). It means that 
the audience can understand and interpret it similarly as if the events would 
have been domestic (Riegert, 2011). Considering the fact that wars and armed 
conflicts can be counted among international events, it is obvious that domesti-
cation can also be used in their coverage – especially when the dispute concerns 
our country in some way and its parties are perceived in a specific way by us.
Olausson lists three types of domestication – (1) introverted domestication, 
which differentiates local (domestic) from the global; (2) extroverted domestica-
tion that combines local (domestic) with global; and (3) counter-domestication, 
which leads to deterritorialization and misses the local (domestic) reference 
(2013: 715). In the case of the third type of domestication, attention is paid to 
universal values shared by the majority of the world community. The researcher 
refers in this context to the existence of a global identity (Olausson, 2013: 720). 
The distinction between different types of domestication shows that it can be 
understood differently. However, in most of the studies on news domestica-
tion, attention is usually paid to elements that connect the analyzed event to the 
countries where the information about it is published. This is what the second 
type of domestication is all about, and it seems to meet the assumptions of 
this study.
Even if the foreign events covered by the domestic media do not concern the 
audience directly, they can start to be interested in them anyway. This is due 
to the fact that the recipient is able to notice a link between the described sub-
ject and himself or his country. Therefore, how information is valued plays an 
important role (Sumpter, 2009: 1003–1005). Increasing the level of interest in 
the issue may be possible on the basis of some kinds of connections and simi-
larities. If such a connection is seen, the consumer decides to devote more time 
to absorb the information. According to Gurevitch et al., an element that has a 
major impact on the effectiveness of the described process is cultural, ideolog-
ical and historical ties (1991: 195–216). These ties can result from a common 
historical experience or territorial location. Regionalism in the coverage is one 
of the factors that can determine the public interest in the presented issues. This 
is due to the fact that the audience is more interested in events that happen in 
neighboring countries or in the same geographical region (Lee et al., 2017: 905).
Similarities may also come from globalization (Lee, 2005), which is a pro-
cess where economic and social links that have a transcontinental or interre-
gional character are created (Held et al., 1999). The domestic media may be 
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interested in publishing information about countries that are economically or 
politically important to them in some way. Belonging to the same international 
organizations or having specific inter-state agreements are examples of such 
important connections. That it is why the political and economic connections 
resulting from globalization can serve to domesticate a certain issue. This may 
also be reflected in the global content presented by the national media, which 
in result can be glocalized – for example, through the translation of interna-
tional information into national languages (Taradai, 2012: 21). In this way, the 
information is better understood by the recipient and consequently becomes 
closer to him.
Although the national media cover global topics, the perspective will 
always differ depending on who creates and presents the information (Gomez 
Rodriguez, 2007:  52). According to Thompson, how certain information is 
covered always depends on the specific socio-cultural or historical context 
(1995: 174). The journalist is part of the certain society and interprets events ac-
cording to a certain system of values. Therefore, the same international event can 
be portrayed differently in different countries (Riegert, 2011: 172). In the case 
of domestication of global news, journalists use frames to shorten the distance 
between the recipient and the specific material. It is done by referencing the 
values shared in society and through cognitive schemes. In this way, information 
becomes understandable and relevant to the audience (Clausen, 2004), because 
they are able to understand and decode the message contained in the material 
(Taradai, 2012: 20). The process of decoding is therefore very important in the 
case of domestication. It helps in finding connections between the contexts used 
by the journalist and the presented event. If such connections are found, it has 
a particular effect on the recipient. Typically, this effect manifests itself in the 
form of commitment, and causes increased interest in the subject presented in 
the material.
According to Chyliński and Russ-Mohl, the public’s understanding of the 
information and hence its validity is based on several key elements (2008). Even 
though the authors do not use the term itself, it seems that these factors can be 
seen as variables having to do with domestication. In their book, these variables 
are proximity, status and identification (2008:  126–130). In the case of these 
elements, attention shall be given to the geographical, political, cultural, social 
(personal) and emotional links (Chyliński and Russ-Mohl, 2008: 126–130). On 
this basis, the information is assessed by the recipient. The authors note that the 
value of the information is greater when it affects the recipients in some way and 
becomes essential for them (2008: 127). This is the case for both national as well 
as foreign information.
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It seems, however, that generating interest in the consumers is more diffi-
cult when it comes to the coverage of foreign events  – for example wars. On 
the other hand, some recipients might be interested in armed conflicts gener-
ally, even those that are not happening close to them. Of course, the interest 
in these events may be greater when the audience is able to identify some kind 
of connections to the described issue – for example economic or political rela-
tions with a state that is somehow involved in it – for example as a party to the 
dispute (Wasburn, 2002). It is important in this case to pay attention to related-
oriented news factors, which determine the interest of the national media in cov-
ering international events. A good example of this type of relationship is when 
domestic military troops engage in foreign armed conflicts or peacekeeping 
missions – like Polish military being present in Afghanistan, Iraq and Mali as a 
part of interventions by NATO and the European Union. In the first two cases 
in particular, they were covered quite a lot in the Polish media, especially in the 
beginning (see Szmidt, 2007; Matuszak, 2014), because of the presence of Polish 
soldiers on the spot, but not only for that reason. These were concrete links to 
the events abroad, but in the case of domestication, the media also might refer to 
other – more symbolic – elements, such as a common set of values (see counter-
domestication) or a common understanding of the “enemy”. Therefore, it seems 
important to pay attention to the mechanisms that can be used by the journalists 
to bring the event – especially wars and armed conflicts – closer to the audience.
Issues of a historical and cultural nature represent some of the most effi-
cient domestication mechanisms, and can take the form of cognitive schemas 
(Goffman, 1974) that are useful in understanding information in a certain way. 
This is especially helpful in understanding the context of the events (Gurevitch 
et  al., 1995). Referencing historical experiences, for example a specific event 
or entity, gives the situation a certain meaning. Gurevitch et  al. says that one 
example of such a mechanism might be the Holocaust for Israelis (1995). The use 
of historical frames by a journalist may make the recipient able to automatically 
assign a specific characteristic to a given event. On this basis it will be possible 
to make a faster and unequivocal assessment. This can help to determine the 
proximity of the event – if it is connected to us or not. That is, whether there is 
a mutual historical fate between the covering state and the parties to the dispute 
or not.
Another important factor may also be if – according to the media – the con-
flict to some extent resembles other disputes, in which the covering state took 
part. On this basis it is possible to create a kind of emotional connection that 
may be associated with compassion or hatred. Therefore, historical frames can 
also be used by journalists to evaluate the actors involved through the prism 
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of “us” versus “them” or “victims” versus “enemies”. This is due to the fact that 
by referring to the past events in which the state covering the conflict was also 
a victim of the actions of one of the parties to the dispute, it is possible to ap-
peal to the bond of having a common enemy. It seems that this is an important 
factor that can make the conflict more easily domesticated by journalists and 
that can increase social interest in the event and make it perceived as having 
similar importance as domestic events. Therefore, the effectiveness of such 
techniques can be strengthened by there being a real relationship between the 
country that uses domestication and the country which the information is about. 
It seems that such mechanisms can be visible in the case of the coverage of the 
Russian-Ukrainian conflict by the Polish media. That is why domesticating mil-
itary disputes by referring to history seems to be an important technique used 
by the media.
Taradai notes that the Ukrainian media used a comparison of the Battle of 
Tskhinvali to the Battle of Stalingrad to imply for the audience who the aggressor 
and who the victim was (2014: 74). In this way society was able to decode and 
assess both the actors and the incident. It seems that in this way – through the 
ability to understand the phenomenon and its origin, as well as the evaluation 
of individual actors – the audience may perceive the event as more relevant to 
them. However, it should be considered if the use of historical mechanisms by 
the media might distort the general opinion about the war, since references to 
historical experiences may result in specific – positive or negative – evaluations 
of the event and the actors involved. By only selecting negative examples, the 
content can become misleading and biased. Therefore, although historical factors 
are an important element of domestication, they can also be considered as one of 
the significant problems that the strategy produces.
Whether it is perceived as “our” or “their” dispute may also result from geo-
graphical location, security issues and emotions. It can be said that in the case of 
conflicts that take place near the borders of our country and which may have a 
real impact on our situation, domestication is not needed that much. However, 
Taradai, who studied the coverage of the conflict in South Ossetia in 2008 by the 
Ukrainian media, notes that a domestication of this dispute occurred (2014). 
This was partly due to the nature of the relations between Ukraine and the 
parties to the conflict. It was also associated with a fear of the conflict spreading 
to Ukrainian territory, and this was visible in the domestic coverage (Taradai, 
2014: 77). Fear resulting from the media presenting a possible threat of war can 
actually make the audience more interested in the dispute, even if the recipients’ 
state is not involved in the conflict. That feeling may also be a result of domesti-
cation. Therefore, fear of the negative consequences of the dispute is one of the 
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dominant mechanisms that serve to determine whether the conflict will be con-
sidered as “ours” or not. Qadir and Alasuutari, who studied how the term “the 
war on terror” was domesticated by the Pakistani media, noted that journalists 
were trying to domesticate it by invoking political and economic consequences 
for the country which resulted from terrorism (2013: 585–586). On this basis, 
the media tried to indicate to consumers that the “war on terror” affects them 
directly. It seems that precisely through doing this – indicating an actual or poten-
tial impact of foreign events on our lives – the recipients may feel connected to 
the event. The possible impact of the conflict on the economic or military secu-
rity of the domesticating state is therefore an important element of the strategy.
The authorities’ specific reactions to the existing situation  – for example 
calling a government meeting to discuss possible scenarios of the conflict and 
their influence on the country  – can also be used by journalists as a form of 
domestication of foreign activities. Recipients understand that if foreign actions, 
such as armed conflicts, require domestic politicians to take certain actions, 
it means that it concerns them as well. Also, frequently referencing domestic 
politicians’, experts’ or other domestic sources’ opinions about the event may 
elevate the sense of connection with it. If these actors speak about something, it 
is likely that it has some influence on the situation of the country. Therefore, the 
national or regional angle in the media coverage of international disputes may 
increase the effectiveness of the analyzed strategy (see Lee et al., 2017; Smolak, 
2016a). It also shows how the external environment of the media system – polit-
ical, economic or social – affects how national media cover foreign events. It may 
be that by presenting information on specific opinions or actions of political 
actors, the media – for example due to the level of political parallelism, which 
in the case of Poland is relatively high – may show support for the given enti-
ties, and also transmit their messages and certain perspective to the public. This 
is also noticeable in the case of the social impact on the journalists, who are 
members of a specific group, for example the nation. It may be that when domes-
ticating and covering a given event, the media adopts an attitude based precisely 
on this group affiliation. That is why using domestication and making it “our” 
conflict may also be a problem concerning journalistic objectivity.
It is noted that giving an ethnocentric character to foreign warfare by closing 
the distance between the recipient and the conflict or between the journalist 
and the event, can reduce professionalism. According to Nossek (2004), the 
more the coverage has a domestic character, the less professional it is. This is 
due to the fact that the media identify important problems from the point of 
view of their own society. Therefore, focusing only on information that can be 
easily interpreted by the audience, for example in accordance with a national 
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value system, may blur the overall context of the event (Gans, 1979). Some 
elements may be omitted, because of their incompatibility with the accepted 
way of understanding the events. Moreover, the necessity of domesticating for-
eign news and finding links to the national community may make the journalist 
take only a partial view of the events.
The degree of emotional involvement in the topic can also limit profession-
alism (Qadir and Alasuutari, 2013: 695). The journalist may think that in some 
sense he is also a party to the dispute, because the event affects his country. It is 
possible that in this way the reporter may fail as a neutral observer, assuming that 
is what he is trying to be. On the other hand, through the links resulting from 
recognizing a war as “our”, supporting the actor with whom we are somehow 
connected seems obvious. Therefore, covering an armed conflict only from the 
perspective of one side – the one with whom we are linked – may lead to bias. 
A similar situation may also arise in the case of referring to the impact of an 
event on the state’s security. When the journalists define a threat it can be exag-
gerated – especially in the case of tabloid media – and it serves mainly to show a 
possible connection with an event. As a result, although pointing to the possible 
effects of an armed conflict on national security is important, it can also lead to 
a situation where the society will not be able to assess the event from a broader 
perspective.
Emotions  – both connected with the aforementioned fear, as well as those 
involving, for example, compassion or hatred  – comprise another factor that 
may condition the domestication of foreign events by journalists. Qadir and 
Alasuutari, while describing the coverage of the “war on terror” by the Pakistani 
media and how it was domesticated, also mentioned victimization (2013). The 
media portrayed the Pakistanis as victims of terrorism (Qadir and Alasuutari, 
2013: 583). In this way, they sought to indicate that the “war on terror” was actu-
ally connected with their country, and the lives of citizens were at risk. Therefore, 
when examining the degree of domestication of a given conflict by the media, 
attention should also be paid to issues related to the possible suffering of victims, 
further reinforcing the information emotionally and psychologically.
Personalizing the story (Chyliński and Russ-Mohl, 2008: 130) by giving the 
tragic information a face may also make it more appealing to the recipient. On 
this basis it may be possible to identify both the problem and the person directly 
afflicted by it. In the case of war and similar events, being able to identify with 
the victim may make the recipient feel a strong bond with the portrayed person 
(Joye, 2015: 685). Joye stressed that strengthening domestication by appealing to 
emotion can be more effective when the victim of the event comes from the same 
country as the recipient (2015: 687). Then the distance between the audience and 
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the covered entity is further reduced. As a result, the degree of domestication of 
the event is greater. Moreover, when the citizens of our country are wounded or 
killed in a conflict, the authorities usually react to this situation somehow, and 
then it might become also “our conflict” (Smolak, 2016a) – due to the national 
angle. It is worth noting that by doing so – indicating that an international event 
may jeopardize the security of the citizens – there is in fact a possibility for the 
media to influence the actions of politicians (Entman, 2007). As a result, the link 
between the country and the phenomenon may be stronger. That is why, making 
content in such a way that it has an emotional impact on the audience seems to 
be one of the most effective mechanisms used by the media.
Joye describes the extent to which domestication of tragic events can influence 
public engagement (2015). He notes that the process of covering such events can 
have an impact on the emotions of consumers, including compassion for the 
“other” (2015: 692). Showing the suffering of people that we can identify with 
or with whom we are connected (Moeller, 1999), for example through a similar 
historical experience, can make us more engaged in their situation. Referring 
for example to the aggressive actions of an entity who is one of the parties to the 
conflict and who is perceived negatively by the domestic audience – because of 
past events – can invoke compassion and a sense of being a “victim” of this actor. 
Domestication can in that way be about defining and demonizing a common 
enemy, which as mentioned earlier is one of the key elements of conflict re-
porting. It can also make us devote more attention to assimilating information 
that relate to that kind of event, and we can also perceive it as similar to the 
national information. However, too much emotional involvement, resulting 
for example from the personalization of the story, or fear, is next to historical 
factors one of the significant problems of domestication. The perception of cer-
tain events or entities through the prism of feelings can make the judgment of 
these things misguided to some degree. That is to say, by recognizing these issues 
as important and directly related to us, we may not be able to assess the event and 
its consequences in an objective manner.
Another interesting issue arising from the use of domestication in the cov-
erage of military conflicts, is when specific social values are referenced. The 
values shared by society can make the coverage of some issues characterized by 
a national perspective (Hjarvard, 2001). This is also an expression of domestica-
tion. Riegert examined the coverage of four foreign military operations, such as 
the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, by the Swedish Television (SVT) (1998). 
She noticed that the medium was more critical of the state considered as the ag-
gressor than the BBC was (1998). The researcher points out that the differences 
resulted from discrepancies between the two countries in how they imagined the 
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resolution of those disputes (Riegert, 1998). Paying attention to specific elements 
of the conflict and giving them a certain socio-cultural context means that the 
public might become more interested in its course. However, it should be con-
sidered if interpreting foreign events through the journalist’s national standards 
is appropriate. The nature of armed conflict is not always so simple. Therefore, 
attempting to evaluate these events in accordance with your own national value 
system can lead to bias (Gans, 1979). However, it seems that this is common 
practice when the media portray armed conflicts.
Making judgements through a certain cultural view can also be trouble-
some – for example, an evaluation that is based on the “Western” value system. 
This can lead to generalization. This is quite important, especially when it comes 
to conflicts in countries that do not belong to Western civilization or that are 
somewhere on the civilization’s border. Interestingly, some kind of universali-
zation by referring to the existence of a global or regional identity in the case of 
such conflicts may also be the result of the described strategy, which is defined by 
Olausson as counter-domestication (2013: 71). Therefore, universalization may, 
for example, arise from referring to the “Western” value system while covering a 
conflict. Citizens of a country that belongs to the Western civilization can then 
start to perceive the conflict as important to them (see Qadir and Alasuutari, 
2013: 700) – especially when a group of countries, like the members of NATO 
or the European Union, get involved in resolving the dispute. This is similar to 
the case of Poland’s and other members of the European Union’s engagement in 
stabilizing the situation in Ukraine. It may make the recipient interested in the 
given event, which is important considering the possible social impact on the 
decision of political actors – especially in the context of a peaceful ending of a 
given dispute and minimizing the number of victims. However, giving impor-
tance to a foreign event only by a reference to the global or – like in the case of 
the conflict in Ukraine – a pan-European value system may still not make this 
event as important for the society as in the case of conflicts which are connected 
to the audience and their state directly. Therefore, it seems that in the case of cov-
ering the Russian-Ukrainian conflict by the Polish media, counter-domestication 
(Olausson, 2013) may be an additional option for the journalists, rather than 
their main method of domesticating the dispute.
The role of professed values and history in decoding the contexts used by 
journalists shows that domestication may be an unconscious process. It seems 
that it can be a very effective tool for manipulating consumers and their 
opinions about an event and its actors. Although a conflict might not directly 
affect a country, by referencing security, economy or other factors, journalists 
give people a reason to take more interest in this issue than might actually be 
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warranted. That is why domestication appears to be more effective in the case 
of regional events, because finding connections seems easier then. In the case of 
the Russian-Ukrainian conflict there are obvious connections to Poland, which 
makes it appear as not only an external conflict.
1.4  Analysis of earlier studies
The media coverage of warfare, as well as war journalism, is fairly extensively 
presented in scientific publications. This is particularly the case in the Anglo-
Saxon countries. There the professional experience of war journalism is much 
more developed than in Poland. Therefore, foreign scholars give much more at-
tention to this subject than domestic scientists. This in turn has an impact on the 
amount of earlier analyses that can be found devoted to the subject of my study.
The nature of the conflict – its hybridization and irregularity – means that 
the media coverage of it may differ from the coverage of other conflicts. It 
seems that the level of scientific interest in this subject should therefore be high. 
Indeed, many foreign analyzes devoted to this issue have been made, but only 
few have been done by Polish or Central and Eastern European scientists. One 
of the reasons for this may be the fact that this conflict is a relatively new event, 
which more or less intensively is still ongoing. Moreover, its hybridity makes 
the conflict difficult for a complete and reliable scientific analysis. On the other 
hand, the ability to determine how and by what mechanisms the media covered 
it seems very interesting, because of the impact of the external environment on 
the functioning of the media system. The level of politicization of certain media 
sectors, and their business models, can also affect the coverage. It was decided to 
present the overall results of previously conducted research about the examined 
subject. In that way it will be possible to check and compare the coverage of the 
Russian-Ukrainian conflict by the Polish media in different periods of time. It 
will also be possible to check how the coverage of the event varied between the 
analyzed media outlets and the international ones.
While reviewing the research, only analyzes in Polish and English were 
included, due to my language capabilities. It might be problematic that studies 
made in other languages were left out, but accessing and understanding them 
would be very difficult or even impossible. That is why it was decided to 
omit them.
The international research devoted to the media coverage of the conflict 
in Ukraine was led for example by Roman, Wanta and Buniak (2017). They 
checked how events that occurred in Ukraine from April 2014 to March 2015 
were covered and framed by the most popular Russian (Vremya by Channel 
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One Russia), Ukrainian (TSN by 1+1) and American (Nightly News by NBC) 
television news programs (2017: 364–365). The research focused for instance on 
how the dispute and sides of the conflict were defined. The analysis confirmed 
that the coverage of the situation in Ukraine depends on the opinions presented 
by domestic political actors and the involvement of the states in the conflict. 
Therefore, NBC showed the dispute in a relatively neutral way, while Russian 
and Ukrainian television programs showed mutual dislike in their content 
(Roman et al., 2017).
The book Media and the Ukraine Crisis: Hybrid Media Practices and Narratives 
of Conflict (Global crises and the Media) includes studies about the information 
management, the role of the internet – civic journalism and blogosphere – as 
well as the classical conflict coverage by Russian, Finnish, Estonian, German 
and Polish media, both in press and television (Pantti, 2016). This book is an 
important collection of research relating in almost a holistic way to the role of 
the media in presenting events in Ukraine. Importantly, the media coverage 
and framing of the conflict by Polish (Polityka and Newsweek), Russian (Profil 
and Russkij Reporter) and German (Der Spiegel and Focus) weekly political 
magazines, as well as the role of the media in acting as a link between political 
and social opinions, was also presented in the publication (Szostok et al., 2016). 
Analyzes conducted from April to May 2014 and from February to May 2015 
showed that the Russian and German media demonstrated more interest in the 
events in Ukraine than Poland  – the Polish media also covered Russia in the 
most negative way (Szostok et al., 2016). They indicated that this state is to blame 
for the dispute, and that perspective was a reflection of the current political and 
social views, as well as historical factors.
The media coverage of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in the context of the 
ideological dispute between Russia and the West was also presented in the 
research. Boyd-Barrett drew attention to the narratives created by the American 
and British mainstream media about the causes of the dispute and actors taking 
part in it (2017). The author pointed out that the Western media’s coverage of 
the conflict contained elements of hegemonic competition between Russia and 
the Western World  – mainly the United States  – thus producing propaganda 
against Russia (2017). This was manifested by a focus on Ukraine’s will to join the 
European Union and NATO and demonizing Russia’s role as a country attacking 
an independent state.
Pasitselska, by analyzing the coverage of the event by Russian TV stations – 
Channel One and Russia-1 – from November 2013 to the end March 2014, con-
firmed that the materials contained issues relating to ideological factors – “we” 
versus “they” (2017: 595). It was seen in the context of the United States and 
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Europe supporting Ukrainian revolutionary activities, which contributed to the 
close ties between Russia and Ukraine ending. The way the researcher paid atten-
tion to the ideological aspect of the conflict coverage, in particular going beyond 
the political or military understanding of the dispute in terms of civil war or 
inter-state conflict – is an interesting approach to problem analysis. However, in 
the case of the West-Russia relations this is not really surprising.
A similar research result to those made by Pasitselska (2017) and Boyd-Barrett 
(2017) was also presented by Finnish researchers who studied the coverage and 
framing (visual and textual) of the conflict from February 2014 to February 
2015 – taking into account four specific events that occurred during this period, 
for example the MH17 catastrophe – by the German (Die Welt), Swedish (Dagens 
Nyheter), British (The Guardian) and Finnish (Helsingin Sanomat) media (see 
Ojala and Pantti, 2017; Ojala et al., 2017). It was shown that despite the national 
diversity of the analyzed media, pro-Ukrainian and pro-European geopolit-
ical narratives prevailed in the coverage, while the actions of Russia and Putin 
were criticized, which was the result of the media belonging to the Western civ-
ilization. Because some of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, such 
as Poland, are rather influenced by Western civilization, it is possible that the 
references to the conflict of values described by Pasitselska (2017) and Boyd-
Barrett (2017), was visible also in the coverage of the dispute by these states.
In turn, the domination of the pro-Russian perspective in the Russian media, 
especially television, as well as their propaganda function, was examined by 
Strovsky (2015). The researcher, referring to the coverage of the annexation of 
Crimea and Euromaidan, said that the media behaved as propagandists, re-
flecting only the Kremlin’s views (2015). Therefore, the audience had access 
mainly to the official position of the government.
A comparative content analysis of quality newspapers from 13 countries 
such as: Albania, Czech Republic, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Ukraine and Russia, 
was carried out by a research team supervised by Fengler (2018). Two best-selling 
newspapers with different political angles per country were analyzed, and 
Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita were chosen for the study in Poland. 
These two dailies were also chosen by me for my study. The project’s analysis 
included four events which took place in Ukraine from February to May 2014 
(Fengler et al., 2018) and showed that cultural and geographical proximity, as 
well as political and economic issues affected the coverage. International pol-
itics, and economy in the case of Poland, were the most frequently covered 
topics, and the Polish and German coverages were characterized by “high at-
tention to the conflict” (Fengler et  al., 2018). Therefore, it is possible to talk 
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about a domestication of the dispute by the media from certain countries. 
Russian political actors dominated the coverage and Russia was personified 
by Vladimir Putin (Fengler et al., 2018).
The online coverage of the situation in Ukraine was also the subject of for-
eign analyzes. The impact on the social perception of the dispute was addressed 
through studying the presentation of visual narratives, the personalization of 
journalistic content and the role of reporters. Having analyzed the Twitter ac-
counts of several Western journalists and how they used photographs from 
the field, Pantti pointed to the three roles of reporters:  1) information inter-
preter – using images that illustrate the content; 2) moral agent – personalizing 
the message and instigating a moral discussion; 3)  self-promotion  – focusing 
on showing the reporting process more than the information itself (2017: 18). 
The role of foreign correspondents in showing the conflict on Twitter was also 
examined in the case of Finnish journalists. Ojala, Pantti and Kangas concluded 
that the reporters mainly used their accounts to emphasize their professional 
expertise and to interact with other correspondents – and in that way they act 
more like community-builder journalists than disseminators, interpreters or 
advocates (2018: 308–309). Both studies show that the role of journalists in con-
flict reporting is seen as similar despite the technological differences of working 
in traditional and social media.
Among the analyzes devoted to the coverage of the war in Donbass in social 
media  – especially in the context of the presence and interpretation of visual 
frames – there were also studies dedicated to how the dispute was presented and 
understood in pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian communities on the Vkontakte 
portal (Makhortykh and Sydorova, 2017). The research carried out showed 
differences between the groups, and that the frames used on the internet could 
have been a reflection of information coming from the mainstream media. 
In addition, it was noted that frames with a negative angle  – for example, 
presenting death – were more interesting to the users, and in particular to the 
pro-Russian side.
Although the main subject of my study is the media coverage of the con-
flict in Ukraine, it will also analyze the role of the journalists. Analyzes by for-
eign researchers, such as Pantti (2017), were about this aspect, but the Finnish 
researcher mainly looked at online media, and these will not be examined in this 
book. The role of the journalists in covering the Ukrainian dispute, both in national 
and regional television, press and internet media, was presented by Orlova (2016). 
After conducting 47 interviews with journalists from 42 Ukrainian media outlets, 
she showed that although the respondents were aware of the need to maintain 
objectivity, their emotional involvement in the event – which was manifested, for 
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example, in the underrepresentation of the pro-Russian point of view – could have 
influenced the coverage (2016: 19). Moreover, Orlova asked journalists about the 
professional standards, work pressure – external and internal – and their expe-
rience from working at the front (2016). From that she found out which factors 
could have affected the presentation of the dispute to the greatest extent.
Studies devoted to the media coverage of the conflict were usually conducted by 
foreign researchers, which is demonstrated by the analyzes described above. A lot of 
research has been done by Finnish researchers like Pantti and Ojala. Having checked 
how many studies on this subject has been carried out in Poland or about the Polish 
media in general, it was found that this type of work is scarce. The analyses which 
were made about this issue were usually related to the press and sometimes online 
coverage, rarely to television, which shows that there is a need to supplement the 
state of research. On the other hand, the earlier analyzes only look at a short part of 
the conflict – two or three months. Therefore, it is difficult to observe how the infor-
mation about the dispute was made and for how long it was covered.
The research project “Polish press discourse on the conflict in Ukraine. 
Comparative perspective 2014–2015” conducted by the University of Warsaw, 
concerned the media coverage of the events in the Crimea in February and March 
2014 and 2015. The study analyzed 50 newspapers  – both daily newspapers 
and magazines  – with the highest readership and sales (Laboratorium Badań 
Medioznawczych, 2017a: 4). The terms and metaphors used to describe the dis-
pute were analyzed, because they could have a significant impact on how the 
event was perceived. Therefore, content analysis and narrative and discourse 
analysis were used in the study. On this basis it was possible to notice that the 
journalists perceived Russia in a negative way, and that they also did not devote 
that much attention to the causes and effects of the event (Laboratorium Badań 
Medioznawczych, 2017a). In that way the information might have been simpli-
fied. The historical references presented in the media reports were also analyzed. 
It was possible to observe to what extent these issues could have affected the cov-
erage, which was also studied by Szostok et al., who examined how the dispute 
was described by Polish, German and Russian weekly political magazines (2016). 
Interestingly, the Warsaw Laboratory of Media Studies has also conducted other 
research on the dispute in Ukraine. This was devoted for example to the public 
perception of internet memes on the conflict and its parties (Laboratorium Badań 
Medioznawczych, 2017b), and the opinion of over 1 600 Polish respondents on 
given actors’ responsibility for the dispute and the credibility of the media cov-
erage (Laboratorium Badań Medioznawczych, 2017c).
The coverage of the conflict in Ukraine by the Polish media was also exam-
ined as a part of an international research project organized by the Södertörn 
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University in Stockholm. “Ukraine 2014  – media war and the war in media” 
aimed to analyze the media coverage of the war from July to September 2014 
in Poland, Sweden, Ukraine and Russia – including quality newspapers, tabloids 
and television news programs (Nygren and Hök, 2016). Due to the fact that this 
project is the methodological basis of my study, more detailed information about 
it is presented in the next chapter. However, it is worth noting that the project 
showed how the same event was covered by the four different countries in relation 
to the political regimes and journalistic cultures. It is so far the only international 
project concerning the dispute in Ukraine which includes how the conflict was 
covered by the Polish media. It is also the only project that describes the coverage 
of the conflict both by Polish newspapers and television, and which also includes 
in-depth interviews with the journalists who covered the events in Ukraine.
Among the studies on the conflict’s coverage by the Polish media, there were 
also analyzes of the three most popular Polish web portals – Gazeta.pl, Onet.
pl and Wp.pl  – from February to April 2014 (Smolak, 2017:  67). The content 
and frame analysis of the events in Ukraine – especially the Crimean crisis – 
showed that the most often presented issues were the causes and the course of 
the dispute, and the tone of the conflict was pro-Ukrainian. This is the inverse 
of the press coverage presented in the studies made by the Laboratory of Media 
Studies (2017a). This might indicate some differences in the coverage of the dis-
pute between traditional and online media in Poland.
The earlier Polish and foreign studies dedicated to the media coverage of the 
conflict in Ukraine, showed that the scholars were often interested in different is-
sues, used different methods, research units, research periods, and had different 
ways of defining the dispute. The greatest differences that have been shown are 
those between traditional and online media. This is mainly due to the kind of con-
tent and the mechanisms used by the journalists to describe the examined issue. It 
seems interesting in the future to analyze both media groups simultaneously. On 
the other hand, it is equally important to check how the different types of media 
covered the Ukrainian crisis during the same time period. This will allow a fuller 
picture of the analyzed coverage. It should be noted that the state of Polish research 
regarding the media coverage of the dispute is relatively incomplete and needs to 
be supplemented – especially in the field of television and online coverage, as well 
as the role of the journalists. This book aims to fill in some of these gaps.
Summary
The way of presenting wars and armed conflicts by the media can be marked 
by history, geopolitics, interstate relations or the level of political parallelism of 
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media organizations. Also the nature of the described event itself can strongly 
determine the process of acquiring and presenting information about the event 
by journalists. This is due to the fact that the hybridity of the conflict in Ukraine 
is manifested both by the conflict on the military and media fronts. Therefore, 
paying attention to this fact may, for example, allow to understand to what 
extent the two-dimensional aspect of the dispute conditioned the work of Polish 
journalists  – especially in the context of the quotation and verification of the 
information sources used by them.
The reference to the Polish media system and its functioning also seemed 
important, because it may be one of the factors explaining the obtained results of 
empirical research – especially since the Polish media system, just like the con-
flict itself, has a hybrid character. Therefore, the way in which events in Ukraine 
can be covered may result from the relatively high political parallelism of some of 
the Polish media or their commercially-oriented activity, which will be checked 
in the next chapters of the book.
Finally, a reference to the theoretical aspect of the role of the media during 
the presentation of war activities – both to the coverage theory and the domes-
tication strategy – allows to understand what factors could affect the journalists’ 
interest in the analyzed in this book event, and how the media could shape 
information on this subject. For example, trying to reduce the gap between the 
recipient and the dispute. Also, the reference to external factors – including the 
influence of domestic and foreign political actors and the society – as well as 
the extent to which these elements may condition media action during conflict 
reporting, may help in understanding what was the role of Polish journalists 
during the coverage of events in Ukraine.
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The following chapter presents the methodology on which the results of the 
analysis described in the book are based. Attention will be focused on the 
description and characteristics of the research methods and tools used in the 
study, the selection of research material as well as the problems resulting from it 
and attempts to solve them. The applied tools and research methods will be used 
to answer the research questions and hypotheses, which will also be presented 
in this part of the study. Moreover, I will refer to the research project “Ukraine 
2014 – media war and the war in the media”, which is an important part of the 
methodology of the conducted research. However, it should be noted that my 
participation in this project meant that I had an influence on the choice of meth-
odology and research tools used in the analysis, and I was one of the persons 
responsible for conducting the research.
2.1  The theme, subject and aim of the research
The coverage of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict by the Polish media will be 
analyzed. It seems very important to show how the Polish media present the 
Ukrainian issue and at the same time whether and to what extent media dis-
course can influence political or social discourse and vice versa. The argument 
for writing about this topic is the fact that there is not much research devoted 
to the media coverage of this event made by Polish scholars. This is due to the 
fact that the war in Ukraine is a relatively new event, which is still underway. 
Therefore, the opportunity to examine the role of the media in it seems to be 
important and interesting.
The subject of the study are issues related to the Russian-Ukrainian con-
flict, which were presented by the Polish journalists from national daily 
newspapers, that is tabloids and quality newspapers, as well as from televi-
sion news programs. Attention will be given to how specific issues were cov-
ered, sources of information were used, the conflict was defined, as well as the 
way the parties to the conflict were presented. The subject of the study also 
includes the Polish journalists who covered the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. 
These journalists will be examined in terms of their role in the conflict and 
their level of work autonomy. This will be helpful in understanding the real 
causes and contexts connected with the coverage of the conflict by the chosen 
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The aim of the study is to describe how the Russian-Ukrainian conflict was 
covered by the Polish media in 2014 and 2015 and to conclude if the fear of 
it spreading to Poland, as well as historical and cultural patterns, influenced 
the coverage. The purpose of the study is also to check if the crisis in Ukraine 
was domesticated by the Polish media. This seems to be interesting, especially 
due to the proximity of the conflict. Both newspapers and television programs 
will be analyzed to see if the Polish media spoke with one voice during the cov-
erage of the conflict in Ukraine. Another possibility would be that differences 
resulting from the medium’s editorial line, the type of media, and the degree of 
relations with political actors affected the perspective of the dispute visible in 
the materials. This study will go a long way in explaining the importance of this 
conflict to the Polish media and society. That is to say, how much space and at-
tention the media paid to the war in Ukraine. This event had a direct impact on 
the military and economic security of Poland. Therefore it seems to be important 
to check what kind of perspective – pro-Ukrainian or pro-Russian – was shown 
in the analyzed materials. It should be noted that Poland’s political and histor-
ical relations with the parties to the conflict are ambiguous. It can therefore be 
expected that the perception of the actors that are involved in the conflict by the 
Polish media will be marked by these patterns.
2.2  The scope of the research
It was decided that the research period will cover thirteen months, from 1st 
of March 2014 to 31st of March 2015. It was decided that the beginning of the 
analysis will cover events after the escape of Viktor Yanukovych from Ukraine 
and the beginning of the Crimean crisis. Its completion will be over a year later, 
which will allow capturing the most important events of the conflict, such as the 
war in Donbass, MH17 plane crash, and the signing of an agreement of settling 
the conflict in Donbass (Minsk II). In addition, the analysis carried out for this 
book showed that at the end of the research period, that is the end of March 
2015, the number of materials devoted to the conflict began to decrease (see 
Fig. 2.2), which may be connected with a drop in general interest in the situation 
in Ukraine by the media. It also indicates that the selection of research period 
was correct.
It was decided to include six Polish media outlets in the study. The media 
selection criteria remained almost the same as in the project “Ukraine 2014 – 
media war and the war in media”, which will be described in the later part of this 
chapter. Attention has been paid to the most popular quality newspapers and 
tabloids, and to television news programs. The editorial line and level of political 
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parallelism were not important factors in this case. Due to the choice to analyze 
newspapers and television, it was possible to notice differences in how the con-
flict was covered, not only between media that make different types of content, 
but also between the media outlets that belong to the same group. Paying atten-
tion to mainstream media is also important considering their range and the high 
likelihood of them having an influence on the public opinion. Therefore, two is-
sues were considered when choosing media to be analyzed. First, sales and view-
ership, as well as the ability to influence public opinion and the content of other 
media, which was checked by taking into account research about the most influ-
ential media in Poland in 2014 and 2015, carried out by the Institute of Media 
Monitoring. Thanks to these distinctions, two tabloids, Fakt and Super Express 
two daily newspapers – Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita, as well as two TV 
news bulletins, Wiadomości TVP1 and Fakty TVN qualified for the analysis. 
Interestingly, the selected tabloids were at the top of the sales list of national 
dailies in 2014 (324 730 copies sold) and 2015 (307 474 copies sold) (Kurdupski, 
2016a). Right behind them on the third position was Gazeta Wyborcza with sales 
of 152 041 in 2014 and 144 592 copies in 2015 (Kurdupski, 2016a). Rzeczpospolita 
was in fact on the eighth place in general and on the fourth position among 
the opinion dailies (Kurdupski, 2016a). Considering that Rzeczpospolita sold 
more copies (55 849 in 2014 and 55 886 in 2015) than the two daily newspapers 
Gazeta Polska Codziennie and Gazeta Prawna, despite them being ranked higher 
than Rzeczpospolita, it was decided to include the daily in the study (Kurdupski, 
2016a). It seems that the differences in the location of the dailies in the ranking 
resulted from the balance between the number of newspapers prepared for sale 
and the number of unsold newspapers. This balance was larger in the case of 
Rzeczpospolita than Gazeta Prawna and Gazeta Polska Codziennie. However, 
Rzeczpospolita sold more copies in the analyzed period and thus the range of 
this newspaper was higher than the two other dailies. This is important from 
the point of view of domestication, because the scope of a medium and thus its 
ability to reach a large audience with its message can increase the effectiveness 
of the strategy.
The viewership of the TV news programs in 2014 and 2015 showed that the 
differences between the main editions of the news programs produced by the 
public (Wiadomości TVP1 at 19:30) and private broadcasters (Fakty TVN at 
19:00, or Wydarzenia Polsat at 18:10) is small (Kurdupski, 2016b). Of course, 
the differences appear at the level of general viewership (age 4+) and also in 
the age group 16–49 years old. Differences are also dependent on which viewer 
measurement metrics are used, for example, AMR or SHR (Kurdupski, 2016b). 
Audience viewership research confirms that the TV news programs selected for 
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the analysis belonged to the most frequently watched TV news broadcasts during 
the research period. In the case of general viewership (age 4+), the differences 
in the share of the television audience (SHR) were up to one percentage point 
in 2015, and were almost the same in 2014 (Kurdupski, 2016b). Wiadomości 
TVP1 was watched by 25.7 percent in 2014 and 24.55 percent of people in 2015, 
and Fakty TVN by 25.66 percent in 2014 and 23.39 percent of total audience 
in 2015 (Kurdupski, 2016b). Therefore, it is considered that the outlets chosen 
for analysis are appropriate. In addition, the possibility of comparing content 
presented by public and private broadcasters, whose degree of dependence on 
political actors and decisions differ, may give interesting answers on how they 
chose to cover the same conflict.
The research by the Institute of Media Monitoring confirms that the selected 
quality newspapers were at the top of the list of the most quoted media in the ana-
lyzed period (Najbardziej opiniotwórcze…, 2014 and 2015). The study, carried 
out from January to December, included only quotations in the press, radio 
and television. internet quotations were not checked. Therefore, it is possible 
that the results including internet quotations could have differed somewhat. 
However, taking into account the results by the Institute of Media Monitoring, 
it should be noted that in 2014 Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita were 
ranked second and third among the most quoted media in Poland (Najbardziej 
opiniotwórcze…, 2014). In turn, in 2015 Gazeta Wyborcza was on the first and 
Rzeczpospolita on the second position on the list (Instytut Monitoringu Mediów, 
2015). This means that these newspapers had a big impact on other media, and 
thereby also the opinions of readers of these media. In the case of tabloids, in 
2014 and 2015, Fakt was ranked on the 9th place. Super Express held the 15th 
position in 2014, while in 2015 it had already taken the 11th place, ahead of 
the weekly magazine Polityka, which is considered as one of the leading socio-
political weeklies in Poland (Najbardziej opiniotwórcze…, 2014). In conclusion, 
the tabloid media quotations in the analyzed period was five or six times lower 
than quality newspapers, but these newspapers were in this respect higher than 
the tested TV stations. Of course, it is worth noting that in the case of influ-
ential TV channels, entire stations were evaluated without dividing them into 
individual programs. In 2014, the ranking of the most influential TV channels 
was as follows: TVN24 (2276), TVN (956), TVP Info (637), TVP1 (334) and 
TVP2 (199) (Instytut Monitoringu Mediów, 2014). Differences in the number 
of quotations seem to be considerable, however, it should be remembered that 
these stations belong to two owners, namely the Polish Television and the TVN 
Group. Therefore, the interchangeability of journalists and topics between these 
channels is quite smooth. That is why it often happens that the same content 
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presented on TVN24 is also presented on TVN. A similar situation takes place 
in the case of TVP Info and the first and second TVP channels. In 2015, the 
ranking of citations was as follows:  TVN24 (3126), TVN (1515), TVPInfo 
(971), Polsat News (503), TV Republika (440) (Najbardziej opiniotwórcze …, 
2015). As can be seen, TVN’s channels were still on the first two positions. Also, 
TVP Info took the same place as the year before. However, TVP1 and TVP2 
were not included in that year’s ranking.
The rankings of the most influential media in Poland at the turn of 2014 and 
2015, together with the sales and viewership show that choosing the six media 
outlets seems appropriate. This is due to the fact that these outlets are not only 
the most popular television programs and press dailies in the country and thus, 
they had the largest audience, but they also affected the agenda of other media. 
Therefore, it seems that they could have a great effect on the media and social 
discourse about the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, especially since the type of own-
ership and the level of political parallelism might also influence the coverage.
Tabloids do not give a clear support to any political side, because of the 
nature of the medium itself, and in the case of Fakt it might also be a result of 
the ownership. The owner of Fakt is the German-Swiss publishing company 
Ringier Axel Springer Poland. It can be assumed that foreign ownership affects 
the political neutrality of the medium, but as mentioned earlier, there are 
outlets owned by foreign companies that are not neutral. The analyzed quality 
newspapers and television news programs are also not impartial. Gazeta 
Wyborcza from the beginning of its existence has been associated with the 
Solidarity movement (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2011b: 132), and today its editorial 
line has a centro-left character (Mielczarek, 2007: 92). Rzeczpospolita was con-
sidered a conservative newspaper (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2011b: 141), however it 
seems that now the daily is more center or center-right oriented (Jaspal et al., 
2014: 254). Both quality newspapers and Super Express remain in the hands of 
Polish owners, although by 2011 the State Treasury owned 49 percent of shares 
in Rzeczpospolita (Konopka, 2013: 107). Therefore, the possibility of influence 
from political actors on media content could have been greater in the past. 
In the case of TVP and TVN, the issues of political sympathies are also clear. 
TVP as a public broadcaster is dependent on the state, although it should the-
oretically operate independently. However, after every change of government, 
the Public Media becomes the political prey of the ruling party, which has 
an influence on the selection of governing bodies of both radio and televi-
sion (Oleszkiewicz, 2013: 194–195), and as a consequence also on journalists. 
The owner of TVN is the American group Scripps Network Interactive, which 
in March, 2018 was sold to the media group Discovery Communications 
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(Discovery…, 2018). Therefore, the degree of political parallelism can be con-
sidered as medium, for example the support of any political party is condi-
tional (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2007: 43). It is noted that TVN supports the Civil 
Platform and other opposition parties. This is interesting, since during the 
research period the Civic Platform was in power, and the presidential election 
campaign was ongoing. Therefore, the conflict in Ukraine could have been the 
subject of political discussion in Poland at that time, especially concerning 
possible military support for Ukraine.
2.3  Research hypotheses and research questions
The following research hypotheses will be tested in the study:
H1:  An anti-Russian perspective is dominant in the Polish media coverage of the 
Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
H2: Stressing the threat to the economic and military security of Poland was the domi-
nant tool of domestication of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict by the Polish media.
In order to confirm or falsify these research hypotheses, it was decided to create 
eleven research questions.
The main research questions:
RQ1: What are the similarities and differences between the media in how they framed 
the Russian-Ukrainian conflict?
RQ2:  What kind of perspective, pro-Ukrainian or pro-Russian, was dominant in the 
media coverage of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict?
RQ3: Is domestication of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict visible in the Polish media?
RQ4: Do the analyzed materials contain information about how the conflict in Ukraine 
affects the political, military and economic security of Poland?
RQ5: To what extent did historical and cultural factors affect the coverage of the conflict 
by Polish media?
RQ6: How do journalists assess their own role in covering the Russian-Ukrainian conflict?
Specific research questions:
RQ7: What kinds of specific mechanisms were used by the Polish media in the domesti-
cation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict?
RQ8: How were the parties to the conflict portrayed?
RQ9: To what extent did fear of Russian expansion affect the coverage of the conflict?
RQ10: What specific issues were mostly presented in the analyzed media?
RQ11: What kinds of sources of information occurred most frequently in the analyzed 
media and why?
Getting answers for those research questions will help to determine how the 
Russian-Ukrainian conflict was covered and domesticated by the Polish media 
and what factors affected the actions of journalists.
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2.4  The research project “Ukraine 2014 – media war  
and the war in media”
This study was inspired by and based on the international research project 
“Ukraine 2014 – media war and the war in media”, which was carried out from 
2014 to 2016 and was financed by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency. The 
project was organized by Södertörn University in Stockholm, Sweden, and its 
coordinator was Nygren. Coordinators of the research teams in the other coun-
tries were Głowacki from the University of Warsaw, Kiria from the Higher 
School of Economics in Moscow, Taradai and Orlova from the Mohyla School 
of Journalism in Kiev. The project aimed to analyze the media coverage of the 
war in Ukraine in the summer of 2014. Poland, Russia, Sweden and Ukraine 
took part in the research. Thanks to that it was possible to observe how coun-
tries which are different from each other at the level of political regime, journal-
istic culture and attitude towards the analyzed issues, presented the Ukrainian 
conflict in the media. It is worth noting that it was decided to analyze the pre-
sentation of the conflict by mainstream media, because it was recognized that 
this kind of media has the greatest impact on the formation of public discourse 
(Nygren et al., 2016: 4).
Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used in the research. The 
main research method was a quantitative content analysis, which was com-
bined with semi-structured interviews with journalists who covered the con-
flict (Nygren and Hök, 2016: 56). The hybridization of research techniques and 
methods allowed for a more in-depth understanding of the investigated subject 
and its context. Another method is a comparative analysis. According to Dobek-
Ostrowska and Sobera, the comparative analysis should also be included among 
the hybrid methods, which is the effect of its flexibility, that it is of both quan-
titative and qualitative character (2017: 30). On the one hand, the use of the 
comparative analysis allowed to show differences in the coverage between press 
and television, and tabloid and quality media. On the other hand, it helped 
to understand how the same conflict is seen and understood in four different 
countries. As a result, it was possible to show how the biggest media from the 
selected countries perceive the Ukrainian conflict and its impact on these coun-
tries. This is particularly important, both for the Russian and Ukrainian media, 
due to the conflictual character of their relationship, but it is also important in 
the case of the Polish media, since the conflict had a significant impact on the 
functioning of the country. Therefore, applying the mentioned methods and 
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The methods and tools used in the analysis were helpful in obtaining answers 
to the created research questions (Nygren, 2016a: 23):
RQ1: How is the conflict framed in the mainstream media? (For example, how is the 
enemy portrayed? which words are used in the description of what is happening? 
How are the main events in the conflict described?)
RQ2: Which patterns can be seen in the use of sources in the different countries? (For 
example, who are allowed to speak and how are different types of sources handled? 
How do different forms of disinformation appear, and how do the journalists handle 
source criticism?)
RQ3: How do the journalists see their own role in the conflict? (For example, do they 
take sides or are they neutral observers? How is the journalists’ work affected by 
threats to their security or by conditions that limit their work?)
The research questions are connected, both with the mechanisms used by the 
media selected for the analysis, as well as the behavior of journalists when cov-
ering the conflict.
Due to the fact that the subject of interest of the researchers participating 
in the project was the way the conflict in Ukraine was covered by mainstream 
media, it was decided that three types of traditional media will be included 
in the research. It was decided to analyze the most popular tabloids, quality 
newspapers and television news programs. Therefore, the following media 
from the analyzed countries qualified for the research:  Aftonbladet, Dagens 
Nyheter, SVT-Rapport (Sweden); Komsomolskaja Pravda, Kommersant, 
Channel 1 (Russia); Den, Segodnya, Channel 1+1 (Ukraine); Fakt, Gazeta 
Wyborcza, Wiadomości TVP (Poland) (Nygren, 2016a:  27). The content 
analysis included materials related to the conflict in Ukraine, which appeared 
in the chosen media from July 10 to September 6, 2014. It was decided to 
choose this research period, because of the intensity of military actions 
during this time, and the ceasefire agreement signed between the parties to 
the conflict on September 5, 2014 (Nygren et al., 2016: 4). The analysis did 
not include debates and editorials (Nygren et al., 2016: 5). It should be noted 
that only five materials were coded per day, including the first five materials 
in the case of newspapers and television. Doing so made it possible to limit 
the number of analyzed items. In the case of the printed media, pictures and 
texts were analyzed together. 1 875 materials in total were analyzed (Nygren 
et al., 2016: 5), and 325 of them were published by Polish media (see Fig. 2.1) 
(Smolak, 2016a:  33). Most of the materials appeared in Gazeta Wyborcza 
(see Fig. 2.1). Also in Sweden, the most material was published in the quality 
newspaper, while TV materials dominated the Russian and Ukrainian cov-
erage (Nygren, 2016a: 27).
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Press and television materials were analyzed based on a code book consisting 
of 37 variables (see Appendix no. 2). Attention was paid to such issues as domi-
nant topic and sources. Frames visible in the coverage were also taking into con-
sideration. The code book included questions about the main perspective of the 
material, visible contexts and language used to describe the situation in Ukraine 
and parties to the conflict (Nygren et al., 2016: 4). Detailed attention was also 
paid to such events as the disaster of the Malaysian airplane MH17 and the pres-
ence of Russian troops in Ukraine. The interest in these certain topics came from 
the selected research period, as well as the importance of those issues for media.
In the research, 32 in-depth interviews with journalists and members of edi-
torial boards from media who covered the war in Ukraine were also made. In the 
case of Poland, six interviews were conducted, Swedish researchers made five 
interviews, four interviews were conducted with journalists from Russia (only 
two interviews with journalists from the analyzed media), and 17 interviews 
were made in Ukraine (Nygren, 2016a: 28). The interviews had a semi-structured 
form which means that researchers had a list of areas, questions that they had to 
discuss with the media representatives (see Appendix no. 4). The journalists were 
asked about such issues as professional experience, a sense of autonomy while 
covering the dispute, security, criticism of sources and disinformation, and the 
role of the journalist in the conflict (Smolak, 2016a:  34). Due to the form of 
interviewing, it was possible to ask additional questions, which is undoubtedly 
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Fakt Gazeta Wyborcza Wiadomości TVP
Fig. 2.1: The media coverage of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict by the Polish media in 
2014 (in numbers)
Source: Author; Smolak (2016a: 33).
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a great advantage of semi-structured interviews. It is assumed that most of the 
conducted interviews were face-to-face interviews, but no recommendations 
were imposed on researchers in this regard.
The results of the research showed that historical and cultural issues had an 
important role in the coverage of the conflict in Ukraine, which was especially 
evident in the case of Ukrainian, Polish and Russian media (Smolak, 2016a: 42). 
For example, the analysis showed that the coverage of the war by the Polish 
media outlets was characterized by support for Ukraine and fear of Russian 
actions (Głowacki and Smolak, 2016: 156–158). The coverage in the Russian and 
Ukrainian media had a patriotic dimension and was characterized by mutual 
negativism, which is obviously the result of the involvement of these states in 
the dispute (Nygren, 2016b: 29). The Swedish media presented the conflict in the 
most neutral way of all of the analyzed countries. However, the coverage was still 
more pro-Ukrainian than pro-Russian (Nygren et al., 2016: 16). The finds from 
the content analysis were also confirmed during interviews with journalists.
One of the results of the project was also a model created by Nygren, which 
describes the conditions of media during the coverage of conflicts (2016: 15). 
When creating the model, he relied on Hanitzsch’s research on journalistic 
cultures (2007), and distinguished between neutral and partisan journalism 
(Nygren, 2016a: 24). Nygren also paid attention to the level of political and mil-
itary control over media, dividing it into a strong and weak one (2016a:  24). 
On this basis he described the conditions of journalists in this dispute. He con-
sidered Russia as having a high political control over media and partisan jour-
nalism (Nygren et  al., 2016:  15). In Ukraine and Poland, partisan journalism 
was also visible, but the role of the state was rated lower than in Russia (Nygren 
et al., 2016: 15). Poland was considered as relatively free from political control. 
Sweden had neutral journalism and weak political control over media (Nygren 
et al., 2016: 15).
The described research project in which I  took part is the methodological 
and thematic basis for further reflection on the media coverage of the conflict in 
Ukraine, but only and exclusively by the Polish media. The research tools created 
for the media analysis of the conflict by researchers from Poland, Russia, Sweden 
and Ukraine will serve, although in a slightly modified form, in the analysis 
conducted in my study. It should be emphasized that I was the person respon-
sible for carrying out and analyzing materials on the coverage of the dispute by 
the Polish media in the project. I  was also involved in the choice and testing 
of the research tools. Therefore, I  had knowledge about their usefulness and 
the potential need for modifications for future analyzes. In the methodological 
chapter of my book I explain the differences between my study and the project 
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“Ukraine 2014 – media war and the war in media” in terms of aim and research 
tools. In this way, readers will be able to assess the degree of independence of my 
research from the project in which I participated. A detailed description of the 
applied methods and techniques, along with the changes made therein, will be 
presented in the following subsections.
2.5  Research methods and tools
The study will present the results of the empirical research where both qualitative 
and quantitative methods and tools were used. A hybridization of methods – 
combining quantitative and qualitative methods – was also used.
The main research method is the content analysis, which was used to quan-
titatively and qualitatively examine press and TV materials about the war in 
Ukraine, published by six Polish mainstream media in 2014 and 2015. It is 
supplemented by semi-structured in-depth interviews with journalists working 
in the selected media and who covered the conflict from March 2014 to March 
2015. Comparative analysis also found its application in the study, both in the case 
of the content analysis and the analysis of the results of the in-depth interviews. 
Desk research, which is usually defined as a research technique, was used when 
referring to the reports made by the Centre for Public Opinion Research.
2.5.1  Content analysis
Content analysis is the main research method used in this study. Although it 
is considered to be a strictly quantitative tool (Lisowska-Magdziarz, 2004: 21), 
when it is combined with elements of frame analysis it takes on a hybrid char-
acter (Dobek-Ostrowska and Sobera, 2017: 29). Such a combination was used 
for this study. The code book created originally for the research project “Ukraine 
2014 – media war and the war in media”, and later modified by me, contains both 
qualitative and quantitative elements (see Appendix no. 2). This is due to the fact 
that the creators of the project, in which I took part, also wanted to examine qual-
itative elements – that is, frames visible in the media coverage. The same goal was 
set when developing the research tool that will be used for my analysis. Therefore 
it was not only possible to answer the question if something was presented in 
the research items – for example a given issue or a source of information (see for 
example RQ10 and RQ11) – but also how it was presented – especially in terms 
of attributes given to specific issues and entities (see for example RQ1 and RQ8).
All kinds of materials were analyzed except for debates and editorials, as set 
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day, which was the case in the international research project. Thanks to that, it 
was possible to observe and present the real intensity of the coverage of the war 
by the Polish media (see Fig. 2.2). The selection of research units was based on 
the content referring to the topic of my study – the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. 
Due to the fact that paper versions of the examined press titles were analyzed, it 
was necessary to review full editions of the chosen newspapers in detail, which 
excluded searching for articles based on selected key words. In the case of televi-
sion materials it was likewise necessary to view full editions of news programs in 
order to find materials regarding the conflict in Ukraine.
The research tool used for the content analysis was a code book created for the 
research project “Ukraine 2014 – media war and the war in media”. However, the 
code book had to be modified to fit the topic of the study. The code book used 
in the study consists of six parts: General Information, Analysis, MH17 (catas-
trophe), Russian Troop, Framing and Language. This is the same structure as for 
the original code book. The names of the parts seem to be clear and indicate the 
nature of the questions that are assigned below them (see Appendix no. 1 and 
no. 2). Two events, MH17 (catastrophe) and Russian Troops, were chosen to pay 
special attention to. This is mainly a result of the selected research period for 
the international project. However, the materials that have been analyzed in my 
study cover a four times greater period, which takes into account both the time 
of the disaster and the beginning of the Russian military presence in Crimea, 
with the appearance of the “little green men”. That is why it was decided to not 
remove these sections. However, the data obtained regarding these two specific 
cases – in particular the MH17 plane crash – were not fully used in this study. 
This could be considered as a limitation of the research tool, although it could 
not be assumed from the beginning that the mentioned issues would not dom-
inate the coverage, especially since one of the research questions is dedicated to 
specific issues visible in the materials (see RQ10).
The code book consists of 38 questions with single and multiple choice 
variables. Beside the questions related to sources of information and history, the 
vast majority of variables require one dominant answer (see Appendix no. 1). In 
this way, it was tried to give transparency to the research. I realize that for some 
questions, narrowing the answer to one dominant issue can be a limitation for 
the study. On the other hand, due to the size of collected material (see Fig. 2.2), 
such a solution seems to be reasonable, because it is still possible to present gen-
eral trends that are visible in the coverage. One of the significant changes made 
to the original code book (see Appendix no. 1) was the addition of variables 
and questions that referred directly to Poland. For example, modifications were 
made to questions about dominant themes, actors visible in the material, and 
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sources of information. Some elements, due to the international character of the 
project “Ukraine 2014 – media war and the war in media”, have been omitted or 
standardized. For example, instead of Polish or Swedish sources of information, 
the list included representatives of the European Union. The revised version of 
the code book contains references to Polish political actors, experts, represent-
atives of the army and citizens. The list of topics was also changed by adding 
“Consequences of the conflict for Poland” and types of support given by Poland 
to Ukraine (see Appendix no. 1). The code book also contains questions related 
to the concrete consequences of the dispute for Poland, how Poland should react 
and what role Poland plays in the dispute (see Appendix no. 1). A question about 
conflict scenarios presented by the media has also been added. Among the pos-
sible scenarios that are important from the point of view of the Polish audience, a 
transition of the conflict beyond the Ukrainian boarders, and economic war, have 
been taken into account. Another important change was to draw attention to his-
torical contexts used by journalists (see Appendix no. 1). If there are references 
to historical contexts – for example, a comparison of the situation in Ukraine to 
other past wars and armed conflicts, or references to events connecting Poland 
with the parties to the dispute – it seems to be worth noting. This shows, to what 
extent journalists who described the conflict tried to give context to the cov-
erage. The use of historical references or references to the consequences of the 
dispute for Poland, for example its economic or military security, indicates to the 
recipient how to read and understand the materials. These factors are interesting 
to study, because of the popularity of the media chosen for the analysis and their 
role in the creation of public discourse.
An important element of the code book is also the reference to the causes, 
nature and naming of the dispute and parties to the conflict. It is equally impor-
tant to refer to the geopolitical and historical contexts visible in the coverage (see 
Appendix no. 1). According to Krippendorf, taking into account the contexts 
of both the information and the used terms is important in the case of con-
tent analysis (2013: 88–89). To focus only on the quantitative layer of content 
analysis narrows the possibility of understanding and explaining the observed 
tendencies, which seems crucial in the case of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict 
(Dobek-Ostrowska and Sobera, 2017: 29). Therefore, it was decided to construct 
and modify a code book so that it allows for a more detailed understanding of 
the trends presented by the media, especially in the context of their bias towards 
one of the parties to the conflict which is connected with the first research 
hypothesis. It should be noted that the modification of the code book prepared 
for the project “Ukraine 2014 - media war and the war in media” meant that 
research materials from Fakt, Gazeta Wyborcza newspapers and Wiadomości 
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TVP1 had to be analyzed a second time. The possibility of using the results 
obtained for the project in my studies was therefore limited.
While the quantitative nature of content analysis allows for relatively objec-
tive research (Neuendorf, 2002: 1), the frame analysis is more subjective. The 
researcher determines whether the given frame is actually present in the mate-
rial or not. The ability to read certain frames requires some knowledge about 
contexts, history, and language that allows decoding information in the right 
way. That is why in the case of the frame analysis, which complements the content 
analysis, it is very important to adapt the code book to a specific reality (Smolak, 
2017: 66). Remaining objective is also problematic when asking questions about 
the tone of the coverage and attributes given to actors, and thus the general 
perspective of the coverage. Although it was tried to conduct the analysis in a 
completely impartial way, I am aware that being completely neutral might some-
times be problematic. It seems to be even more difficult, when values given by 
a journalist to certain entities or subjects may have a so-called second bottom 
(Sobera, 2017: 83). That is why it was necessary to conduct in-depth interviews 
with journalists to explain the real motives of their actions while covering the 
conflict. In the case of questions about the perspective or tone of the coverage, 
it was tried to take into account phrases used by journalists, or the nature of the 
described event. I  realize that a good solution in this respect would be to use 
discourse analysis, but the size of the research material made this very difficult.
Another important issue of choosing content analysis as the main research 
method is the research period in which six Polish media outlets were examined. 
It was decided that the research period would cover just over a year, from 1st of 
March 2014 to 31st of March 2015. In this time, 1 726 materials from all six media 
were chosen to be analyzed (see Fig. 2.2). The most information on the conflict 
appeared in Gazeta Wyborcza (438), while Fakt had the least (170) (see Fig. 2.2). 
A total of 527 materials about the dispute were presented in TV (see Fig. 2.2).
Interestingly, the amount of interest in specific events that took place during the 
time period seems to be similar in all of the analyzed media. The figure showing 
the life cycle of the conflict-related materials reveals three growth phases during 
the research period – from April to June and from June to October 2014, as well 
as from January to March 2015 (see Fig. 2.2). The first growth phase is connected 
with the beginning of the Donbass war and the Ukrainian government’s launch 
of its anti-terrorist operation (ATO) against the separatist oblasts in Luhansk and 
Donetsk, as well as the Ukrainian presidential election in May. The second growth 
phase includes further fighting between the Ukrainian army and separatists, the 
shooting down of MH17, the signing of the Minsk protocol and the signing by 
President Poroshenko of the ratification of the Ukraine Association Agreement 
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with the European Union. The last of the growth phases involves the signing of 
the Minsk Agreement on the Ceasefire (Minsk II) in February 2015 by the pres-
idents of Russia, Ukraine, France and the German chancellor. Importantly, most 
of materials about the conflict appeared between July and August 2014, which 
might be result of the MH17 catastrophe, which occurred on July 17 that year. 
The material published in this time period accounted for about 30 percent of the 
whole research material.
The three growth phases appearing almost at the same time in all media 
shows that the selection of the research period, and of the research units, was 
correct (see Fig. 2.2). There are some differences between the outlets, but this is 
the result of the general amount of information devoted to the war in Ukraine 
and the character of the certain medium.
Analyzing six media outlets which covered the conflict in Ukraine during 
the same time period, allows for the use of another research method  – com-
parative analysis. The comparative analysis is a supplementary method of con-
tent analysis, where significant differences in the media coverage between the 
research units are observed. The use of comparative analysis in this case seems 
to be a good solution, especially since this method is very often combined with 
content analysis (see Sadaf, 2011; David et al., 2017). It seems obvious, especially 
when more than one medium is included in the study. The media selection for 
this study was based on popularity, and not on such elements as political paral-
lelism or ownership. However, these factors can still affect how the information 
about the conflict will be presented. Therefore, the opportunity to compare how 
different media have covered the Ukrainian issue seems to be particularly inter-
esting. Moreover, the model of media actions during the coverage of the conflict 
made by Nygren based on the results of the project “Ukraine 2014 – media war 
and the war in media” will also be taken into account (Nygren, 2016a: 261). It 
will be possible to check if the model looks the same in the case of the bigger 
number of analyzed media and an extended research period. The use of content 
analysis and supplementing it with in-depth interviews with journalists will be 
helpful.
2.5.2  In-depth interviews with journalists
The content analysis used in the study quite often, especially in the case of 
media research, requires the use of a complementary tool, which in this case are 
in-depth interviews. In-depth interviews are also used to complement results 
of surveys, which allow to obtain general quantitative information, but omits 
the qualitative dimension, that is, the reasons for a given situation or tendencies 
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(see Dobek-Ostrowska and Sobera, 2017: 29; Kvale 2010: 43). Therefore, it was 
decided that using only the content analysis, despite its both quantitative and 
qualitative nature, would be insufficient in the case of this study. It was also nec-
essary to conduct in-depth interviews with journalists from the six Polish media 
outlets, who produced information on the dispute in the analyzed period – from 
March, 2014 to March, 2015.
It was decided that two interviews will be conducted with journalists from 
each of the media outlets due to the number of journalists who described the 
war in Ukraine. In the case of printed media, there were usually the same people, 
for example three or four journalists, who worked for the foreign and political 
department. An equally important determinant was the presence of journalists 
in Ukraine, which in the case of some of the media selected for analysis was 
very difficult. For mainly economic reasons, media owners have stopped sending 
journalists abroad, for example in the region of armed conflict. While in the 
case of television, for both TVP and TVN, there were several correspondents 
working in Ukraine during the analyzed period. In the case of printed media, 
one can speak of no more than one permanent correspondent who was on the 
spot. This was the case, for example, in Gazeta Wyborcza, whose correspondent 
in Eastern Ukraine was Piotr Andrusieczko. In an article made for the magazine 
Press concerning the lack of Polish correspondents in Ukraine, the author cites 
the words of one of the journalists of Tygodnik Powszechny, Wojciech Pięciak, 
who said that not sending Polish journalists to Ukraine for financial reasons is 
provincial (Wyszyńska, 2015). This opinion is quite controversial, but it does not 
change the fact that indeed the number of journalists who covered the conflict in 
Ukraine, on the spot, was low. In the period of the Crimean crisis, or even during 
the Euromaidan Revolution, the number of journalists from Poland seemed to 
be larger, and in the later period the situation was slightly different. This has been 
confirmed during interviews with journalists. It is worth noting that works by 
freelancers such as Paweł Pieniążek, who worked in the conflict zone, were used 
by Polish media. Also people who are experts in the field of Eastern Europe, 
especially scientists who were in Ukraine in 2014 and 2015, commented on the 
situation in Ukraine for media that did not have their own correspondents in 
Ukraine. The situation was that many journalists wrote about Ukraine from 
their offices in Warsaw. The journalists were asked about the impact of these 
working conditions on the quality of their coverage of Ukraine during in-depth 
interviews.
An equally important element affecting the number of journalists working 
in the conflict zone was security. Piotr Kraśko, the head of Wiadomości TVP1 
during the analyzed period, called the situation in Ukraine and its impact on the 
Róa Norström - 978-3-631-79027-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 12/03/2020 01:06:53PM by A.Gorlikowski@peterlang.com
via Peter Lang AG and Adam Gorlikowski
Research methodology68
security of journalists a “death lottery” (Wyszyńska, 2015). Therefore the number 
of journalists from mainstream media who wrote about Ukraine in 2014 and 2015 
was limited. That is one of the reasons why it was difficult finding respondents 
for this study. Another difficulty with conducting in-depth interviews with 
journalists is that some of them refused to take a part in the study or failed to 
respond on requests for participation. In addition, particularly in the case of 
tabloids, identifying the actual authors behind the texts was difficult. Most of the 
journalists who wrote for Fakt or Super Express used pseudonyms. Only a few 
authors used their full name, and it was decided to conduct interviews with these 
journalists. An equally important issue is the increasingly common practice of 
using external experts, for example politicians, researchers, or army representa-
tives, who make journalistic content and commentaries for the media, including 
those chosen for this analysis. The possibility of reaching directly to journalists 
thereby narrows down even more. On the other hand, the use of such experts 
may indicate a desire from the publishers to improve the quality of their content, 
especially concerning international issues, including armed conflicts.
I conducted eleven interviews with journalists who covered the conflict in 
Ukraine in 2014 and 2015. Ten of them worked for the analyzed media outlets. 
It is worth mentioning, that one of these ten respondents cooperated with both 
tabloid and quality newspapers in the research period. Therefore, he could refer 
to work experience in both types of media organizations. The eleventh interview 
was conducted with a journalist outside the analyzed media. The reasons for 
including him in the study anyway were his work experience as a war corre-
spondent, and the fact that he was in Ukraine close to the fighting area during 
this study’s time period. I would like to point out that six of the eleven in-depth 
interviews with journalists used in my research were carried out for the project 
“Ukraine 2014 - media war and the war in media”. Due to the amount and con-
tent of the collected research material, as well as the purpose and subject of my 
analyzes, few of the fragments used in the report from the international project 
were used by me again in this study.
The conducted interviews were semi-structured, same as in the case of the 
research project “Ukraine 2014 – media war and the war in media”. There was a 
group of problems and questions that all journalists were asked about, and some 
additional issues were also addressed. As in the case of the code book used for 
the content analysis, the in-depth interviews were expanded in some areas, such 
as historical factors and their influence on the coverage, the journalists’ opinions 
about the perspective visible in national media, and the reasons for the media’s 
and society’s interest in the conflict (see Appendix no. 3). When conducting an 
unstructured or semi-structured interview, particular attention is paid to the 
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possibility of obtaining additional information about the examined problems, 
which results, for example, from the description of issues or events relevant to 
the respondent (Frankforf-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2001: 251–252). In the case 
of the interviews conducted for the purpose of this research, such a strategy 
proved to be very helpful, since the journalists quite often referred to their own 
experiences or the experiences of their colleagues from other media, in order 
to provide more detailed information about the discussed topic. For example, 
when they were asked about how their Polish origin affected the willingness 
of the parties to the conflict to speak to them. In addition, in semi-structured 
interviews one can ask additional questions to the respondents, especially when 
the certain problem turns out to be very interesting for the researcher (Anderson, 
2012: 303). That is why the length of the interviews and the amount of questions 
that the journalists were asked about differed.
The interviews were conducted from April 2015 to January 2018. They were 
conducted in Polish, however, some of the fragments that were found to be par-
ticularly useful for this study have been translated into English. The conversations 
were mostly carried out face-to-face or by phone. One of the interviews was 
made by using the program Skype, because one of the journalists was in Ukraine 
at that time. There were, of course, some limitations resulting from making 
the interviews over such a long time period. Some journalists were not able to 
fully identify the mechanisms they used while covering the conflict. However, it 
seems that most of them, especially those who worked on the spot, or who are 
interested in Eastern Europe and often write about it, answered in detail to the 
questions being asked. The long period of making interviews resulted from the 
necessity of first finishing the content analysis, thereby making it possible to refer 
to the results of the analysis during the interviews.
As mentioned earlier, the interviews were conducted in a variety of ways – 
by phone or by using a Skype program. Most of the interviews were conducted 
in an individual form, meaning face-to-face conversation with the journalist. 
Thanks to this, the control of the interview seemed higher (Frankfort-Nachmias 
and Nachmias, 2001: 255) than in the case of using telephone or Skype. Another 
advantage of individual interviews, according to Frankfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias (2001: 254), is the higher percentage of received responses, but this 
trend was not observed in the case of the other two forms of obtaining infor-
mation from journalists. The telephone interview turned out to be a good 
solution especially for those journalists who did not have time to meet and be 
interviewed in person. This was done four times. However, this is nothing sur-
prising, because the journalists who took part in the research are employees of 
the mainstream media. Their time for meeting with the researcher was thereby 
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limited. Of course, one of the characteristics of a telephone interview is its dura-
tion. In the case of the telephone conversations, they usually lasted from 25 
to 40 minutes, whereas in the case of personal interviews it took more time. 
The face-to-face interviews lasted from 40 minutes to as long as two hours. It 
seems that despite the shorter duration of the telephone interviews, their quality 
is comparable to those carried out in person. Of course, the opportunity to 
observe the respondents behavior in relation to the asked question was diffi-
cult, but hearing the tone of the respondent’s voice or laughter also allowed for 
assessing the journalists’ reaction to the discussed issues. Paying attention to 
body language when conducting interviews is very important, because it allows 
the researcher to understand the real feelings of the respondent, especially in a 
situation where he or she does not want to fully or not at all answer a question. 
The journalists who were interviewed for this study did not avoid answering any 
of the questions. However, at certain moments, paralanguage was an important 
element that strengthened the reaction of the respondents, especially when they 
talked about their contacts with the parties to the dispute.
Despite some journalists agreeing to disclose their names when using 
fragments of their statements in the study, it was decided to let the respondents 
remain anonymous. In that way it was possible to ensure a homogeneous research 
structure and also take into account the ethics of conducting interviews (Kvale 
2010: 60). The only disclosed information about the journalists is their gender, 
age range and working place.
2.5.3  Desk research
Desk research is a research technique that is quite often used within the field 
of social sciences, especially in public opinion and social policies studies 
(Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2001:  324–325). It can supplement the 
state of knowledge about a given issue when the researcher lacks time or re-
sources to conduct additional research herself (Johnston, 2014: 619). Indeed, 
I  did not have the opportunity to conduct opinion polls on the conflict in 
Ukraine. This also is not the subject of the research. Moreover, using studies 
made by other people has is limitations, for instance that the variables are 
not adapted in the way that the researcher would prefer, as the studies were 
made for a different purpose (Bednarowska, 2015). However, it was decided to 
apply desk study by analyzing reports made by the Centre for Public Opinion 
Research. It seemed that these reports could help in some sense to understand 
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The reports were made based on CAPI interviews. The first one was carried 
out in November 2014 on a sample of 934 people (Centrum Badania Opinii 
Społecznej, 2014). The second one was published in June 2015 on a sample of 1 
011 people, but the research described there was carried out in 2014 (Centrum 
Badania Opinii Społecznej, 2015). It was a representative random sample of 
adult inhabitants of Poland. The used reports relate to the impact of the conflict 
in Ukraine on the security of Poland. The report from 2014 refers to the State 
Security Assessment and was commissioned by the National Security Office. 
An important issue that has been highlighted is the perception of internal and 
external threats by citizens, including those related to the activities of Russia 
and the situation in Ukraine (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, 2014). 
Importantly, the study was carried out after the announcement of the National 
Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, which includes references to the 
situation in Ukraine and the Russian intervention in that country (Legucka, 
2015: 143). Therefore, it is possible to check to what extent political discourse 
coincides with social discourse and later with the media discourse. The report 
from 2015 also refers to the situation in Ukraine and includes the risk assessment 
for Poland from February 2014 to April 2015, which includes the research period 
of my study (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, 2015).
Using these reports made by the Centre for Public Opinion Research seems 
to be interesting for the purpose of comparing media discourse and social dis-
course, which as mentioned earlier is important particularly in the case of the 
second research hypothesis. This is due to the fact that journalists who want to 
domesticate an event must also take into account the societal attitudes to that 
given issue (see Sumpter, 2009; Gurevitch et al., 1991). However, the reports 
do not refer to recipients of certain media, but to representatives of the society 
in general. It should be noted that in Poland there are not many institutions, 
or perhaps none whatsoever, that study media audiences and their attitudes 
toward certain issues. The analyzed media do not carry out such analyzes 
either, and if they do, they focus on a very small time period or a very spe-
cific issue. It was, therefore, impossible to make use of such reports. That is 
why it was considered that the reports made by the Centre for Public Opinion 
Research will be used only as an additional technique in the study, without the 
need to create hypotheses or research questions dedicated to these data. This 
does not change the fact that these reports may be helpful in understanding 
the mechanisms used by media, which are part of society and therefore per-
ceive certain issues in a specific way, for example, due to historical conditions 
or national stereotypes.
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3  The analysis of the conflict’s coverage
This chapter will present the results of the content analysis and the in-depth 
interviews with journalists. Attention will be paid to the choice and presenta-
tion of topics, sources of information used, how the conflict is defined and the 
perspective of the coverage. On this basis it will be possible to determine the 
differences between the analyzed media and how journalists assess their role 
when writing about the dispute.
3.1  Dominant issues and sources
The media’s selection of issues and quotations of specific sources may affect the 
perception of the material and the whole event in question. Journalists who cov-
ered the situation in Ukraine were asked whether they were free to choose topics, 
or if it was imposed on them by the editor or owner. They were also asked about 
access to sources of information and difficulties in that regard. Along with the 
results of the content analysis, it will be possible to describe how the media have 
dealt with these issues.
3.1.1  Covered topics
The importance of an issue for the media is often manifested in the intensity 
of its coverage (Yarchi et al., 2017). In the case of covering foreign events, this 
factor seems even more important, because journalists usually consider them 
less newsworthy than national news (Hepp et al., 2016). When it comes to armed 
conflicts, the media’s interest in them may result from, for example, their rare oc-
currence (Galtung and Ruge, 1965).
During the 13  month research period, from March 1, 2014 to March 31, 
2015 – 1 726 research units on the conflict appeared in the analyzed media. The 
television news programs are broadcast every day, while the newspapers are 
published from Monday to Saturday. Consequently, the amount of information 
that appeared in the newspapers was in that way limited in relation to the tele-
vision programs. For comparison, the most news about the dispute – in terms 
of time – appeared in Wiadomości TVP1, which may be due to the nature of 
the medium itself. The program broadcast information about the dispute for 
196 days, which shows that on average more than one news story was published 
daily. Fakty TVN similarly covered the event for 164  days. Gazeta Wyborcza 
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110 days and Fakt for 98 days. In the case of the press, almost two news items 
per day were published on average, which indicates that the conflict had a high 
priority on the media’s agenda. News on the dispute was not published every day, 
and the intensity of the coverage was often dependent on specific events (see 
Fig. 2.2). However, the story appeared in the media almost every month, and 
it seems that in this way the recipient could follow on a regular basis what was 
happening in Ukraine.
Over 607 newspaper pages1 and 25 hours in total of analyzed television news 
programs were devoted to the coverage of the conflict. This displays a rela-
tively high level of Polish media interest in the conflict. It should be noted that 
differences at the level of the amount of newspaper pages or the length of televi-
sion news programs could have influenced the amount, and thus the importance 
of information provided by the media on a certain topic.
In the case of tabloids, the number of pages in each issue varies from 34 to 40 
pages, and in the case of quality newspapers from 36 up to 48 pages. The tabloids 
are rather similar in how many pages they write per issue, while Rzeczpospolita 
usually has more pages than Gazeta Wyborcza. Therefore, it seems interesting to 
check what information was published on the covers and full pages, as this may 
indicate the relevance of the issue.
The method of archiving Fakty TVN made it impossible to check the posi-
tion of the news segments in the structure of the program. Therefore, time was 
the element to measure. The length of Wiadomości TVP1 is usually 30 minutes 
long, and Fakty TVN is 27 minutes. The three minutes of difference between the 
programs may or may not be a factor that significantly influenced the amount of 
time spent on Ukraine. It seems more important to check what the average time 
of the news items was.
The difference between tabloids and quality newspapers was 255 pages. 
Tabloids devoted 176 pages to the conflict, and 101 were full pages. Most of the 
information took quarter of page. In the case of quality newspapers, the total 
number of pages on Ukraine was 431. Most of the information about the dispute 
was published on a half of a page, and 194 pages were entirely devoted to events 
in the Eastern Europe.
Fifteen hours of information on the conflict were presented by Wiadomości 
TVP1 and 10 hours of materials appeared in Fakty TVN. The average time of 
 1 The total amount of pages was summed up based on the space that it took to describe 
a certain issue. That is, full page, half page, quarter of a page and less than quarter were 
all combined to give a total number of pages.
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one segment was comparable in both media. In the case of Wiadomości TVP1 it 
was 186 seconds, and 158 seconds in the case of Fakty TVN. However, it is worth 
noting that the difference of over 20 seconds may be significant, because some of 
the analyzed units were not longer than that.
The amount of material produced by each individual medium, as well as 
its structure, for example the number of pages and length of time, could have 
influenced the reception of the information by the recipients. Referencing these 
data was meant to show that although the amount of material was mainly taken 
into account when determining the importance of the event, its location and 
length is equally significant.
The media’s interest in a foreign event may have to do with event-oriented 
and context-oriented factors (see Shoemaker and Cohen, 2006; Zerback and 
Holzleitner, 2018). It seems that in the case of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, 
its newsworthiness for the Polish media can be assessed both through the prism 
of event-oriented factors  – like the dispute’s hybridity  – as well as context-
oriented factors – like the relations with Russia and Ukraine and the territorial 
proximity to the conflict. One of these groups of factors might be more empha-
sized, however, because of how the national media system functions and the 
influence of its external environment. It seems important to find out which of 
these two groups of factors had the greatest impact on how the conflict was 
presented – something that can be, for example, seen through the most often 
covered topics.
Based on the results of the content analysis, it was possible to distinguish 18 
topics that were covered in the media (see Tab. 3.1). Among them were issues 
related to the actions of the European Union and NATO representatives, the 
course of the conflict and actions of actors involved in it, the MH17 catastrophe, 
and the role of Poland in the dispute. These specific events stand out because of 
what went on during the research period. Despite the structure of the material, 
it was possible to indicate the dominant topic of the coverage, by taking into ac-
count the amount of material on the issues.
The three topics most commonly presented by the analyzed media were inter-
national political discussion and sanctions (23 %), consequences of the conflict 
for Poland (12 %) and Russian military involvement in the conflict (10 %). The 
differences between the most frequently presented issue and the other two are 
significant, which may indicate its importance. NATO intervention in Ukraine 
(1 %) and economic and political support for Ukraine from Poland (1 %) were 
the least frequently covered topics (see Tab. 3.1).
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5 14 25 31 23 21 23
NATO intervention 1 0 1 3 0 1 1
Military actions in the 
conflict area
5 2 9 8 16 5 8
Consequences for civilians 
in the conflict area
1 1 2 1 2 6 2
Pro-Russian rebels and 
their actions
7 3 6 1 4 4 4
Russian involvement (in 
general)
2 5 8 6 3 3 5
Russian military 
involvement in the conflict
11 10 13 12 4 9 10
Military support for 
Ukraine from Poland
3 3 1 1 2 3 2
Economic and political 
support for Ukraine from 
Poland
2 1 0 1 1 1 1
MH17 14 11 7 3 5 4 6
Consequences of the 
conflict for Poland
27 19 5 8 14 10 12
Relations between Poland 
and parties to the conflict
4 4 2 5 4 2 3
Negotiations and peace 
agreements
4 4 4 5 8 5 5
Russian humanitarian 
convoy
2 1 1 1 4 4 2
Stories on Ukrainian 
military (not fighting)
1 3 3 1 2 5 2
Annexation of Crimea and 
its consequences
3 9 5 5 3 3 5
Stories on the Ukrainian 
government
0 1 1 2 2 3 2
Other 8 9 8 6 3 11 7
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N = 170 206 438 385 294 233 1726
Source: Author
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The role of Poland and the Polish perspective were important elements of 
the coverage, especially in the context of the two most frequently presented is-
sues. This is due to the fact that Poland is a member of international organiza-
tions. Therefore it is assumed that it agrees with proposals for conflict resolution 
presented by these entities. On the other hand, the close relations with Ukraine, 
as well as the dispute’s influence on Poland, could also have shaped the media 
coverage. Therefore it seems that the context-oriented factors may have been 
quite significant for the coverage. The way they are used and the amount of news 
they concerned seems to be dependent on the character of the medium and the 
kind of content it presents (see Tab. 3.1).
Political discussion and sanctions was the most important subject for 
quality media, including both newspapers and television news programs (see 
Tab. 3.1). This may be due to the fact that such materials may include analyzes 
and estimations regarding the impact of the sanctions on the European Union 
members and Russia. This opinion seems to be confirmed by the interviewed 
journalist from Gazeta Wyborcza, who claims that although human stories are 
the most interesting for an ordinary reader, the profile of the newspaper also 
requires presenting other types of information:
“Gazeta Wyborcza is a newspaper which must inform about what is happening. So it is 
impossible to escape from such analytics, from what is happening in the political world 
in Ukraine.” [R5]
The focus on political issues was reflected in the cover article from March 2014, 
devoted to both the political and economic isolation of Moscow by the United 
States and the European Union. The article’s headline, “Resist Putin” (Gazeta 
Wyborcza, 05/03/2014), is the American Secretary of State John Kerry’s answer 
to a military presence of Russia in Ukraine. During Kerry’s visit in Kiev he talked 
about Russia breaking international law in Crimea and demanded full cooper-
ation between the Kremlin and the OSCE observers (see Picture 3.1). At the 
same time he gave his full support to the Ukrainian authorities, which the pic-
ture illustrated.
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Picture 3.2: “Kremlin is preparing for sanctions”. 
Source: Rzeczpospolita, 17/03/2014
The media profile was also significant in the case of Rzeczpospolita. 
It specializes in economic issues, and so focusing on sanctions and their 
consequences is not surprising. This medium wrote about these issues 
most often (31  %). The article entitled “Kremlin is preparing for sanctions” 
(17/03/2014) describes the actions of Russian companies and oligarchs, who 
were forced to withdraw their financial assets from the West (see Picture 3.2). 
A similar activity was also observed in the case of Western investors. An inter-
esting way of illustrating the information is the picture of Putin and Medvedev 
looking concerned, while they were forced to face the consequences of their 
decisions about the Crimea. When comparing pictures one and two, it can quite 
clearly be seen that they are a kind of visual frames which serve to strengthen 
the message of the texts (D’Angelo and Kuypers, 2010: 251) and give them a 
clearly anti-Russian and at the same time pro-Ukrainian context. This is espe-
cially interesting from the point of view of the first research hypothesis. It also 
shows that despite the differences between the media outlets  – for instance 
the level of political parallelism  – both quality newspapers used similar 
mechanisms and perspectives when pointing to Russia’s responsibility for the 
conflict.
Equally interesting is the article “Getting harder against the Kremlin” 
(Rzeczpospolita, 18/03/2014). A  preview of the article was placed on the first 
page of the newspaper on March 18, 2014, which may indicate its impor-
tance. The article is about the European Union imposing further sanctions on 
Russian politicians. The author of the article also mentions that similar actions 
Picture 3.1: “Resist Putin”. 
Source: Gazeta Wyborcza, 05/03/2014
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were taken by the United States. The photograph attached to the article shows 
the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski, who is talking to 
Catherine Ashton. Poland’s role in imposing economic and political sanctions 
on Russia is emphasized, which is another example of context-oriented factors 
influencing the covered topics  – Gross and Kopper (2011) included political 
and economic relations to these elements. Furthermore, it should be remem-
bered that in 2014, Russia put an embargo on Polish fruits and vegetables in 
response to decisions of European Union, as well as Poland’s support for 
Ukraine. Therefore the Polish angle was also significant at the international 
level.
Importantly, international political discussion and sanctions was the most 
frequently presented topic on the covers, especially by Gazeta Wyborcza and 
Rzeczpospolita (both 19 times). Only once did the subject appear on the cover 
of a tabloid – Fakt. However, it accounted for eight percent of all information 
on the conflict that appeared on the covers. Moreover, 113.5 pages in quality 
newspapers and 14.5 pages in tabloids concerned this issue, which is 21 percent 
of the total number of pages about the conflict.
Television also devoted the most attention to this topic. International political 
discussion and sanctions were presented for three hours in total by Wiadomości 
TVP1 and one and a half hours by Fakty TVN. This shows that there might be 
a correlation between the number of units devoted to certain topics, and their 
importance for the media.
The consequences of the conflict for Poland were especially emphasized 
in the tabloid coverage. This shows that these media used context-oriented 
factors differently than quality media, which more often wrote about “polit-
ical discussion and sanctions” (see Tab. 3.1), focusing more on international 
than regional relations. Both Fakt (27 %) and Super Express (19 %) consid-
ered the consequences of the dispute for Poland to be the most important 
issue. The national perspective was thereby even more visible in the coverage, 
because in this way journalists referred directly to the influence of the event 
on the country. The interviewed journalist from Super Express stated that 
paying attention to these elements is more important when covering issues 
from abroad:
“When we create materials about foreign affairs, the Polish angle always appears some-
where, so the reader can be aware of the consequences for Poland (...). I think that from 
reader’s perspective it was extremely important.” [R3]
Proximity, understood more broadly than just territorial closeness, is an 
important news factor (Chyliński and Russ-Mohl, 2008). Although in the case 
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of the second most covered issue it was rather connected with its negativity, 
since the media mostly presented the negative consequences of the dispute. 
According to Galtung and Ruge (1965) negativity is one of the main factors of 
newsworthiness. Such a result does not seem surprising when taking into ac-
count the character of the examined media. Tabloid journalists writing about 
consequences of the dispute for Poland, referred to emotional factors such as 
fear. In the case of the impact of the conflict for Poland, it could attract social 
interest. One such issue was the direct military threat, which was pointed 
out by a Fakt journalist, when speaking about the causes of social and media 
interest in the dispute:
“While the revolution was interesting, because something historical is happening around 
us, it went to a higher level when the Crimea and Donbass began, because questions 
about ourselves were being raised, and what threatens us in fact.” [R1]
Fear of the conflict transferring to Poland was also connected with Russia’s mili-
tary involvement in Ukraine. The Super Express journalist said that this element, 
for example due to history, could have conditioned the increased interest of the 
audience:
“It was happening close to Poland. It’s obvious that Ukraine was not a threat to us. 
Perhaps Russia’s expansion in Ukraine always was a threat, and the question was – what’s 
next?” [R3]
The threat of Russia’s expansion could have gained the Poles’ interest, espe-
cially those who are readers of tabloid media, but not only them. This is due 
to the fact that Poles perceive Russia as the “enemy” (Taras, 2015), and the 
negativity of the coverage may be directly connected with certain actions of 
this country. A good example of such rhetoric is a cover of Fakt published in 
March after Sergey Aksyonov announced that Crimea wanted to be a part of 
Russia. The cover presents the question: “Will Poland be next?” (see Picture 
3.3). The question was formulated in this way because of the Russian occu-
pation of Crimea and the beginning of disarming Ukrainian soldiers in the 
area. This information was also presented on the cover. Prime Minister Donald 
Tusk is also quoted. He said that the conflict in Ukraine is “to be or not to 
be for Poland” (Fakt, 03/03/2014). He mentions that “we must modernize the 
army” and that “the military intervention of Russia in Ukraine is a threat to our 
borders” (Fakt, 03/03/2014). Presenting such information on the cover may 
suggest to the reader that Russia’s military activities in Ukraine may indeed 
cross over to Poland.
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A similar tone was presented by Super Express (see Picture 3.4). The head-
line “We will sweep Poland from the earth!” refers to the words of Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky for Rossiya 24 (Super Express, 12/08/2014). The politician warns 
that in the case of an outbreak of the Third World War, Poland and the Baltic 
States will be destroyed. The article also contains historic references to the First 
and Second World War and the role of Russian and Soviet leaders in how they 
began, which are clearly context-oriented factors. Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s words 
do not give a realistic description of the situation, but for the ordinary reader it 
may sound disturbing. The use of such historical frames can further strengthen 
the fear among recipients, which was confirmed by Taradai, when writing about 
the role of historical factors in the Ukrainian media’s domestication of the con-
flict in South Ossetia (2014). Of course, Russian expansion is not the only con-
sequence for Poland, but it seems that the use of such rhetoric by the media 
intensified public interest in the conflict.
The presented examples show that the national consequences of the con-
flict appeared both on the covers (13  % of materials), and the whole or half 
pages of tabloids. Tabloids devoted a total of 41.5 pages to this issue, and quality 
newspapers 30.5 pages. It was placed nine times in total on the covers of Gazeta 
Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita. Television news talked about it for three hours 
Picture 3.3: “Will Poland be next?” 
Source: Fakt, 03/03/2014
Picture 3.4: “We will sweep Poland 
from the earth!”. 
Source: Super Express, 12/08/2014 
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and 25 minutes, with two hours of materials published by the TVP. This shows 
that public media, probably due to dependence on political actors, hence due 
to the raison d’état, had to devote more attention to this issue than private 
broadcasters.
The media mechanisms of bringing the conflict closer to the Polish recipient 
will be discussed in detail in the next empirical chapter.
Russia’s military involvement in Ukraine was the third most frequently 
discussed topic. It was more important for quality newspapers (25  % of 
materials in total) and tabloids (21  % of materials in total) than TV news 
programs (13 % of materials in total) (see Tab. 3.1). This might be due to the 
fact that the genres used by journalists in tabloids and quality newspapers 
can have more opinion character than those used in TV news programs. 
Additionally, in the case of tabloids, it might not always be necessary to use 
information that is fully verified (Newman and Fletcher, 2017: 26). Moreover, 
journalists from quality newspapers who wrote about Russia’s military 
involvement could rely on their own analyzes and knowledge – for example, 
when they explained the context of the conflict to the recipients. Moreover, 
the military presence of Russia in Ukraine covered by the tabloids may be 
related to sensationalism and for example strengthening the fear among the 
audience. Especially in the context of a Polish-Russian war – which was men-
tioned as a possibility.
Worth noting is that the fact of a Russian military presence in Ukraine for 
some time was uncertain, and the Kremlin denied it. This may be the reason 
why Wiadomości TVP1 and Fakty TVN published less materials on this subject 
compared to other media. In the case of television, they tried to present photo-
graphic evidence of Russian presence in Eastern Ukraine, to prove to the viewer 
that Russian forces and equipment were indeed there. In this way, visual factors 
and frames could have played an important role in shaping the image of the 
parties to the conflict. According to Zelizer, images can create sympathy or aver-
sion toward actors involved in armed conflict (2004: 131). Aversion is usually 
directed against the aggressor, and Russia can easily be perceived as that when 
taking into account the fact of its military involvement in the events in Ukraine 
(see Picture 3.5).
Segments broadcast by Fakty TVN in August 2014 showed how Russian 
heavy military equipment was being transported across the Ukrainian border 
near the areas controlled by separatists. During the two-minute segment the 
journalist discussed Russian military involvement in the region and claims that 
such activities took place very often. Similar information was also presented in 
other materials made by TVN.
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Russia’s involvement in Ukraine was also confirmed by Wiadomości 
TVP1. The material “The act of aggression” (Wiadomości TVP1, 28/08/2014) 
presents interviews with Alexander Zakharchenko and one of the recruiters 
of the volunteer armed forces, who openly admitted that Russian soldiers are 
fighting with them. At the same time, Zakharchenko stresses that Russian 
troops are fighting in Ukraine as a part of their vacation, and not because 
of orders from the Kremlin. However, these explanations seemed unreliable 
to representatives of Polish authorities and experts, who called it a Russian 
invasion.
The TVN and TVP broadcast interviews and video confirming Russian pres-
ence in Ukraine for over one hour and twenty minutes, which is five percent 
of the total time dedicated to Ukraine by these media. This topic appeared on 
a cover only once, in Rzeczpospolita. The number of pages describing the issue 
of Russian military involvement amounted to 20.5 pages, that is three percent 
of all pages. Therefore, taking into account the amount of information, not the 
number of produced materials, it can be seen that television devoted more atten-
tion to this issue than tabloids and quality newspapers.
Although there are differences in the amount of information published about 
the conflict between different media, in the case of dominant topics it is possible 
to see that there are great similarities (see Tab. 3.1). The Polish media presented 
the conflict with emphasis on similar issues, for example international sanctions. 
As a result, the coverage by the mainstream media, at least at the level of topic 
selection, was very similar. Other frequently covered topics – like “consequences 
Picture 3.5: “The journalist shows Russian military equipment”. 
Source: Fakty TVN, 18/08/2014
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of the conflict for Poland” (12 %) and “Russian military involvement in the con-
flict” (10 %) – show that also when it comes to the general perspective, the Polish 
media paid attention to Russia’s negative actions, which may be one of the things 
that confirms the first research hypothesis.
Who made the choices of which topics to cover is very important. Most of 
the interviewed journalists said that it depended on their own decisions, not 
the editors or owners. This corresponds to the results of previous research, 
which showed that Polish journalists feel a high sense of autonomy in their 
daily work, especially when it comes to choosing which subject to cover 
(Nygren, 2015:  139). The same study also found that autonomy is a factor 
independent of the national media system, and more of an integral part of 
the journalistic profession (Nygren, 2015: 139). That is why the interviewees 
did not talk about feeling pressure in the case of selecting topics to cover. It 
was especially so for journalists working in quality newspapers and televi-
sion programs. Among the reasons for that was that the journalists were on 
the spot, and the very changeable nature of the conflict. Therefore, the pos-
sibility for editors to prepare topics was difficult, which is confirmed by one 
respondent:
“It was difficult when I  was in Donetsk for several days and I  could hardly leave, 
because the pro-Russian side did not give me any accreditation. When for two days 
I  saw how the City Council was burning, and that there were riots, then I  had to 
describe it.” [R8]
Being in the conflict area required the TVN journalist to adapt to the rhythm of 
the dispute and what was happening in front of his eyes. That is why he was in 
fact deciding the topics that were presented to Polish viewers at 19 o’clock. The 
same mechanisms were noticeable in the case of public media. The journalist 
who worked for Polish Television (TVP) also pointed to the course of the conflict 
as a factor that determines the presented issues more than editors:
“My work is primarily about reporting what is happening. I’m a news journalist and my 
job is to prepare relatively fast and current relations. In Ukraine, everything that was 
happening was almost happening in front of me.” [R10]
Being able to cover the course of the dispute in a relatively free way may also be 
the result of the character of television media, which seems to be confirmed by 
the above statement. Journalists from news stations, who are forced to quickly 
report information from the front, do not have too much time to prepare 
materials. Their role, especially in the case of armed conflicts, is documenting 
rather than creating information. Of course, this situation is mainly applicable to 
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foreign correspondents close to the action. Journalists who are reporting a dis-
pute from another country may have a slightly different opinion in this respect. 
A good example is the statement made by a tabloid journalist who claims that 
teamwork is important in his media organization:
“We work in such a way that we think about a certain category of information and look 
for it all the time. A lot of ideas were created outside of me, and I was just a worker. It 
can be said that some of the topics were imposed on me, but I didn’t have to write about 
something that I disagree with.” [R1]
Teamwork when searching for information that may be interesting to the 
readers does not seem surprising, since only a few newspapers had their own 
correspondents in Ukraine. Rewriting, which was also mentioned by the respon-
dent, is almost necessary in this situation. However, relying only on materials 
created by other media can be problematic. Therefore, taking suggestions from 
the editor-in-chief or colleagues seems understandable. In addition, the respon-
dent draws attention to the freedom of choice, especially at the ideological level, 
which is the dimension of internal pluralism (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). In the 
case of tabloid media, and perhaps even more so in the case of Fakt, which has 
a foreign owner, opinion pluralism and thus ideological plurality seems to be a 
standard (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2011: 55). Therefore, even if the respondent had to 
prepare articles for predetermined topics, he still had the freedom to choose if it 
was something he wanted to do.
Journalists from quality newspapers had a similar situation and also spoke 
about a general sense of professional autonomy. Both the Gazeta Wyborcza and 
Rzeczpospolita journalists responded negatively to the question about the influ-
ence of the editors, owners or politicians on the selection of topics. One of the 
respondents even indicated that it is a standard in his media organization:
“I decided what I was describing and who I was talking to. The editorial office consisting 
of my colleagues sitting on the left and right didn’t interfere in it in any way. This is 
Rzeczpospolita and that’s how it looks.” [R6]
Interestingly, despite the quite clearly defined editorial line, the respondent said 
that he had full influence on the content of his articles and did not feel any pres-
sure. The teamwork described by the Fakt journalist did not take place in this 
case. This may be due to several reasons. First of all, the respondent mainly write 
opinion articles or columns, therefore he has the freedom to choose the topic, as 
well as to give the text a certain tone. Secondly, long work experience, and thus 
the position in the editorial office can also affect professional autonomy, which 
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seems important while covering the conflict which is so ambiguous from the 
Polish point of view.
The journalists’ almost total autonomy in selecting topics shows that 
the editorial line was not an important element in the case of the conflict 
described. This seems interesting due to the diversity of the analyzed media 
in this context. Work autonomy is also important for another reason. The 
choice of subject can influence the audience’s perception of the conflict. This 
is due to the fact that in this way the journalist can draw attention to specific 
problems that, when published at the right time, can enhance the perspective 
of the medium or the author (Entman, 1993). One of the respondents points 
to these factors:
“[…] I started to write about the life of the Crimean Tatars during the annexation pro-
cesses. The choice of the topic itself was a certain response [to Russia’s actions] and 
showing a bigger drama.” [R7]
Drawing attention to the Crimean Tatars in the context of the Ukrainian con-
flict could be an implicit negative judgement of Russia and pro-Russian ac-
tors. Especially when taking into account the displacement of Tatars by the 
Soviet authorities in the 1940’s and problems with their return to the Peninsula 
(Olszański, 2014). In addition, this minority group was against the inclusion of 
Crimea to Russia, and their relations with Ukrainian authorities were relatively 
good. Therefore, describing the Crimea annexation from the point of view of the 
Crimean Tatars, who were against it, could be a form of journalistic bias. This 
may indicate a rather pro-Ukrainian than pro-Russian attitude to the situation. 
On the other hand, it is an extension of the conflict perspective by reference to 
several actors and sources, which can be considered as acting impartial. This is 
due to the fact that sketching the context of the conflict and appealing to other 
actors, usually absent in the media discourse, makes it possible to understand 
what the dispute is really about.
The choice and frequency of a given topic not only generates social interest, 
but can also influence the perception of the certain phenomenon. The presented 
fragments of interviews confirm that it was mostly journalists who decided about 
topic selection, having almost full autonomy in this matter. However, as previous 
research shows, journalists often reflect the values and priorities of the media 
organization they belong to, and editorial policy and similar factors are impor-
tant for Polish journalists when choosing their workplace (Anikina, 2015: 153). 
It is possible that the selection of topics, although it is made by the individual 
journalists, in this way can be influenced by the character of the certain medium. 
Equally important, if not even more important, is the journalist’s nationality, 
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sense of patriotism and adherence to the national interest (see Sreedharan, 2013; 
Ravi, 2005). When covering armed conflicts – especially those which affect the 
journalist’s homeland – this may become more important than the interests of 
the media organization.
3.1.2  Sources
The selection of sources of information as well as the topic selection may influ-
ence the tone of the presented information. This is due to the fact that the refer-
ence to specific sources or their omission may show the degree of bias of a given 
medium or a journalist (Lee et al., 2005). This seems particularly important in 
the case of armed conflicts. Showing both sides, even if we disagree with any 
of them, is necessary in order to understand the real causes of the dispute (see 
McGoldrick and Lynch, 2000; Galtung, 2006). The explanation of the extent to 
which this issue, as well as other ones, could affect the journalistic work and the 
coverage will be presented in this subsection.
3 518 quotations appeared in the analyzed materials (see Tab. 3.2), which 
shows that an average of two quotations per material was used. It should be 
noted that the analysis included only visible sources. The greatest number of 
quotations were used by Wiadomości TVP1 (944 quotations), and Gazeta 
Wyborcza (781 quotations). The least references were found in tabloids (431 
quotations in total). The differences mainly result from the number of col-
lected research units, and may be caused by the necessity of using quotes 
from other media or sources, rather than information obtained from indi-
vidual conversations. Therefore, the most rarely quoted sources included press 
agencies and social media. The Russian soldiers and citizens were equally rarely 
referred to, which may be due to the fact that Russia’s military involvement in 
Ukraine was not officially confirmed by the Kremlin for some time (Walker, 
2015). That is why access to military sources of information could have been 
limited. On the other hand, contacts with the army are generally marked by 
certain restrictions (see Czapnik, 2007; Knightley, 2003), for example due to 
confidentiality but perhaps also a willingness to control information output. 
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Political actors are the most quoted sources, which could mean that the 
coverage was strongly elite-oriented, which according to Galtung is one of the 
common aspects of war journalism (2006). In this way it is possible that less at-
tention is paid to the opinions of the victims of the conflict (see Galtung, 2002; 
Ottosen, 2009: 93), which indeed could explain the low number of quotations 
of civilians in and from conflict area (2 %) in comparison with political actors 
(44 %). These were mainly representatives of Polish authorities, as well as rep-
resentatives of the parties to the conflict. European Union members were also 
often referred to. Often quoting politicians may result from the dominant topic 
of the coverage, which was international political discussion and sanctions. In 










Press agency 1 1 0 0 2 0 1
Foreign media 7 6 5 8 5 2 5
Journalist in the conflict area 9 12 9 0 5 5 6
Social media 1 3 1 0 2 0 1
Ukrainian politicians 8 9 1 14 12 12 10
Ukrainian military 3 2 6 3 7 5 5
Ukrainian citizens 2 2 2 1 6 4 3
Russian politicians 6 2 12 8 6 10 8
Russian military 1 1 2 0 1 0 1
Russian citizens 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
Separatists 3 3 7 5 5 6 5
Polish politicians 14 16 7 14 11 20 13
Polish military 5 3 0 1 1 2 2
Polish citizens 5 4 1 0 1 2 1
Polish experts 15 8 2 4 2 9 5
Russian experts 2 1 5 2 1 0 2
Ukrainian experts 0 1 4 6 0 0 2
International experts 1 6 7 10 5 1 6
EU-politicians 4 4 9 9 10 8 9
US-politicians 2 2 4 5 5 4 4
NATO 2 1 3 2 3 2 2
Civilians in and from conflict 
area
3 2 2 0 2 3 2
Other 5 11 11 7 7 4 6
Total 188 243 781 682 944 680 3518
Source: Author
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addition, especially in the case of quality media, talking to official sources 
seems to be important, due to the nature of the presented information, 
and also because of their credibility and knowledge (see Lee and Maslog, 
2005; Paletz and Entman, 1981) which is confirmed by one respondent’s 
statement:
“First of all, if I am describing this conflict from the Polish perspective, then these [sources] 
are from having contacts with the politicians themselves. These are interviews, and also 
conversations that take place on all occasions. For example, with the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and people around him. With the Minister of Defense, and President.” [R4]
Covering the conflict from a particular perspective may affect the selection of 
sources (Riegert, 1998), which was mentioned by the respondent. That is why 
in the case of Polish media the dominant sources of information were national 
politicians (13 %). Following this lead, one should consider the extent to which 
more frequent references to Ukrainian sources (20  % in total) than Russian 
(12 % in total) or pro-Russian (5 %) could reflect the general perspective of the 
conflict. That is to say, it could have been connected to a mutual dislike between 
the media and the pro-Russian side, or perhaps it was difficult in general to con-
tact them. To find out what could have been the cause, the journalists were asked 
about the extent to which their Polish origin influenced their contacts with the 
sides of the conflict. The Rzeczpospolita journalist said that during his phone 
conversations with separatists, he felt a real dislike, because of his origin:
“They cursed at me at first. I have repeatedly experienced these types of things in the 
East for various reasons. There are very different resentments in relation to Poland. And 
it is very possible that my patience would end at some point.” [R6]
At the same time, the respondent points out that despite some reluctance, he tried 
to approach his work in a neutral way. Although he disagreed with separatists, 
and even thought their words were nonsense, he decided to present their point 
of view:
“I have nothing to regret when it comes to giving the floor to the opposite side. I even 
have a grudge against myself that I muddied the minds of my readers with what they 
[Separatists] were talking about.” [R6]
The desire to present the opinion of both sides was also one of the reasons why the 
TVP journalist went to the Crimea during its annexation and later to Donbass, 
despite “Western media” not being welcome there. She said that Russian propa-
ganda was the reason for this situation:
“They were fantastic for Russian journalists, and very negative for Polish and Western 
ones (...) They were very negative for the media, but you had to be hard and say: We 
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came here, because we want to know what is your position, and why you want to be a 
part of Russia. This made things easier.” [R9]
Although interstate relations or history could have influenced the contact 
between the media and parties to the conflict the journalists tried to present the 
event in a rather neutral way, which was confirmed by the respondents.
Another issue that limited access to sources is the fact that mainly Gazeta 
Wyborcza, Wiadomości TVP1 and Fakty TVN had their correspondents in 
Ukraine during the research period. Others were mostly describing the conflict 
from Warsaw. Therefore, it was necessary for them to rely on their own contacts 
and internet sources. Consequently, the possibility of talking to civilians or 
soldiers could have been limited. That is why some of the media had to rely on 
freelancers or other media’s reporting, which was especially common for tabloids:
“We used the correspondence of other Poles. TVN always had their correspondents so 
we also used what they gave.” [R1]
The use of information from other media was common in the case of those media 
organizations that did not have their own journalists in Ukraine. In order to 
preserve the plurality of information, it was necessary to refer to other sources, 
including foreign ones. Using information from foreign media (5 %) could be 
one of the forms of solving the problem, and journalists often did it:
“I worked with original, not translated sources. These were Ukrainian, Russian, 
English, mainly American sources. Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, the Guardian. 
Generally a wide spectrum.” [R3]
Looking at and taking information from foreign media also seemed important 
in the case of a desire to hear the rhetoric of the parties to the conflict. Especially 
when it was difficult for a direct contact:
“For some time I was an urgent listener and viewer of Russia Today, which might not 
have been too glorious, but it was a tool used to learn the argumentation and thinking 
of the other side.” [R4]
The use of Ukrainian or Russian sources of information, especially media, 
seemed necessary to check to what extent national media influenced public 
opinion on the conflict and the “enemy”. However, relying on these types of 
information could also be threat to journalists. The very nature of the cov-
ered phenomenon meant that filtering information, especially if it came 
from the parties to the conflict, was more crucial than in the case of other 
events. Disinformation was an element of warfare (see Pacek, 2018; Baluk and 
Doroszko, 2017). Therefore, a lot of fake news appeared in the media and other 
information channels.
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The content analysis allowed for examining the degree of source criticism 
found in the materials (see Tab. 3.3). Additionally, it was checked which side of 
the conflict was accused of disinformation and fake news, both by the journalists 
and their sources (see Tab. 3.4). In this way it was possible to check whether the 
journalists judged the parties to the conflict similarly, or if one side was seen 
as more dishonest. In the case of conflict reporting and war journalism in gen-
eral, it is quite common to “expose ‘their’ untruths” (Galtung, 2006), which usu-
ally benefits the perceived victim rather than the aggressor (see Ottosen, 2005; 
McLaughlin, 2002). This seems to confirm the results of the content analysis and 
interviews with journalists.
Explicit criticism of sources appeared in 104 of the materials, and 56 times 
in total in television news. Most of the criticism concerned false informa-
tion. Forty three percent of all criticism toward sources referred to this issue. 
Materials made by Wiadomości TVP1 and Gazeta Wyborcza provide good 
examples. The material “Polish mercenaries” (09/06/2014) made by TVP 
presents separatists accusing Polish and Czech military companies for involve-
ment in the conflict and supporting the Ukrainian side. These claims were 
negated both by experts and government representatives, and considered as 
Russian propaganda. Another example was related to the massacre in Donetsk, 
where civilians were killed while waiting for the trolleybus (Wiadomości TVP1, 
“Ukraine”, 22/01/2015). Kiev authorities held pro-Russian separatists respon-
sible for the attack, while the Kremlin spoke about a Ukrainian crime against 
humanity. The civilians’ statements, including the families of the victims, 
that the attack was initiated by separatists were also presented. Accusations 
against the Kremlin and the pro-Russian separatists, as well as criticism of 
their statements, were also made after the MH17 catastrophe. Materials on this 
topic appeared in Gazeta Wyborcza in the articles “Who shot down the pas-
senger plane?” (18/07/2014) or “Moscow blames Ukraine” (19/07/2014). These 
materials contained criticism expressed by both the sources themselves, for 
example Ukrainian authorities, as well as the journalist. Radziwinowicz, who 
was at that time correspondent for Gazeta Wyborcza in Moscow, wrote that 
the Kremlin began a propaganda campaign against Ukrainians just after the 
shooting down of MH17 (“Moscow blames Ukraine”, 19/07/2014). It was made 
to transfer the responsibility for the catastrophe to the Ukrainians. The jour-
nalist refers to reports by Russia Today and to the Russian politician Mironow, 
who say that it is Europe and the USA who want to blame Russia for the catas-
trophe, and make false accusations.
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Partiality 0 75 22 33 13 33 21
Not complete 
picture
0 0 6 45 12 33 16
False facts 6 0 67 22 75 25 43
Other 94 25 5 0 0 9 20
N = 17 4 18 9 32 24 104
Source: Author













65 85 71 96 59 71 73
Russian rebels 35 15 29 4 38 26 26
Ukraine 
(military)
0 0 0 0 3 3 1
N= 23 20 38 26 33 35 176
Source: Author
The criticism towards Russian authorities and the separatists for transmit-
ting false information showed that these entities were considered to provide 
most of the disinformation being spread (see Tab. 3.4). Both the analyzed 
materials and the respondents’ statements confirmed that it was the Russian 
media and politicians, who manipulated information to the greatest extent. 
Only in one percent of the materials in total was the Ukrainian side accused 
of the same thing, and only in Wiadomości TVP1 and Fakty TVN, but these 
accusations mainly came from quotes. In this regard, it seems that Galtung’s 
(2006) theory that the media focus mostly on the lies of one side, was con-
firmed. It is also a form of confirmation of the first research hypothesis, 
because it shows that the Polish media did not recognize the Russian side as 
a reliable source of information. This was also confirmed by the low number 
of quotations of Russian actors, which might consequently influence the per-
spective of the coverage.
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One of the issues for which the Kremlin was criticized the most was the denial 
of the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine – despite the later confirmation by 
Putin that Russian soldiers were in Crimea before and after referendum. This 
behavior by the Russian authorities, spreading this type of information in the 
public space, is unacceptable for the Gazeta Wyborcza journalist:
“Putin, who said that there are no soldiers on Crimea, and then admits that, of course, our 
brave soldiers liberated the Crimea, this is a first degree falsification. And that’s not some 
random guy saying that, but the President of the state. Interestingly, he doesn’t hide it. If 
we look at it from this point of view, then this is a waterfall, this is Niagara of lies.” [R4]
The Russian authorities being perceived as presenting false information could have 
made both Western media and the international community not willing to accept 
messages from them (see Boyd-Barrett, 2017; Pasitselska, 2017). It was equally 
problematic to accept the opinions of pro-Russian separatists, because they under-
took almost identical activities in this matter as the Kremlin. The Rzeczpospolita 
journalist even claimed that the separatists acted similar to communists from the 
time of the Polish People’s Republic, who used lies to manipulate the public:
“When I talked to them, it took me back to my youth and it was like talking with PZPR’s 
agitators. It’s a qualitative leap. It’s not quantitative, that someone is lying less or more. 
This is a qualitative leap. For them there is no sense of truth or lies. There is revolu-
tionary truth and everything is subordinated to it.” [R6]
Furthermore, Russian media, especially TV stations, very often duplicated the 
Kremlin’s messages, while also creating their own, which served to strengthen the 
authorities’ rhetoric. In addition, the Ukrainian perspective was often lacking, which 
made it difficult for the recipients to create their own opinion about the dispute. 
One of the journalists who were in Ukraine during the research period mentions 
that he had the opportunity to observe how the Russian media worked on the spot:
“From my point of view, it had nothing to do with journalism. For me it is a complete 
denial of journalism.” [R5]
The respondent explains that the Russian media were not interested in presenting 
reliable information, neither the context of the conflict or the opinion of the 
other side. This was difficult to understand and accept for Western countries and 
media. However, as the TVP journalist explains, this is the result of differences at 
the level of professed values, and thus accepted standards:
“We don’t understand one thing. We are still governing by our democratic rights. We 
present information in such a way that we present at least two sources, two sides of the 
conflict, because it’s more honest. And they don’t care.” [R9]
Presenting only one side of the conflict, or even downright false information, 
was an important element of the war. That is why, apart from the armed conflict, 
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there was also an informational conflict in Ukraine – making it a so-called hybrid 
war – which one respondent points out:
“These are classic hybrid activities  – not only kinetics, but also soft activities in the 
media, on the internet – which the war in Ukraine showed in an outstanding way.” [R11]
Hybrid war includes disinformation and propaganda as one of its dimensions 
(see Nemeth, 2002; Pacek, 2018), and as confirmed by the respondent [R11], this 
strongly influenced the media’s work. However, running the war in this way was 
not only the result of Russia’s actions. The analysis of the research materials (see 
Tab. 3.4) and interviews with journalists showed that the Ukrainian side also 
used information tools at that time:
“There is a lot of such disinformation, both on the Ukrainian and Russian side, because 
propaganda is a tool used during the conflict.” [R10]
The opinion of the Wiadomości TVP1 journalist seems to be confirmed by 
another respondent. He adds that the work of the media in such conditions can 
be as difficult as working near the battlefield, because of the necessity to separate 
truth from propaganda:
“All parties to the conflict work in this way. You must understand that it’s necessary to 
be able to verify information, and this is often difficult. Sometimes impossible.” [R11]
The difficulty or complete inability to verify some sources could lead to them being 
underrepresented (see Tab. 3.2). On the other hand, the disinformation tools used, 
especially by the Russian side and separatists, made Polish and Western politicians 
and media, treat their messages as unreliable information. The problem was also 
the low number of Polish correspondents in Ukraine, as well as complicated inter-
state and intercultural relations between Poland, Ukraine and Russia, which, ac-
cording to the respondents, was also a difficulty in the access to sources. That is 
why Polish politicians were the most often quoted sources. However, the Ukrainian 
sources were also often quoted, which had the effect that this side of the conflict, 
and the Ukrainian perspective, might have been dominant in the Polish coverage.
3.2  Definition of the conflict
The events in Ukraine, which coverage by the Polish media is the subject of 
my study, can be defined in various ways. Considering the definitions used in 
international relations studies, it is difficult to say whether this is an armed con-
flict or a war. And if it is the latter, it raises the question of whether it is a civil 
war or rather a war between states. Another frequently used term is hybrid war 
which combines armed struggle, both between state and non-state actors, with 
elements of economic and informational warfare (see Pawlak, 2015; Hajduk and 
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Stępniewski, 2015:  136). It seems interesting to study how the media defined 
the events in Eastern Europe and their causes, because there is a difference of 
opinion on this matters. This is important, because media discourse can shape 
social discourse, especially in the context of the conflict causality, the applied 
nomenclature, and thus its general perception.
3.2.1  Nature of the conflict
One of the issues featured in the content analysis was the causes of the conflict. 
Seventy eight percent of the gathered material contained information about it 
(see Tab. 3.5). Among the six key reasons for the conflict in Ukraine, most were 
related to Russia’s rather than Ukraine’s actions. Russian support for separatists 
was mentioned 53 percent of the time as the cause. Thirty four percent of the 
time, it was presented as a Russian invasion. Therefore it can be seen that the 
media recognized the Russians and separatists as guilty of starting the conflict. 
This might have something to do with the dispositional enemy image of Russia, 
where the Polish media seem to have expected from the start that Russia would 
be the aggressor (see Ottosen, 1995). The historically hostile Polish-Russian rela-
tions could have played an important role in this respect.



















8 2 2 0 0 3 4
As a result of 
divided country
11 2 5 1 9 3 5
Russian support 
for separatists
33 55 54 48 67 64 53
Russian invasion 38 39 36 49 24 29 34
Other 6 1 2 2 0 1 3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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It is possible to notice some differences between television and newspapers 
in how they presented the causes of the conflict. The view of both Wiadomości 
TVP1 and Fakty TVN, was that Russian support for the separatists had the 
greatest impact on the outbreak of military combat (over 60 % of their broadcasted 
segments in total). Military assistance was the most common form of that support. 
In one of TVP’s segments, “Fights in Ukraine,” the Ukrainian authorities accused 
Russia of arming separatists in Donetsk and Lugansk, who attacked civilians and 
fired on a bus (Wiadomości TVP1, 14/01/2015). Accusations of providing arms 
to separatists are also made in the material “Ukrainian offensive” (Wiadomości 
TVP1, 18/01/2015). In the news segment, devoted to the fight for the Donetsk air-
port, it was said that the separatists used Russian weapons against the Ukrainian 
army, and in effect Russia supported one side of the war. The Russian support for 
the rebels was also discussed in the context of the annexation of Crimea, which 
might be considered as the beginning of the conflict. For example, in Fakty TVN 
some materials discussed Russian soldiers disarming Ukrainian troops stationed 
in Crimea (16/03/2014) and Putin’s request to the Duma to accept the inclusion 
of the Peninsula to the Russian Federation (19/03/2014).
Rzeczpospolita had a somewhat different perspective. The quality newspaper 
recognized that it was a Russian invasion that inflamed the situation in Eastern 
Ukraine (49 %). It was quite eloquently expressed on one of the August covers of 
the daily (see Picture 3.6), which seems to be a good example of illustrating the dis-
positional enemy image of Russia with pictures (Ottosen, 1995). On its first page, 
Rzeczpospolita published an article called “Russia attacks Ukraine” (29/08/2014) 
about a joint attack of separatists and Russian troops on the port in Nowoazowsk. 
The author of the material refers to President Poroshenko, who said that the Russian 
invasion may lead to the separation of Ukraine from the Azov Sea. At the same 
time, the US ambassador for the OSCE is quoted as saying that Russia’s actions 
are a threat to Ukrainian independence. Despite the rather negative tone of the 
text, the reader’s attention is likely caught by the attached graphic by Krauze. The 
graphic shows a huge bear in a military cap with a red star, lying with his back to 
the ground. It can be assumed that this bear is meant to symbolize Russia. There are 
also smaller, almost crushed, figures escaping from under his body, which may refer 
to Ukrainian society or army. It seems that the size of the bear and figures were used 
to compare the Russian and Ukrainian forces, and to highlight the fact that Russia is 
an active aggressor in the conflict. However, the caption of the graphic seems to be 
the most interesting. It says: “It’s not an invasion, I just want to stretch my bones!” 
This sentence might be a sarcastic response to the Kremlin’s statements that Russia 
is not a party to the conflict. However, the information presented in the article is a 
kind of contradiction, because although Russia officially did not participate in the 
war, it still supported the separatists, who are important actors in the dispute.Róa Norström - 978-3-631-79027-4
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Russia’s support to separatists was also often highlighted in the case of how the 
conflict was described (see Tab. 3.6). The content analysis shows that most often, 
the events in Ukraine were defined as a conflict between the state and non-state 
actors supported by another state. Slightly less often – with a difference of only 
two percentage points  – the conflict was called a dispute between two states, 
Russia and Ukraine. Despite the fact that Russian support for separatists, and 
not Russian invasion, was the most often mentioned description of the con-
flict, Russia’s involvement was so significant that the conflict could have been 
regarded as a dispute between states.
Covering the conflict in Ukraine as an inter-state dispute was most often done 
by journalists from quality newspapers. This type of rhetoric was especially notice-
able in Rzeczpospolita. This is not surprising, especially since the daily considered 
Russian invasion as the main cause of the dispute. A good example is the article 
“Putin liked war” (Rzeczpospolita, 08/04/2014). Already in the first sentence infor-
mation was presented about Russian aggression in Ukraine, which was apparent in 
Crimea, and which constituted a serious violation of international law. Therefore, 
it is a confirmation that the dispute is going on at the inter-state level. At the same 
time, the article contains references to events in modern history, especially the 
Picture 3.6: “Russia attacks Ukraine”. 
Source: Rzeczpospolita, 29/08/2014
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As a civil war 0 0 2 1 0 0 1
Between the  
East and West
4 4 1 1 0 2 2
Other 8 4 0 3 2 16 4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N= 170 206 438 385 294 233 1726
Source: Author
conflicts in Chechnya and Georgia, where Russia’s involvement was also obvious. 
The author also critically refers to the actions of the West, claiming that the lack of 
decisive action meant that the EU and NATO demonstrated their weakness towards 
the Kremlin, which is a party to the dispute and in fact the aggressor. Importantly, 
the very titles of some of the articles from Rzeczpospolita suggest that the role of 
Russia is critical in this dispute. Examples include:  “Russians are waiting at the 
border” (Rzeczpospolita, 18–19/06/2014), “Russia is breaking into Ukraine: a new 
front in the south” (Rzeczpospolita, 26/08/2014), and “Russians again in Ukraine” 
(Rzeczpospolita, 05/11/2014). The apparent armed presence of the Russian 
Federation in Ukraine may therefore be taken as a confirmation that they took an 
active part in the dispute, and are not just passively supporting the separatists’ cause.
The most commonly used description of the event was that it was a conflict 
between Ukraine and the separatists supported by Russia. The most materials 
with this angle appeared in Fakty TVN, Gazeta Wyborcza and Fakt. Similarly to 
the causes of the conflict, the description of the conflict was usually related to mil-
itary and political support given to the rebels by Russia. In addition, the impor-
tance of Russia in the dispute was also expressed through materials dedicated to 
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peace negotiations. An interesting example is the material that appeared in Fakty 
TVN (03/09/2014). It said that despite starting a dialogue at the state level, Russia 
claims that the events in Ukraine constitute a civil war. Therefore, the peace talks 
which Russia was invited to should take place between Ukraine and the separatists, 
without the Kremlin. The material also includes Barack Obama’s statements who, 
during his visit to Estonia, said that Russia’s goal is to destabilize the situation in 
Ukraine in the long term. The then US president also said that although the con-
flict is physically led by separatists, they are encouraged and supported financially 
and militarily by Russia. Defining the conflict as a dispute between a state and 
non-state actors supported by another state was also visible in the newspaper 
coverage. In the article “Who disassembles Ukraine” (02/05/2014) the Gazeta 
Wyborcza journalist tries to answer the question – who is in fact to blame for the 
crisis in Eastern Europe? The author claims that the situation in Donetsk is very 
similar to what happened in Transnistria, especially since this dispute too con-
cerned the Russian-speaking population, and the involvement of Russia was also 
significant. The same situation was, in his opinion, taking place in Ukraine. The 
journalist claims that the Kremlin has been destabilizing Ukraine since the 1990’s, 
and supporting separatists is just a part of this plan. The article is an interesting 
example of how journalists describe the conflict in Ukraine. Although it is indi-
cated that the dispute is taking place between Ukraine and the rebels, the use of 
historical references to the situation in Transnistria may strengthen the feeling that 
Russia’s presence there is not accidental. This is due to the fact that the historical 
contexts have a specific meaning and give the recipient a clear way to interpret the 
content (Gurevitch et al., 1995), in this case in a strongly anti-Russian way. The 
difference in what terms the media used to describe the conflict is relatively little, 
since journalists seem to take it for granted that Russia is the aggressor.
The differences in how the causes of the conflict were described, and the 
different terminology used by the media, may have resulted from problems of 
determining what was actually happening in Ukraine. During the interviews, 
some journalists were asked how they would describe the fighting in Ukraine 
and the reasons of their occurrence. Some of the answers show that respondents 
could have had problems with clearly defining the dispute due to its complexity. 
This issue was noted by the Gazeta Wyborcza journalist:
“More and more often we have to deal with situations in which it’s increasingly difficult 
to determine what a war is in the classic sense of the word and what it’s not. It is such a 
problem for us that this is partly a war between two countries, but also an internal war.” [R4]
Despite having experience in covering armed conflicts, the quoted journalist 
points out that the conflict in Ukraine differed from the other wars he has 
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reported on. Therefore, clearly identifying who the actual parties to the dispute 
are, and why it started, could have been problematic. This opinion seems to be 
confirmed by another respondent:
“I think that with this conflict, it is like with the name of this war, which is also a hybrid 
in some sense. One the one hand, we can see Russian aggression against Ukraine from 
the beginning, because weapons were delivered. On the other hand, there are also locals 
who are involved in this conflict. It is very complicated.” [R5]
The hybrid character of the dispute was certainly an element that could hinder 
the work of journalists, both due to the involvement of certain actors and also 
because of the disinformation. However, despite the complexity of the events, the 
quoted respondents confirmed that Russia’s role in the conflict was significant, 
although it was shown in various ways. A similar trend was observed in the case 
of the content analysis. Considering how the causes of the conflict were defined, 
it can be noticed that especially for Rzeczpospolita the situation in Ukraine was 
the result of Russia’s aggression. The quality newspaper quite clearly expressed 
this issue, while writing about Russia’s violation of international law and sim-
ilar activities in the past. Although the other analyzed media more often than 
Rzeczpospolita blamed the pro-Russian separatists for the conflict, a strong criti-
cism of Russia in general was also visible in their content. It is worth noting that 
only a few materials blamed Ukraine for the war. Such articles appeared in the 
press, in tabloids and in Gazeta Wyborcza, but they were rather the results of 
used quotations than the opinions of journalists or media in general.
3.2.2  Terminology used to describe the conflict
An important element of the conducted research was also to check what words 
were used to describe the events in Ukraine as well as the actors participating 
in them. On this basis, it was possible to see what kinds of meanings were given 
to these issues by the media, especially in the context of their later perception 
by the audience (see Nygren et al., 2016: 7; Winston et al., 2010: 97). It seems 
that the phrases used, together with the description of the causes of the conflict 
and its definition, may reinforce support for one perspective – pro-Russian or 
pro-Ukrainian. In that way it is possible for the media to put the main respon-
sibility for the conflict on one of the two parties and at the same time create 
a dichotomy between “victim” and “enemy” (Carpentier, 2005). That can lead 
to the “enemy” party being demonized, which has been seen in how the media 
defined the causes of the conflict and its character.
Among the list of alternatives, the events in Ukraine were most often referred 
to as a “war” (see Tab. 3.7). It seems that this type of expression could be associ-
ated with the presence of a state actor in the dispute and it being aggressive, as 
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well as with intense military operations. Secondly, the word “war” is definitely 
more emotionally charged than “conflict”. Therefore, the use of such terms by 
the media could emphasize the information, and thus increase the interest of 
recipients. Furthermore, by using the word “war”, which has strongly negative 
connotations for most people (Cox, 2016), some of the media outlets may have 
wanted to give Russia’s actions in Ukraine a negative tone. Examples include 
articles from Rzeczpospolita, such as “Putin threatens war” (03/03/2014), and 
Fakt – “The world is facing war and the West is silent” (03/03/2014). Looking at 
the frequency of the term in the materials, it can be seen that it was most often 
used by television and tabloids (see Tab. 3.7). In the case of quality newspapers, 
especially Rzeczpospolita, the term “conflict” was used, which has a more broad 
meaning and may refer to both military actions and economic and political 
disputes (see Tab. 3.7). This seems to be understandable considering the most fre-
quently described issues by the daily, which were international political discus-
sion and sanctions. “Russian invasion” was the third most frequently used term 
about the events in Ukraine. This concept was mainly used by journalists from 
Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita in the case of opinion articles. Interestingly, 
most articles on this subject were published in March and April 2014, which may 
be related to the annexation of Crimea and the presence of so-called “little green 
men” on the peninsula. Therefore, it shows that the phrases used – “war” as well 
as “Russian invasion” – are directly connected to the negative actions of Russia.










War 49 46 40 35 60 53 46
Conflict 16 29 31 43 23 32 31
Situation 2 9 4 1 2 0 3
Civil war 0 1 2 1 2 0 1
Russian 
invasion
4 10 14 15 2 5 9
Crisis 12 1 4 3 4 7 5
Uprising 
rebellion
5 3 2 0 0 0 1
Intervention 12 0 0 0 0 0 1
ATO 0 1 3 2 7 3 3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N= 122 200 391 355 292 206 1566
Source: Author
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The terms used for the parties to the conflict have also been analyzed. The 
rebels were usually referred to as “separatists”, “Russians” or “pro-Russian” ac-
tors (see Tab. 3.8). The differences may result both from the description of the 
conflict (see Tab. 3.5) and its causes (see Tab. 3.6), as well as from the twofold 
nature of the dispute – that it is a war between states or between a state and 
non-state actors supported by another state. This complexity could cause dif-
ficulties in defining the involved parties, especially since some of the terms 
already contain very strong connotations, and linguistic frames can also be 
used as a way to demonize the enemy (Ottosen, 1995). It is worth noting that 
the quality media, both the press and television, most often used the terms 
“separatists” in relation to the rebels, because it corresponds to how Ukraine 
is being divided. It is a less negative term than “bandit” or “terrorist,” which 
in fact also appeared on the list. Therefore, the use of the terms “pro-Russian” 
or “separatists” seems to be less judgmental for the media to use, especially 
for television and quality dailies, and thus a more secure choice of wording. 
Tabloids most often went for the term “Russians”, thus indicating the involve-
ment of Russia in Ukraine. A good example is the article “That’s how Putin 
lies” from Fakt about the occupation of Crimea, where the journalist wrote 
that “Russian soldiers based in the Crimea are those self-defense units wearing 
uniforms bought in the shop just around the corner” (06/03/14). The article 
sarcastically paraphrases Putin’s words, who stated that the soldiers in Crimea 
were not from the Russian army, and that similar uniforms could be bought in 
almost every military shop (Shevchenko, 2014). The use of the word “Russians” 
by tabloids may be associated with the most often mentioned cause of the dis-
pute – a “Russian invasion”. Moreover, it might be a way of presenting Russia’s 
actions as illegal and aggressive (Boyd-Barrett, 2017). Fakt and Super Express 
made more references to the Russian army than to the separatists (see Tab. 
3.8), which can mean that these media through language demonized Russia’s 
actions in the strongest way. Interestingly, the results of the project “Ukraine 
2014 – media war and the war in media” (see Nygren and Hök, 2016; Nygren 
et  al., 2016) showed that the Ukrainian media very rarely used phrases that 
referred directly to Russia. It can therefore be said that the language used by 
the Polish media was more characterized by a demonization of Russia than 
the Ukrainian media – despite Ukraine being a side of the conflict and victim 
of Russia’s aggression. I realize that this is not a perfect comparison since the 
project covered a much shorter research period as well as a smaller number of 
analyzed media. However, it is still interesting because it shows that Poland’s 
aversion toward Russia – for example due to historical reasons – might have 
been stronger than the animosity felt by Ukraine.
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Among the words least used were such terms as “terrorists” and “criminals/
bandits”. The interviewed journalists were asked if the use of those names in 
relation to the parties to the conflict is appropriate. Most of the respondents 
considered this unacceptable, especially because of the words’ emotional char-
acter. They accepted them to appear in opinion articles. However, one of the 
respondents said that such nomenclature can be appropriate, because of the 
methods used by the parties to the conflict:
“If someone uses terrorist methods, then you can use such wording. That is, what 
happened in Crimea can be described as a terrorist act. It was not an open war. It is not 
an ordinary crime. It’s terrorism.” [R2]
The Gazeta Wyborcza journalist disagrees. He believes that the same effect – that 
is, condemnation of what has happened in the eyes of the recipients – can be 
achieved by accurately reporting what is happening:
“From my point of view, it seems that the description of a given event can defend itself. 
Then the reader can call it what he wants. Certain things, even if I don’t use the term 
[terrorist/bandits], still looks bad.” [R5]
It is important to clarify that in most cases these words were used in quotes. The 
journalists also agree that when words like “terrorist/bandit” are used in the con-
text of referring to someone’s statement, it is necessary to accurately reproduce 
it. Then the reader can understand the perspectives of both parties better. This 
opinion is confirmed by one of the quality newspaper journalists:
“If there is a quote from the Prime Minister, a high military Ukrainian, and he says 
“Donetsk bandits,” from my point of view as a journalist, what should I write to the 
Polish reader? Should I write that the general said “Donetsk separatists”? No, because 
he did not say that. They are using some words to create a certain atmosphere around 
the conflict. And if we translate such statements, I  think we should translate them 
literally.” [R6]
The Rzeczpospolita journalist’s explanation seems reasonable. Referring to direct 
statements made by the parties to the conflict lets the recipient see the conflict 
as it really is. Therefore, the responsibility for using a particular word and its 
tone lies more on these actors, not on the journalists. On the other hand, when 
journalists use such statements they may show support for one of the sides of 
the dispute in a fairly clear way, which is well illustrated by the opinion of the 
respondent:
“I think that the language battles will last very long, and often the way the words rebel, 
terrorist and insurgent are used, also determines the attitude to the Ukrainian conflict, 
which is not always unambiguous.” [R4]
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Terrorists 4 8 3 4 7 3 5
Pro-Russian 11 12 13 20 13 17 14
Rebels 3 2 5 4 5 5 3
Soldiers 4 0 6 9 10 1 6
Separatists 29 30 38 42 65 60 44
Militants 0 0 1 2 0 1 1
Criminal/
bandits
1 1 1 0 0 2 1
Russians 48 47 33 19 0 11 26
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N= 114 181 341 201 218 139 1194
Source: Author
Although most of the analyzed media called rebels in the conflict area 
“separatists,” putting it in a certain context can produce the same negative con-
notation as “terrorists” or “bandits” would. That is why it seems important to pay 
attention to the tone given to particular actors and the general perspective of the 
coverage, which will be presented in the last subsection.
The used terminology was also examined in the case of the Ukrainian side 
of the conflict (see Tab. 3.9). The Ukrainian army, just like the rebels, was most 
often defined by neutral expressions. In this case, it was with the word “soldiers”. 
Interestingly, all of the six Polish media used this phrase most often. Therefore, 
no significant discrepancies between the media were noticed, like in the case 
of describing the rebels. The dominance of military-oriented (“soldiers”, “artil-
lery”) rather than ideology-oriented (“fascists”) terms shows that in the case of 
the Ukrainian side the media paid more attention to their military actions. Of 
course, words that had a more judgmental character were also used. For example, 
the Ukrainians were called “defenders”, which indicates that they are the victim 
in the dispute, and therefore their actions are justified responses to aggression, 
mainly from Russia (see Tab. 3.8). This term was often used by the Wiadomości 
TVP1, the Super Express and the Gazeta Wyborcza journalists. The latter wrote 
about Ukrainian “defenders” in the context of the annexation of Crimea in the 
article “Ukraine will not give up” (Gazeta Wyborcza, 17/03/2014). The tabloids 
used a similar tone with a slightly more blunt language, which is expressed in the 
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text “Only strength can stop the aggressor” (Fakt, 27/03/2014). Defending itself 
against Russia was not the only activity of the Ukrainian army described by the 
media. Journalists also mentioned their fights with the separatists. Wiadomości 
TVP1 broadcasted material about it. The segment titled “Ukrainian offensive” 
(Wiadomości TVP1, 18/01/2015) discussed the expulsion of separatists from 
the Dontesk airport. Importantly, both in the case of the words “soldiers” and 
“defenders”, references were made to military operations, with the most fre-
quently used description of the events in Ukraine, for example “war”. This can be 
evidence of a strong military angle in the materials.
Negative terms were also used in the case of the Ukrainian army. The soldiers 
were called “fascists”, but this term was used in a quote and was not necessarily 
representative of the journalist’s opinion. It is worth noting that these expressions 
constituted only two percent of all words used to describe the Ukrainians (see 
Tab. 3.9). However, the total amount of times that this word was used is definitely 
lower than in the case of the terms “terrorist” and “bandit”, referring to the rebels. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that how the Ukrainian side was defined in the 
research materials was more positive than in the case of the rebels.










Soldiers 87 62 73 89 56 90 73
Volunteers 0 0 1 0 2 0 1
Heroes 0 4 0 0 0 0 1
Defenders 0 30 20 7 36 2 20
Fascists 6 0 4 2 1 1 2
Security 
forces
2 1 2 0 0 0 1
Right sector 0 1 0 2 1 2 1
Artillery 5 2 0 0 3 5 1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N= 53 91 182 116 185 100 727
Source: Author
The way the conflict and its causes were defined, as well as the terminology 
used in relation to the parties to the dispute, shows that such elements could 
have an impact on the coverage’s perspective, which seems to be the confirma-
tion of the first research hypothesis. This is due to the fact that the used terms 
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can indicate to the recipient how something should be interpreted  – as posi-
tive or negative. Therefore, the contexts in which specific terms and definitions 
were used by the media are very important. This was especially apparent on 
the Rzeczpospolita cover where the drawing of a giant white bear symbolized 
the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Also the historical references used by the 
journalists, such as the comparison of the conflict in Ukraine to the situation in 
Transnistria in the Gazeta Wyborcza article (“Who disassembles Ukraine” 2014, 
02/05/2014), puts a certain perspective on the event and the participating actors. 
It seems that these factors could have influenced a more pro-Ukrainian than pro-
Russian perception of the conflict by the audience, and in result be an example of 
the media demonizing Russia.
3.3  The perspective of the dispute
The conflict in Ukraine generated a lot of interest from the Polish media, which 
can be seen by the number of analyzed materials devoted to this issue (see Tab. 
3.1). The reason for this might be the geographic proximity of Ukraine, but also 
Poland’s relations with the parties to the dispute. It seems that these factors, 
which are highly context-oriented, could affect what perspective dominated in 
the media coverage. Some respondents admitted that they faced difficulties, for 
example in the access to sources of information, because of their nationality. 
At the same time, the journalists’ national or civilizational affiliation could also 
have created a general aversion to one of the parties to the conflict – especially 
when a similar situation like in Ukraine has already occurred in the past with the 
involvement of this actor. That is why it seems important to check to what extent 
the Polish journalists have been partial while covering the conflict, and to what 
extent they acted through the prism of their emotions. According to Russ-Mohl, 
social and national affiliation plays an important role in the covering of armed 
conflicts (2013) – in fact, this affiliation can have an even stronger effect on the 
journalist than the organization he belongs to. This is also confirmed by Wolsfeld 
(2004). It is also important that these journalists are working for the mainstream 
media, which, as shown by reports from the Institute of Media Monitoring (2014 
and 2015), have a significant impact on the agenda of other media in the country. 
Therefore, it is possible that other media outlets not only quoted the analyzed 
media, but also repeated their narrative about the conflict. That is why it is 
important to pay attention to whether the examined media, while covering the 
conflict, speak with one voice or not. On this basis, it will be possible to deter-
mine if the Polish media was more pro-Ukrainian or pro-Russian.
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3.3.1  Dominant and secondary actors
One of the elements that illustrate the dominant coverage perspective is the 
attitude towards the actors presented in the materials. Two types of actors were 
taken into account: the dominant actor (see Tab. 3.10) and the secondary actor 
(see Tab. 3.11). In this way it was possible to observe whether the same negative 
or positive attitude applied to all actors from the same national group, and if one 
person personified the whole society or the perceived enemy. Osama bin Laden 
and Saddam Hussein have been mentioned as examples of people that were 
presented as personifications of evil by both the media and the political sphere, 
although they did not necessarily personify a whole society (Epkins, 2016). It is 
interesting to see if something similar was done in the coverage of the Ukrainian 
conflict.
The distinctions between the dominant actor and the secondary actor were 
made mainly on the basis of the space they and their actions were given. The 
presence in the lead and in photos was also taken into account (Nygren and 
Hök, 2016:  272). The list of actors in the code book contains 13 alternatives, 
which included political actors, armed forces and civilians. Actors who did not 
fit into any of the specific groups were placed in the “other” category. These were, 
for example, citizens of other countries who were not representatives of interna-
tional organizations or political authorities. In the Super Express article entitled 
“Lithuania is preparing for war” information was presented about bringing back 
military conscription in Lithuania and military exercises for civilians, which 
was related to Russian aggression in Ukraine (21–22/03/2015). Therefore the 
Lithuanian army and the Lithuanian civilians were categorized as the “other” 
actor, even though Lithuania is a member of NATO. However, their actions had 
an internal character, which is why it was decided that these Lithuanian actors 
should be included in the “other” category. The same was done in the case of 
the victims of the MH17 plane crash and their families, but only if they were 
not Polish, Russian, or Ukrainian citizens. Categories have been created for cit-
izens of these countries. Importantly, the distinction between official actors and 
civilians will make it possible to check how the media categorize these entities – 
if the journalists covered them in the same way or not. It is also interesting to 
see if the media made a distinction between the politicians and the army, and 
the people. It is worth noting that the coverage of each actor was coded on a 
scale – positive, neutral and negative. Attention was paid to the tone of the whole 
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When it comes to the dominant actor in the coverage, it can be seen that it was 
most often the Russian authorities (see Tab. 3.10). This is interesting, since this 
entity was not the most quoted actor, and it took only a fourth position among 
all of the quoted entities in the research material (see Tab. 3.2). In addition, by 
comparing the visibility of the Russian authorities as the dominant and the sec-
ondary actor to the number of references to their statements, it can be noted 
that the journalists wrote more about the Kremlin than they quoted it. In the 
case of how the dominant actor was covered, the Russian authorities were usu-
ally assessed negatively. This is also the second highest rate among all negatively 
rated entities. Only the rebels, with almost twelve percentage points of differ-
ence, were covered more negatively. However, it should be remembered that the 
total amount of times that the rebels were covered as the dominant actor was 
less than half as many as in the case of the Russian authorities. As a result, the 
number of negative research units about rebels was over 40 materials lower than 
in the case of the Russian authorities. It also should be noted that the Russian 
military was presented with a mostly negative tone.
Taking into account the number of times Russia was the dominant actor, 
it can be seen that it is evaluated far worse than the Ukrainian side. Only two 
percent of the time, Ukrainian political actors were presented negatively. In 
one case it was an article from early March on Viktor Yanukovych, who crit-
icized the Ukrainian authorities and announced his return to the country to 
fight against fascism (Super Express, “Yanukovych wants to fight against fas-
cism”, 12/03/2014). The article itself was also critical of the former president of 
Ukraine. The Ukrainian side – authorities, military and citizens – were mainly 
assessed in a neutral way (Tab. 3.10). “International politicians”, “other foreign 
actors in the conflict”, or “Polish citizens” and “Polish authorities” were also 
presented in a neutral manner. However, it is noteworthy that the “civilians in 
the conflict area” by taking into account the percentage of positive indications, 
were rated the best among the mentioned dominant actors. This may be due to 
the fact that they were in the center of the conflict, and at the same time had to 
bear the biggest losses. Especially Fakty drew attention to this by publishing, for 
example, materials about the evacuation of Ukrainian citizens to Poland. Just 
behind the civilians, “Polish authorities”, “Ukrainian military” and “Ukrainian 
authorities” were covered the most positively. Therefore it can be said that 
among the dominant actors, the pro-Ukrainian perspective is stronger than 
the pro-Russian one, which confirms the first research hypothesis. Although 
the tone of the materials with the Ukrainian side as the main subject was usu-
ally neutral, the high negativity towards the rebels and Russia is not without 
significance.
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It is worth noting that the negative way that the Russian side was presented 
was mainly noticeable at the level of political actors and the army, and to a 
much lesser extent at the level of the civilians. This may be because the offi-
cial actors, and not the whole society, were considered as a party to the con-
flict, since they made real decisions about it. This is in line with the rhetoric 
presented by the media. Moreover, the Russian authorities were mostly per-
sonified by Putin. According to Kabel, this is a generally observed phenom-
enon in the Western media (2017: 8). When he analyzed the coverage of Russia 
by the Danish media, he also found that Putin was very often portrayed in 
that way (2017:  35). However, the Danish researcher pointed out that Putin 
personified the whole Russian nation (2017), but that was not the case in the 
Polish media’s coverage of the conflict in Ukraine. The President of the Russian 
Federation was in fact perceived by the Polish media as one of the parties to the 
conflict. It was Super Express who most often depicted the Russian politicians, 
including President Putin, in a negative way. The strong negativity toward 
Vladimir Putin was expressed in the titles and the content – examples include 
such articles as “Putin feeds on fear and weakness” (Super Express, 03/03/2014), 
“Putin is laughing in the world’s face” (Super Express, 05/03/2014), “Putin’s 
aggressive policy results from his desperation” (Super Express, 22/04/2014) 
and “Putin will provoke Ukraine” (Super Express, 16/02/2015). Content on 
Tab. 3.10:  Dominant actor (in percent).
Positively Neutral Negatively N=
Polish authorities 15 78 7 239
Polish citizens 6 89 5 39
Ukrainian authorities 12 86 2 121
Ukrainian military 20 80 0 100
Ukrainian citizens 7 93 0 30
Civilians in the conflict area 20 33 47 30
Rebels 0 19 81 221
Russian authorities 1 30 69 477
Russian military 1 31 68 68
Russian citizens 0 75 25 11
International politicians 6 90 4 233
Other foreign actors in the conflict 5 85 10 93
Other 8 84 8 64
Total 106 893 614 1726
Source: Author
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this topic also appeared in the pages of Rzeczpospolita and Gazeta Wyborcza. 
However, there was less of it there than in Super Express. Gazeta Wyborcza 
had the headlines: “Putin adds to the fire of war” (16/06/2014), “Putin’s entry 
in Stalin’s style” (18/03/2015), “Putin violates Ukraine” (07/03/2014), and 
Rzeczpospolita had: “Brotherly help: how Putin attacked Crimea” (10/03/2015), 
“It’s not Putin’s last row” (01/07/2014). As can be read from the titles, most of 
the materials referred to Russian aggression toward Ukraine, and thus to the 
lack of respect for international law. Importantly, these articles indicate quite 
clearly that Vladimir Putin himself is responsible for the situation in Eastern 
Europe. The pictures were also used as an interesting tool that could strengthen 
the negative image of the Russian president. The use of pictures in this way was 
especially noticeable in tabloids, which could be the result of the style of those 
media outlets (see Pictures 3.7 and 3.8).
Picture 3.8: “West sells Ukraine”. 
Source: Fakt, 04/03/2014
Picture 3.7: “Putin has sick head and atom 
bombs”. 
Source: Super Express, 8-9/03/2014
On the cover of Super Express with the headline “Putin has a sick head and 
atom bombs” (8–9/03/2014) (see Picture 3.7), the Russian president looks like 
a madman who is ready to do anything, including using nuclear weapons in 
Ukraine. This is illustrated in the background of the photo, which shows an 
atomic bomb cloud over an unknown city. An equally interesting photograph 
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has been added to one of the Fakt articles. The article entitled “West sells 
Ukraine” (Fakt, 04/03/2014) (see Picture 3.8) presents Putin as a bear sitting 
on a throne with three defenseless rabbits symbolizing Germany, France and 
the United States at his feet. In the case of this photograph, one should pay 
attention to two elements  – the dominant position, impunity and untrust-
worthiness of Russia, and the West’s inability to oppose the Russian aggres-
sion. Both photographs, just like the presented headlines, underline Putin’s 
role in the conflict, pointing him out as a provocateur of events in Ukraine. 
Interestingly, in the case of materials about the Ukrainian or Polish author-
ities, more than one person would symbolize and represent these countries. 
Of course, this may be related to the nature of the political regimes in these 
countries, which in comparison to the Russian regime are less concentrated to 
one leader. According to Kabel, this trait of the Russian regime, where Putin 
takes a central role, may explain why he to such a great degree personifies 
Russia in the media coverage (2017:  41). This is an important variable that 
strongly affects the coverage perspective, as well as the perception of the mate-
rial. Portraying Putin negatively and pointing to his unpredictable behavior 
may stem from the fact that in this way the Russian president was made the 
embodiment of the nation-wide fear presented by the media, which according 
to Lynch is something that journalists frequently do to actors considered as the 
enemy (2014: 57). In addition, paying a lot of attention to Russia’s president is 
a confirmation that the conflict in the media’s view is not a dispute between 
the separatists, Ukraine, and Russia – understood as the whole country. This 
is more seen as a conflict between Ukraine, the separatists and Putin. It can be 
said that Putin – similar to Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden (Epkins, 
2016) – was simultaneously portrayed as a personification of evil, as well as the 
personification of the national enemy.
A secondary actor was coded only in the case of its actual presence in the 
material. It was included in 1 495 research units, which is 87 percent of the ana-
lyzed material. Russian authorities also appeared most often among the group 
of secondary actors (see Tab. 3.11). Similarly as in the case of the dominant ac-
tors, also this time they were assessed as the second most negatively perceived 
entity, just after the rebels. However, it is important to point out that 39 percent 
of evaluations about Russian politicians were neutral. It is by nine percentage 
points more than in the case of the dominant actors. Therefore, it can be said 
that the Russian authorities are described better as a secondary actor than as 
the dominant actor. The personification of the Kremlin by Putin is also notice-
able at the level of the second actor, but it is definitely lower than in the case of 
the main character of the material. The situation looks similar in the case of the 
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rebels. The pro-Russian separatists were assessed negatively by over twelve per-
centage points less than in the case of the dominant actor. They were assessed 
mainly in the context of the MH17 disaster, and the impact of their actions on 
civilians. A good example is the article from Super Express entitled “Inhuman 
war kills children” (26/01/2015), where the journalist wrote about the victims of 
fighting going on in Donbass and Mariupol. The author of the text emphasizes 
that as a result of the separatists’ attack on one of the Mariupol districts, 30 
people died including two children. In addition, the photo attached to the text 
depicts a child who died in the Donbass now lying in a coffin. This may also 
constitute a negative reinforcement of the material, especially since the words 
“separatists” and “kills children” are bolded. This makes the reader pay more at-
tention to these words and as a result perceive the text and the described actors 
in a certain way (Zelizer, 2004). Gazeta Wyborcza also wrote about separatists 
in the context of the negative impact of war on society. The article “Mariupol 
comes back to life” (Gazeta Wyborcza, 21–22/06/2014), describes the rebuilding 
of the city after the June battles fought by the Ukrainian army and the rebels. 
The article shows not only the damage caused by taking the city back from the 
hands of the rebels, but also criticized the way it was taken. The author also 
discusses the internal problems of Ukraine, which could have allowed the sit-
uation to take place. Still, the Ukrainian side is perceived better than the pro-
Russian, although the percentage of negative references to Ukrainians is a bit 
higher than in the group of dominant actors. Polish authorities and citizens 
as well as international actors are also assessed mainly neutrally. In the case of 
Russian citizens, the score is evenly distributed between neutral and negative 
evaluations, but it is worth noting that they were described as the secondary 
actors only twice. Therefore, it cannot be significant for the final evaluation of 
their activities.
The category “other” for both the secondary and the dominant actor was 
mainly rated neutrally. The number of references to “other” as the second actor 
is slightly higher than in the case of the dominant actor. However, compared to 
other entities, especially parties to the conflict or Polish authorities, this cate-
gory was chosen relatively rarely. If they were evaluated negatively, they were for 
example unpopular historical figures, just like in the text “Resurrection of the 
wraiths” (Rzeczpospolita, 05/03/2015), where the category included Hitler and 
Stalin.
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3.3.2  The main coverage perspective and contexts
How the dominant and the secondary actor were presented in the research 
material showed that the Russian side and rebels were assessed much more neg-
atively than the Ukrainian actors (see Tab. 3.10 and Tab. 3.11). Therefore, it is 
assumed that the coverage perspective developed in the same way. The variable 
dedicated to these issues has been divided into seven smaller categories. As in 
the case of the dominant and the secondary actor, the division into politicians, 
the army and neutral responses was applied. The variable “support for Ukraine 
in general” was added, which also included support for the civilian popula-
tion, and was related with the general sympathy towards Ukraine noticeable in 
the materials. It was decided to apply this solution in the international project, 
mainly due to the fact that it was Ukraine who was the victim in this dispute. 
Therefore, it was assumed that the tone of the material may contain this type of 
connotation. The perspectives were coded based on the general impression of 
the analyzed content, including the title and visual materials. It was decided that 
if the article critically refers to one side, for example to the Russian authorities, 
it means that it shows support for the Ukrainian perspective (Nygren and Hök, 
2016: 272).
Tab. 3.11:  Secondary actor (in percent).
Positively Neutral Negatively N=
Polish authorities 9 90 1 172
Polish citizens 7 93 0 27
Ukrainian authorities 10 89 1 195
Ukrainian military 7 91 2 95
Ukrainian citizens 16 84 0 19
Civilians in the conflict area 0 100 0 19
Rebels 1 30 69 191
Russian authorities 0 39 61 378
Russian military 0 34 66 58
Russian citizens 0 50 50 2
International politicians 2 89 9 189
Other foreign actors in the conflict 5 83 12 58
Other 3 92 5 91
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The content analysis indicated that the pro-Ukrainian perspective was 
indeed dominant in the Polish media’s coverage of the conflict (see Tab. 
3.12). Seventy five percent of the materials had a pro-Ukrainian perspec-
tive, which was divided into three categories in the code book. It is worth 
noting that “support for Ukraine in general” was the dominant perspec-
tive, which may mean that the media did not differentiate so much between 
supporting the Ukrainian authorities or the army. It may also be related to 
the high negativity of Russian politicians, troops, and rebels among the dom-
inant and secondary actors. Interestingly, almost none of the analyzed media, 
apart from Gazeta Wyborcza, ever showed support for Russia and the rebels. 
However, when it did happen it was largely connected with materials crit-
ical to the Ukrainian government, rather than any direct support for Russian 
activities in the conflict area. Distinguishing between different media, it 
can be seen that the pro-Ukrainian perspective was particularly strong in 
Super Express and Gazeta Wyborcza (see Tab. 3.12). Wiadomości TVP1 also 
strongly emphasized their support for Ukraine. In the case of tabloids, the 
situation may be the result of a strong criticism of Vladimir Putin, because 
the Russian authorities were perceived by Super Express as the worst among 
the covered dominant actors. This might be related to the fact that Putin was 
blamed for the economic sanctions imposed on Poland, which is one of the 
consequences of the dispute that Super Express along with Fakt often reported 
on (see Tab. 3.1). The pro-Ukrainian perspective visible in Gazeta Wyborcza 
and Wiadomości TVP1 may stem from the rhetoric presented by the Polish 
government, which in the analyzed time period was the Civic Platform 
party. It is assumed that this party is conditionally supported by Gazeta 
Wyborcza (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2011: 109) while the public broadcaster, due 
to its strong connections with the state, is usually a relay of the opinions of 
the authorities. Considering the involvement of the government in solving 
the Ukrainian crisis, as well as the fact that Poland has been punished with 
a Russian embargo for supporting Ukraine, it is not surprising that the 
pro-Ukrainian perspective was very strong in the broadcasts of the Polish 
Television. A similar situation can be seen in the case of Rzeczpospolita. This 
newspaper presented “Russian invasion” as the main cause of the outbreak of 
the conflict (see Tab. 3.5). Therefore, the lack of support for the pro-Russian 
perspective from this medium is understandable. These presented data con-
firm the accuracy of the first research hypothesis.
One could say, that when presenting the pro-Ukrainian perspective, which 
as mentioned before was also promoted by the government, Wiadomości TVP1 
acts as a propagandist. According to Ross (2007), this is one of the roles that 
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the media might take during war, which is also confirmed by Galtung (2006). 
On the other hand, Polish politicians were not the most quoted source of infor-
mation for this medium (see Tab. 3.2), although they were also quite frequently 
quoted, coming in second place after their Ukrainian counterparts. However, as 
Wanta has written (2012), the media in some states cover conflicts in alignment 
with the foreign policy of their government, which may explain why Russia was 
portrayed negatively and Ukraine positively.
The results of the content analysis including the main perspective of the 
materials showed that a kind of national consensus was visible in all analyzed 
media, which manifested itself in a strong support for the Ukrainian side and 
criticism of pro-Russian and Russian actors. This brings the Polish media close 
to Hallin’s sphere of consensus, where all participants of the public debate are in 
agreement (1986). There seems to be a fixed way of perceiving the parties to the 
conflict, which has it basis in history. Of course, a large portion of the research 
units, especially those presented by Fakt and Fakty TVN, had a neutral tone, but 
the pro-Ukrainian perspective is still more frequent. Therefore, taking the side of 
one of the parties to the conflict was more common in the coverage than taking 
a neutral position (see Tab. 3.12).










Support for Ukraine 
in general
24 55 39 41 71 36 45
Support for 
Ukrainian authorities
22 30 26 22 4 18 21
Support for 
Ukrainian army
15 11 12 8 4 6 9
Support for Russian 
authorities
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Support for Russian 
army
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Support for 
separatists
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neutral 39 4 22 29 21 40 25
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N= 170 206 438 385 294 233 1726
Source: Author
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The dominant position of the pro-Ukrainian perspective may somewhat 
be the result of technical factors, such as topic selection, access to sources and 
the hybrid nature of the dispute. It is worth noting that the lack of foreign 
correspondents in Ukraine and general difficulties in getting contact with some 
of the parties to the dispute could have affected the shape and, above all, the 
perception of the content presented by the media. The topic selection and ter-
minology used to describe the events in Ukraine was also not without signifi-
cance. However, as confirmed by journalists, they had almost total freedom in 
this regard. Therefore, it seems interesting to check why the pro-Ukrainian con-
sensus in the coverage of the conflict by Polish mainstream media was so notice-
able. In order to get an answer to this question, the journalists from the analyzed 
media outlets were asked how they would describe their role in the dispute – if 
they were neutral observers, or if they maybe felt emotional involvement with 
one of the sides. The content analysis showed that the journalists played both 
roles, but that a certain bias prevailed. One reason for this is the fact that it was 
Ukraine who was a victim in this conflict, and the media obviously had a defen-
sive attitude towards the victim of the war (see Taradai, 2014:  74; Nohrstedt, 
2009: 109):
“The sympathy from Poles towards the Ukrainians, especially during the clash with the 
Russians, is definitely on the Ukrainian side. It was difficult to be impartial in a dis-
pute in which we have obvious aggression from one side, as in the case of Crimea and 
Donbass.” [R3]
Treating Ukraine as a victim, which it de facto was, made it difficult for the 
journalists to look critically at the actions of this state that had to defend itself 
against both external and internal aggression. It can be said that the Polish 
journalists in this way recognized the Ukrainian side as the “worthy” victim 
of this war. According to Herman and Chomsky (1988), this can be apparent, 
for example, in how the media focus on the losses suffered by only one side 
of the conflict. The examples of media materials described qualitatively in 
this chapter seem to confirm this theory. It seems that the respondents felt an 
emotional bond with the Ukrainians, which in the case of some of the ana-
lyzed media seemed particularly important, which is confirmed by the Fakt 
journalist:
“There were problems related to the involvement and the fact that I  simply sympa-
thize with these Ukrainians. This helped, that I was not indifferent to them, that I was 
involved in the subject, because it is good if the text is a little bit more emotional.” [R1]
The emotional style of the tabloid articles, in particular drawing attention to the 
consequences of the conflict for Poland, or the impact of the dispute on civilians 
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living close to the front, meant that the perspective took a pro-Ukrainian form 
in advance. At the same time, the presence of Russia in the dispute was also 
significant. The journalists noted that patterns of ideas about the states partici-
pating in the conflict, developed in the past, could have made an impact on the 
coverage. Therefore, although some respondents tried to be neutral, their origin 
and certain way of thinking could pose an obstacle, which is confirmed by one 
respondent:
“If I want to do something for my country, I can inform the citizens well and objec-
tively about what is happening. Only with a solid knowledge they can create their own 
opinion. I understand it this way, but of course some sympathies or dislikes resulting 
from in which country we were brought up, probably have some influence on it.” [R10]
Indeed, the conditions mentioned by the TVP1 journalist could have had a sig-
nificant effect on the perspective that was visible in the materials. On the one 
hand, it could be related to the general lack of trust by the pro-Russian side to 
Polish and Western journalists, as described in the earlier subsections. On the 
other hand, it could have been the result of certain ideas created in the past, such 
as national stereotypes (see Ottosen, 1995; Goffman, 1974). Paying attention to 
these issues is especially important from the point of view of Russia’s assess-
ment because, according to one of the respondents, the negative attitude towards 
Russians is a kind of Polish national feature:
“It is not without significance, whether we are ashamed of it or not, but we are 
Russophobic. I mean Poles as a society, as a nation. The fact that this proverbial “Rusek” 
[Russian] is the bad guy again also faces our view.” [R11]
The aggressive actions of Russia, especially in the context of historical events, 
and thus turning on national stereotypes in the respondent’s mind, could play 
an important role in presenting what was happening in Ukraine. This is due to 
the fact that journalists are part of a certain society and, therefore, their percep-
tion of issues and entities can be predetermined (see Russ-Mohl, 2013; McNair, 
1988). That is why, according to the journalist, the perspective presented by the 
mainstream media was more anti- than pro-Russian:
“The fact that Poles are Russophobic means that people who work in the media are 
Russophobic. This one-sided, dramatically pro-Ukrainian coverage, resulted also from 
this. According to me, it is without a doubt, that many journalists, even those from the 
quality media, wrote materials based on one-party relations. They wrote information by 
choosing facts, so that the pronunciation of the text would fit to the editorial line. The 
line was that the Russians are bad and that they are the invaders.” [R11]
Interestingly, although most journalists pointed out that they autonomously 
selected topics, while looking at the dominant tone of the coverage, it can 
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be seen that the general trend of presenting the dispute remained almost the 
same. Therefore, despite the existence of differences between the analyzed 
media at the level of the editorial line or business model, they operate the same 
in the case of describing the dispute. This may be due to the Russophobia men-
tioned by the respondent, but also according to the Rzeczpospolita columnist 
such behavior might be the result of the general construction of a professional 
environment:
“This is not a question of pro- or anti-Russianness of the Polish media. One of my 
colleagues once said that the Polish journalist is a heard animal and unfortunately he 
was right. The journalist cannot walk in the herd. Meanwhile, these mainstream media 
work like that.” [R6]
Despite the fact that the respondent openly admitted that sometimes he could 
hardly keep to his professional objectivity, it was confirmed by the conducted 
research that he is not the only one. Therefore, it is really possible to talk about 
a kind of general consensus between the Polish media in how they covered the 
events in Ukraine. Interestingly, the journalists realize that they do not act in a 
neutral way, but many authors have claimed that in the case of war journalism, 
it is simply impossible (see Tumber, 2004; Ross, 2003; Gamson et al., 1992), and 
in the case of this conflict being an impartial observer could definitely be more 
difficult than in other wars and disputes. One of the reasons for this is the earlier 
mentioned geographic proximity of Ukraine and the possibility of the dispute 
moving over to Poland. The geopolitical factor is then important. On the other 
hand, historical and cultural issues, and thus sometimes xenophobic attitudes 
towards the Russian side, could also have caused that Russia’s activity was neg-
atively perceived in advance. Therefore, an important factor that influenced the 
final shape of the coverage was also the presence of historical and geopolitical 
contexts in the materials. These issues, like the terminology used to describe 
the conflict, have a specific meaning (see Lee, 2005; Gurevitch et al., 1995). That 
is why the way they are interpreted may determine the overall perception of 
the dispute and its sides. This is due to the fact that these contexts can turn on 
certain mechanisms that cause the audience to see and understand some issues 
in a predetermined manner. These factors were present in the coverage (see 
Tab. 3.13).
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Among the eight mentioned contexts, the “fear of Russian expansion” was 
the most common. This context was particularly noticeable in the case of 
Wiadomości TVP1, Gazeta Wyborcza and Fakt materials (see Tab. 3.13). Other 
media used it to a slightly lesser extent. The journalists, when asked about what 
issues generated social interest in the conflict, drew attention to two factors. One 
of them was the proximity of the conflict to the Polish borders, and the other 
was Russia’s involvement in the dispute. Since this country is usually perceived 
by Poles through the prism of the Polish Partitions, the Second World War and 
the era of communism, it is not surprising that the fear of Russia could have 
been used as one of the frames of the coverage. Using such factors could have 
increased the negative perception of Russia, which was reflected in the main 
perspective of the coverage (see Tab. 3.12) and in the image of the dominant and 
secondary actors (see Tab. 3.10 and 3.11). It also made the audience more inter-
ested in the conflict, something that was noticed by the Fakt journalist:










Fear of Russian 
expansion
35 28 46 33 55 16 38
Fear of lack of NATO 
reaction
6 8 3 5 0 1 3
Contemporary 
Ukrainian struggle for 
belonging to Europe





5 16 26 40 34 41 30
Struggle for Russian 
power, values and 
culture in history
3 12 3 0 0 3 4
Struggle for Russian 
power, values and 
culture today
35 21 14 16 7 25 16
Struggle against 
fascism during WWII
0 0 2 0 0 0 1
War between West 
and East
6 2 2 1 0 0 1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N= 124 178 341 255 278 159 1378
Source: Author
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“The case of Russia’s involvement and these eternal fears about what the Russians will 
do, if they would threaten us in some way, made this conflict interesting.” [R2]
Referring to the threat of Russian expansion, especially in a time when this 
country is waging war with Poland’s immediate neighbor, could have caused 
recipients to follow the media’s reports with greater interest. In addition, it 
could trigger certain factors, such as the previously mentioned national 
stereotypes, which influenced the decoding of information in a certain way. In 
this case anti-Russian. This may be, therefore, an expression of Russophobia, 
which was mentioned by one of the respondents. On the other hand, the 
proximity of the dispute generated real motives related to the fear of Poland’s 
Eastern borders being violated, so it is understandable that journalists wrote 
about these issues. However, everything depended on what arguments were 
made and what image of the conflict was presented to the audience. The results 
of the content analysis show that the media used historical rhetoric, at the 
same time pointing out the unlawfulness and aggression of the actions taken 
by Russia and the rebels. That is why the media messages could thus foster 
fear of similar events in Poland, especially since these issues, for example in 
the context of needing to modernize the army, were discussed at the polit-
ical level. Paying attention to the extent to which the conflict in Ukraine was 
brought closer to the national audience in the sense of its impact on Poland 
will be presented in the next chapter.
It is worth noting that in the case of Rzeczpospolita and Fakty TVN, the most 
important way to explain the dispute was to draw attention to the “historical 
struggle for national independence of Ukraine”. The use of this type of frame 
may have come from the fact that, according to the quality newspaper, the con-
flict in Ukraine was the result of a Russian invasion (see Tab. 3.5). Therefore, 
it can be said that the quality newspaper journalists’ perception of Ukraine as 
a victim affected the coverage. In that way the concept of the “worthy” victim 
(Herman and Chomsky, 1988) might have been somehow supplemented by 
increasing sympathy and identification by Poles with the Ukrainians. Indeed, 
this topic was pointed out in the material entitled “Russia attacks Ukraine”, 
which was described in one of the earliest subsections. Supporting Ukraine in 
defending its statehood could be the result of similar historical fates, especially 
since both Ukraine and Poland have been strongly dependent from Russia. This 
could have caused that especially Rzeczpospolita emphasized the independence 
factor in the coverage, which at the same time influenced social interest, as well 
as understanding information in a specific way. This is confirmed by the state-
ment of the journalist who collaborated with Rzeczpospolita during the research 
period:
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“Poles were interested in Ukraine, because they could find there some of the elements 
important to them. In the case of the Crimea there was also a Russian factor, so it is 
known that Poles and Russians...Even revolutionary and historically there are some is-
sues that allowed the Poles to absorb the knowledge and information they received more 
easily.” [R7]
Easy absorption of information, especially based on the use of specific frames, 
and thus the presence of Russia in the dispute, as in the case of the dominant 
context of the coverage, could cause that the recipients of certain media agreed 
with their views. At the same time they could adopt the journalistic perspec-
tive as their own. This is interesting, because the media do not function in a 
vacuum, therefore their external environment, including social and political 
factors, influence the way they act. The journalists confirmed that elements such 
as origin as well as historical and cultural patterns could have affected the way 
they covered the conflict. It is difficult to determine unequivocally the extent to 
which media discourse has affected social discourse and vice versa, especially 
since journalists are members of a specific society. That is why the perspec-
tive presented by the media could only be a reflection of the moods prevailing 
among the public at that time. On the other hand, the high negativity towards 
Russia, especially by political actors, and the respondents’ confirmation that 
this is the result of factors rooted in the national consciousness, raises the ques-
tion of whether the anti-Russian perspective is only and exclusively the result 
of the Ukrainian conflict. However, focusing only on this event has shown that 
the image of the dispute in the mainstream media’s coverage is strongly pro-
Ukrainian, and that the Polish media spoke with one voice when describing the 
conflict in Ukraine.
Summary
The coverage of the conflict in Ukraine by the Polish mainstream media was 
characterized by condemnation of Russia’s and the pro-Russian rebels’ actions, as 
well as support for Ukraine in the struggle to preserve its sovereignty. That per-
spective, to a greater or lesser extent, was accepted by all examined media, which 
may be the result of the strong involvement of domestic politicians in solving the 
dispute on the eastern border of Poland. Therefore, it can be said that the media, 
despite the differences at the level of political parallelism, supported the vision 
of the ruling party, sometimes trying to impose harsher actions in response to 
Russian aggression. Elements such as media format, ownership and popularity 
did not seem to play a significant role in how the conflict was covered. A national 
perspective on the parties to the conflict, especially Russia, seems to have been 
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more important – which confirms that factors such as national prejudices and 
stereotypes affected journalists in their work.
The Polish angle played an important role in how the dispute was presented. 
It was visible both among the most presented issues and sources of informa-
tion. Polish politicians were the most quoted actors, and the most covered is-
sues in the quality media were international political discussion and sanctions, 
while the consequences of the conflict for Poland were described more often by 
tabloids. Although the most frequently presented topics point to the importance 
of context-oriented factors in the coverage, the way they are used seems to be 
connected to the media format. International political discussions and sanctions 
were often related to analytical, for example economic, issues, which made it 
the most frequently presented topic by Rzeczpospolita, which is profiled in this 
way. In turn, tabloids referring to the consequences of the dispute for Poland 
presented this issue in a mainly emotional way – for example through stoking 
fear of Russia’s actions  – and also in a sensational way, as exemplified by the 
photographs used by Fakt and Super Express. Most importantly, the most fre-
quently described topics usually referred to the negative actions of Russia and 
the separatists, and to a lesser extent to the actions of the Ukrainians. That is, 
when the sanctions were discussed, in most of the cases it was connected with the 
necessity to condemn the activities of the Russian Federation and taking actions 
at the international level to resolve the dispute. In the case of the consequences 
of the conflict for Poland, for example, concerns about Russian aggression were 
referred to. Therefore, it can be said that the Polish coverage of the conflict was 
anti-Russian.
The results of the content analysis as well as the interviews with journalists 
confirm the first research hypothesis, which said that the media presented an 
anti-Russian perspective of the conflict. This was noticeable both in the low 
number of quotations of the Russian side compared to the Ukrainian party of 
the conflict, as well as in the negative assessment of political actors and army. 
Finally, the domination of the pro-Ukrainian perspective of the dispute confirms 
that journalists did not evaluate the parties to the conflict in the same way. This 
means that they did not act as neutral observers when they covered the conflict 
in Ukraine, which seems to accurately reflect the Nygren model (Nygren and 
Hök, 2016: 261). Naturally, the journalists claimed that they tried to give voice 
to the other side, but the content analysis shows that the media gave strong sup-
port to one side of the conflict – Ukraine – while criticizing the actions of the 
rebels and Russia. Super Express and Wiadomości TVP1 provided particularly 
strong support. The public television channel could in this way have reflected 
the pro-Ukrainian attitude of the then government. The tabloid’s perspective 
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can probably be connected to the topic it most often covered  – the negative 
consequences of the dispute for Poland. The pro-Ukrainian perspective could 
also simply have resulted from wanting to support the victim who in this dis-
pute happened to be Ukraine, which was indicated in the way the conflict and its 
causes were defined. The geopolitical and historical contexts in the material were 
equally important, especially the fear of Russian expansion, which may be an 
answer to why journalists were not fully objective in the coverage of the conflict.
The empirical data presented will be helpful in understanding why and to 
what extent the conflict in Ukraine could have been domesticated by the Polish 
media. The presence of a Polish angle in the coverage, especially at the level of 
most frequently presented topics and contexts used, shows that the journalists 
referred to meaning that can be decoded in an appropriate way by the audience. 
Therefore, in the next chapter attention will be paid to the presence of histor-
ical contexts and the economic and military threat for Poland, because these 
issues could have caused the conflict in Ukraine to be perceived by the audi-
ence and the media as “our dispute”. Therefore, in the next part of the empirical 
work, the results of reports made by the Centre for Public Opinion Research 
will be presented, which show to what extent events in Ukraine were perceived 
by the public as a direct threat to Poland. Thanks to this, it will be possible to 
notice whether the media discourse coincided with the social discourse or not. 
Although the way the conflict was presented by the media in Ukraine was some-
what consistent with political discourse, I will try to examine how political is-
sues, especially the impact of the conflict on the actions of political actors, were 
presented by the media. In the end, I will try to get an answer to the question of 
whether in the opinion of journalists the information they presented could have 
an impact on the decisions of political actors regarding the conflict.
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4  The analysis of the domestication  
of the conflict
Domestication, which can be defined as a media technique serving to strengthen 
the ties between recipients and a foreign event, was noticeable in the coverage 
(see Hjarvard, 2001; Taradai, 2014). The content analysis showed that the mate-
rial contained frames and contexts that could make the information more 
understandable, meaningful and important for the Polish audience. Regionalism 
also plays a huge role in this, because the media and the public are much more 
interested in information from countries which are known to them (Wu, 2000) – 
historically and culturally (Lee et al., 2017: 906) – and which are closely located 
(Wilke et al., 2013). Russia and Ukraine meet these conditions. Therefore, it was 
possible for the media to make content that could easily be decoded by domestic 
recipients (Taradai, 2014: 68).
The analysis showed that news about Ukraine contained Polish angles, which 
could be observed in the dominant topics (see Tab. 3.1) and sources of infor-
mation (see Tab. 3.2). It is worth remembering that domestic political actors 
had the highest amount of quotations among the sources used in the coverage. 
The Ukrainian crisis was also often discussed by the government, which was re-
flected in the media content. Therefore, the recipients had reason to think that 
the conflict affected them and that to some extent it was also “their” dispute. 
Moreover, Ukraine is inhabited by Poles or people of Polish descent, and some of 
them were evacuated by the authorities from Eastern Ukraine during the conflict 
(Wojciechowski, 2015). The threat to Polish citizens was also a factor that could 
be used by the media to show the consequences of the conflict for the country. It 
was also an element that generated interest and a connection between the infor-
mation and the audience.
Domesticating the described events is also interesting due to how it affects 
the overall coverage perspective. The conducted analysis showed that the dispute 
was presented in a way that supported the Ukrainian side (see Tab. 3.12). This 
side could be seen as closer to “we” than “they”. This may be because of several 
factors – Poland’s support for Ukraine in joining the European Union, Polish 
citizens living in Ukraine and similar historical experiences, especially with the 
Russian Federation. When it comes to domestication, it is important to make 
news consistent with the beliefs and ideology of the state in question (Gurevitch 
et al., 1991). Therefore the value element is significant. Considering the fact that 
some of the respondents spoke about Russophobia in the media, this element 
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might be important during the conflict domestication. It is worth noting that 
references to specific historical events, especially when one of the parties to the 
conflict is Russia, could also be interpreted as xenophobic. This was also notice-
able in the dominant historical and geopolitical contexts in the coverage (see 
Tab. 3.13).
The coverage perspective may depend on who in fact decides what issues 
and what tone the coverage will present. The interviewed journalists noted that 
they did not feel pressure when choosing topics. Therefore, they decided what 
information should be known to the audience. This is a fairly common phe-
nomenon (Lee et al., 2017: 906). However, it should be remembered that foreign 
publications can be translated through the prism of specific frames and contexts 
resulting from the national or cultural identity of a journalist (see Clausen, 2004; 
Riegert, 2011). That is why the Russian-Ukrainian conflict was presented dif-
ferently by media from the different countries that participated in the project 
“Ukraine 2014 – media war and the war in media” (Nygren and Hök, 2016). It 
should be noted that journalists who are members of a specific community can, 
as shown by the research, reproduce perceptions of “others” that are common 
in that community. That is why examining to what extent the Polish media used 
semantic mechanisms to bring the conflict closer to the audience is important. 
This can help determine if domesticating factors have influenced the overall per-
spective of the coverage.
4.1  Impact of historical references
According to Gurevitch et  al. (1991:  195–216), combining historical, cultural 
and ideological factors increases the effectiveness of domestication. The media 
do not have to produce the necessary connections themselves  – instead they 
can use existing ones. Both history and culture are durable things, being passed 
down from generation to generation and leaving traces in the memory of the 
individuals and the community to which they belong (Czyżewski, 2010). Putting 
information in a context helps the audience adopt a particular perspective. This 
is especially interesting, because the Polish journalists in fact tried to explain 
the causes of the dispute through the prism of history, and they also pointed to 
events that Poland participated in. Earlier analyzes carried out by Polish scholars 
show that this has happened before in other contexts (see Szostok et al., 2016; 
Laboratorium Badań Medioznawczych, 2017a), and this indicates that there is 
a kind of nationwide practice of the Polish media of using historical frames to 
show the audience how to decode the news story (see Taradai, 2012; Winston 
et al., 2010). This is extremely interesting considering the fact that the parties to 
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the conflict are Russia and Ukraine, which share a common history with Poland. 
Therefore, the journalists had the opportunity to choose between many different 
historical events to serve as a frames. They could also be sure that the domestic 
audience would understand the implications of these references.
4.1.1  Frequency of historical references
The content analysis showed that 14  percent of all research units contained 
references to historical events, which is every seventh unit (see Tab. 4.1.). This 
shows that the media quite often referred to historical comparisons and that 
historical proximity was an important element of the coverage (see Chyliński 
and Russ-Mohl, 2008; Kempf, 2012). This may have resulted from the fact that 
the journalists wanted the recipients to be able to recognize some issues. In 
that way, they could see the analogy between past events and what was hap-
pening in Ukraine. Thanks to this it was possible to implicate which side in 
this conflict is actually the aggressor and how it should be evaluated (see Tab. 
4.2). Moreover, using historical frames could increase the audience’s interest in 
the dispute. According to the Fakt journalist, not only geographic proximity, 
but also the fact that “we are strongly culturally and historically connected 
with Ukraine” [R2], could have influenced the Poles’ interest in keeping up 
with the media reports. This is a confirmation that domesticating the conflict 
by referring to the examined factors, which are also a kind of context-oriented 
factors (see Chang et  al., 1987; Shoemaker and Cohen, 2006; Zerback and 
Holzleitner, 2018), could be a successful strategy – especially when it was used 
by mainstream media that reach a wide audience and influence other media’s 
content. The analyzed media belong to this group (see Kurdupski 2016a; 
Kurdupski, 2016b; Instytut Monitoringu Mediów, 2014; Instytut Monitoringu 
Mediów, 2015).










Yes 15 21 16 17 10 6 14
No 85 79 84 83 90 94 86
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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The greatest amount of historical references was found in quality newspapers 
and tabloids (see Tab. 4.1.), which as mentioned earlier seems to be a kind of 
common trend in the Polish media, especially in the press (see Szostok et al., 
2016; Laboratorium Badań Medioznawczych, 2017a; Głowacki and Smolak, 
2016). Also, Wiadomości TVP1 more often than Fakty TVN put historical 
frames into their materials. The reason for this may be the dominant coverage 
perspective (see Tab. 3.12). TVN presented the dispute in Ukraine the most neu-
trally of the analyzed media. Forty percent of its segments were unbiased (see 
Tab. 3.12). Therefore, it can also be expected that TVN used historical frames to 
a lesser degree than the other media, which were much more pro-Ukrainian. The 
Fakty TVN journalist, when asked about the extent to which historical factors 
affected the coverage of the dispute, answered that “it absolutely did not have any 
greater significance” [R8]. That is why only 16 out of Fakty’s TVN 233 materials 
about Ukraine contained references to the past, and most of these were found in 
quotations and not the journalist’s own words.
To a not much lesser extent than Fakty TVN – with a difference of only one 
percentage point – Fakt also presented the story in a neutral way. However, the 
tabloid profile of this paper made historical and cultural references tools of sen-
sationalism. It seems that this might have increased the recipients’ interest in 
the content. A good example is the article entitled “A replay of September 17, 
1939 awaits us” (Fakt, 05/04/2014). The Fakt journalist, while referring to the 
annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Russian troops in Ukraine, criticizes 
the lack of decisive action by NATO and the European Union. At the same time, 
he writes that the aggression of the Russian Federation, allegedly defending the 
Russian-speaking population of Ukraine, may also be transferred to the Baltic 
States and Poland. The journalist outlines an almost complete Russian invasion 
of Poland over the next few years, and sees a possible agreement on dividing the 
country with Germany. Of course, this article has a fantastic character, and his-
torical facts are also altered, but the contexts used are so clear that they allow for 
comparisons to World War II. The title itself is a fairly clear message that directs 
the recipient’s attention to the possibility of the conflict coming to Poland. 
Fakt presented that scenario relatively frequently (see Tab. 4.7). Therefore, the 
quoted article is an interesting example of how tabloids, using both history and 
the fear of Russian expansion, could domesticate the dispute. This is addition-
ally strengthened by the fact that Poles have similar historical experiences with 
the USSR as those described in the material. Therefore, it can be seen that the 
material is obviously biased and at the same time sensational. That is why the 
media type could also have influenced the extent to which references to the past 
appeared in the content.
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It is worth remembering that the quality media, particularly the opinion dai-
lies, used historical issues to explain the background of the conflict and its impact 
on Poland. This was noticeable in one Rzeczpospolita article – “Poland is trying to 
get alliance guarantees” (03/04/2014). It refers to the meeting of Polish ministers 
and opposition leaders with the then Prime Minister Donald Tusk. The meeting 
was dedicated to the situation in Ukraine and the need to take action at the inter-
national level to stop Russia’s aggression and ensure the security of Poland and 
the Baltic States. The article referred to President Lech Kaczyński’s words from 
2008 – that after the Russian attack on Georgia, it is the Baltic countries and 
Poland’s turn (Rzeczpospolita, 03/04/2014). Recalling the situation during the 
Russo-Georgian war and making a comparison to the events in Ukraine, espe-
cially in the context of possible aggression on Poland, is a kind of domestica-
tion. However, drawing attention to the military threat, historical frames and 
the involvement of Russia in the dispute was not the only form of domestication. 
Pointing out that the situation in Eastern Europe requires the Polish govern-
ment to take specific actions, could have increased the recipients’ interest in the 
conflict and feeling that it is directly related to them. Thus, connections at the 
political level can be noted. Tusk’s words in the material are a perfect example 
of it. The Prime Minister said that “the situation in Ukraine is to be or not to be 
for Poland” (Rzeczpospolita, 03/04/2014). That is why helping Ukraine is nec-
essary. It seems that this might explain in part the frames and contexts used by 
the Polish media, as well as the main coverage perspective, because according 
to Nohrstedt the coverage is heavily dependent on the “national foreign policy 
context” (2009: 108). Wasburn (2002) has said that military, political, as well as 
historical ties between the covering state and the state involved in the covered 
conflict influence the media’s interest in the event. Poland has those kinds of 
ties to both Ukraine and Russia. The quote by Donald Tusk indicates, however, 
that the relations to Ukraine are stronger, which also might have increased the 
sense of Ukraine being the “worthy” victim (see Nohrstedt, 2009; Herman and 
Chomsky, 1988).
Although both the quality newspaper and the tabloid articles contain a refer-
ence to the past, they use it differently. It is possible to observe that in the case of 
Rzeczpospolita, emphasis is placed more on political discourse and decisions by 
the government about Ukraine. This is in line with the dominant topic covered by 
this medium (see Tab. 3.1). The historical frames used by Fakt are also the result 
of the main issues described. It seems that these can amplify the recipient’s fear 
by referring to hypothetical scenarios. Making parallels to the period of World 
War II gave the audience a certain picture of the conflict. The tabloid’s material 
can be an interesting example of simplifying reality not only by referring to a 
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well-known aggressor, but also by indicating that history has come full circle. 
The complexity of the conflict is not presented, which obviously affects how it is 
perceived. It seems that omitting certain nuancing facts, or presenting them to a 
lesser extent, than quality media is an element differentiating the media types. 
This was confirmed during the in-depth interviews. The Fakt journalist, when 
asked about the differences in the coverage of the conflict between his medium 
and other media in Poland, answered that the essential element is photos and 
without them the story does not exist. The respondent also pointed out that 
simplicity was crucial:
“We simplify the reality very much, because we assume that our recipient is not so well 
educated and also not strongly oriented in the tides of geopolitics, which is sometimes 
wrong. But we simplify the message so he can know what is going on.” [R1]
Simplifying information by referring to known contexts, like historical issues 
understood as basic facts, is therefore a coverage mechanism used by tabloids, 
as well as a form of domestication. It makes it easy to understand the conflict 
and its parties as good and bad – which is important from the point of view of 
the main coverage perspective. This process is noticeable to a greater or lesser 
extent within all of the examined media, which is the result of a consensus 
among journalists in the way they described the conflict. This confirms, once 
again, Russ-Mohl’s (2013) observations of the influence of social markers on the 
actions of journalists and the coverage they present. This is due to the fact that the 
coverage of international events will always be embedded in a specific national 
context, for example a historical one (see Riegert, 2011; Gomez Rodriguez, 2007; 
Thompson, 1995). It is difficult for journalists to escape this context, as demon-
strated by this study’s results.
4.1.2  Comparisons to historical events in the coverage
More than one historical issue could be described in each unit. Therefore, the 
actual number of historical events referenced to in the publications (see Tab. 
4.2) is higher than the number of units that contained historical contexts (see 
Tab. 4.1). Taking into account the amount of historical events referred to in the 
analyzed media (see Tab. 4.2), it can be seen that they constitute 17 percent of 
the total research material, which is a relatively high result. It also shows a strong 
saturation of information with these types of frames.
Among the most often referenced events were World War II (41 %) and the 
Russo-Georgian war (14 %). It can be seen that the second most referenced cate-
gory was in fact “other” historical events. This contained various events that were 
not categorized into their own groups like the rest. The code book also includes 
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questions about the comparison of the situation in Ukraine to other wars and 
armed conflicts (see Appendix no. 1). The analysis confirmed that World War 
II and the Russo-Georgian war were the most common comparisons used by 
journalists. Therefore, this is an almost identical reflection of the data relating to 
the dominant historical events visible in the coverage (see Tab. 4.2). The charac-
teristics of the most frequently reported events and comparisons related in par-
ticular to the presence and actions of Russia. It should be remembered that this 
state was actively involved in both wars, often being considered as aggressor or 
one of the aggressive actors. That is why it is possible to say that Russia could be 
used by the media as an element of domestication. It could also have a significant 
impact on the dominant coverage perspective (see Tab. 3.12). This is particularly 
interesting from the point of view of perceiving Russia as an “enemy”. Not only 
as an enemy of Ukraine, but also as an enemy of Poland.
Ottosen and Øvrebø’s (2016:  70) research on how the gas attack in Syria 
was framed showed that the enemy image is more noticeable in editorials and 
commentaries than news stories, because there the journalist’s opinion can be 
expressed more clearly. Most of the information relating to historical events, 
where Russia was presented as an “enemy”, was in the press and in particular 
the quality newspapers (see Tab. 4.2). Although editorials were not included in 
this study, Poland has a strong tradition of commentary journalism in the press 
(Dobek-Ostrowska, 2012), so it can be expected that historical frames appear 
more frequently in newspaper articles than in television news.
Referencing historical events like World War II – where Poland was a victim of 
Russian aggression – can also help in creating and strengthening ties to Poland, 
which is the essence of domestication (see Gurevitch et al., 1991; Taradai, 2012). 
On the other hand, it might be a form of deception through a selection of facts 
that supports an anti-Russian perspective of the dispute. One of the respondents 
[R11] mentioned this while speaking about the unanimity of the Polish media in 
the coverage. Consensus in the way the dispute is presented, including the selec-
tion of the same frames, can be a limitation of the journalists’ work. Especially 
when they are not fully aware of the fact that they act in accordance with a cer-
tain group perspectives, and in the case of some respondents this was noticeable.
Most of the materials on World War II and the Russo-Georgian war appeared 
in both quality dailies and Super Express (Tab. 4.2). It looks the same in the case 
of comparisons to other wars and the presence of certain historical events in the 
coverage. An interview for Super Express entitled “The West will sell Ukraine 
like Poland in 1944” (23/07/2014) is a reference to the Yalta conference. The 
interviewee claims that while the shift of Russian aggression toward Poland 
is rather impossible, the West will allow Putin to keep the territories already 
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seized by the separatists. In his opinion, this is to allow peace to be reached at 
the expense of Ukrainian sovereignty, just as in the case of Poland during the 
World War II.
A similar tone was presented by Gazeta Wyborcza in the article “Gdańsk 
1939, Donetsk 2014” (01/09/2014), where the passivity of Europe and the world 
regarding Ukraine was also referred to. The article also used a comparison of 
the situation of Poland from the time of the war to the situation of its eastern 
neighbor at the same time. In this way, it was possible to create a connection 
between these countries on an emotional level, in the context of being “victims”. 
Therefore, the possibility of identifying with the people of Ukraine, which is 
one of the important news factors (see Chyliński and Russ-Mohl, 2008; Galtung 
and Ruge, 1965) increased. However, how the aggressor is portrayed is quite 
different. The journalists point out similarities between Putin and Hitler, which 
is very much emphasized in the text. The Russian president was very often com-
pared to Hitler also in other materials (see Tab. 4.3). The “enemy” is thereby 
personified by these people, and comparing Putin to Hitler is an obvious way to 
demonize him. Despite them being active in different historical periods, their 
actions are perceived in the same way, evoking equally negative emotions. The 
use of comparisons to World War II and negative historical figures in the case 
of Russia’s actions was also noticeable in Fakty TVN. MEP Kowal, whose state-
ment appears in the material “Russia versus Ukraine – the tension lowers, or is 
it the silence before the storm”, says that the actions of the Russian authorities 
resemble the policy of Tsarina Catherine II and Stalin (31/03/2014). These fig-
ures, like Hitler, are embodiments of a general concept of the “enemy”, which is 
identified with Russia – and mainly with political actors. That is why the ability 
to decode information is in this case crucial. It is important to understand that 
the comparison of the conflict in Ukraine to World War II or Putin to Hitler 
and Stalin is only a kind of metaphor. However, it is this metaphor that makes 
the national recipient able to find commonalities between the described event 
and other similar situations from the past. On this basis, the reader can deter-
mine that basically sharing the same “enemy” is a factor that makes Ukraine not 
“them”, but more “we.” That is also why the conflict is not just “their” dispute, 
but also “ours”.
The perception of Russia as an aggressor and a possible enemy is also notice-
able in the case of the Russo-Georgian war. However, this antagonistic image 
is not the result of a direct attack on Poland – like in the case of World War 
II. It is rather a fear that what happened to Georgia could happen to Poland as 
well. It is worth noting that this historical-geopolitical context was most often 
referenced by journalists (see Tab. 3.13). Also, supporting Georgia’s sovereignty 
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and Poland being involved in resolving the dispute in connection with Russia’s 
aggressive actions, means that Russia could be perceived negatively by Poles. 
Most materials referencing this conflict appeared in Rzeczpospolita and 
Super Express (see Tab. 4.2). The tabloid referred in particular to the visit of 
President Kaczyński to Georgia in 2008 and to his words regarding the future 
Russian expansion in the region. For example, this was noticeable in the article 
“Kaczyński predicted it” (Super Express, 03/03/2014), where the journalist 
writes about the involvement of the then head of the Polish state in solving 
the dispute. The political support provided to the Georgian authorities by 
Kaczyński is an interesting reference to be used in the context of the dispute in 
Ukraine. The former government of the Civic Platform, as well as the opposi-
tion, was involved in helping Ukraine – mainly in the form of imposing eco-
nomic and political sanctions on Russia. The reference to the war in Georgia is 
in this case both relating to national security as well as a form of condemning 
the unlawful attack on an independent state.
The illegality of Russia’s actions both in the case of Georgia and Ukraine was 
also presented in the context of the Russian Federation’s imperialistic policy. 
This was reflected in several Rzeczpospolita articles, such as “Empire wants to 
be a civilization” (02/02/2015) and “The last moment to rebuild the empire” 
(19/03/2014). In addition to Russia’s desire to strengthen its political position 
in the region, the text also talks about the conflict at the civilizational level 
between Russia and the Western countries. The author writes that the dispute 
in this respect results from the inability of the West to understand that Russia 
perceives Ukraine as the “pearl in the crown” of its empire. Therefore, it is dif-
ficult for it to accept that Ukraine wants closer ties with the European Union 
and NATO, both of which Poland belongs to. That is why apart from a political-
military conflict, the dispute also takes place at the level of values, which is more 
symbolic. This view of the war in Ukraine also means that the understanding of 
the “enemy” takes on a broader meaning. This enemy is not only perceived as a 
territorial invader, but also as belonging to a different civilization – taking into 
account the different nature of Russia’s political regime and its professed values 
(see Boyd-Barrett, 2017; Pasitselska, 2017). Some of the journalists indicate this 
factor. When asked about how to define the conflict, the Fakt journalist stated 
that this is a dispute “between the Western world and Russia” [R1]. The respon-
dent added that being a part of the Western world generally means belonging to 
international organizations such as NATO and the European Union. Therefore, 
in his opinion, Ukraine joining these entities was unacceptable for Russia, due 
to the risk of losing Ukraine from the sphere of its influence. This view was also 
confirmed by another of the respondents who stated that “this is a conflict over 
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influence between the European Union and Russia” [R2]. It should be noted 
that a similar situation with Russia took place when Poland applied for mem-
bership in NATO (Celewicz and Nizioł-Celewicz, 2006: 222–223). Therefore, it 
is assumed that the similar experiences of Poland and Ukraine in this context 
could strengthen the feeling among the audience that the conflict relates to them. 
Because of its democratic values, Poland supports Ukraine’s right to self-deter-
mination. The Gazeta Wyborcza journalist argues that this type of support for 
the eastern neighbor by political actors and publicists is already a kind of tradi-
tion. However, as the respondent notes, supporting Ukraine in its conflict with 
Russia is also due to purely pragmatic reasons:
“The independence of Ukraine, which is a state striving towards Europe, is such a basic 
element of Polish politics and also one of the founding myths of independent Poland. 
The whole policy of Piłsudski aimed at creating a Ukrainian state, which would be a 
buffer state to Russia, included this aspect. Later on, the emigre politics of Giedroyc and 
Mieroszewski told the Poles: you must make sure to create an attempt to let Ukraine to 
be independent, because this is the best defense of Poland. Therefore, we can say that 
we are currently defending Poland’s independence in this military-political aspect.” [R4]
The journalist’s words show that the interest in the conflict in Ukraine not only 
resulted from a compassion for this country and condemnation of Russian ag-
gression. It could have also been the result of geopolitical traditions, like ensuring 
Poland’s national security. It could be seen as a kind of broadening of Herman 
and Chomsky’s “worthy” victim concept (1988). The Ukrainians are not only 
perceived as defenseless and defeated, in need of help, but also as having security 
interests which coincide with those of Poland. This is very important, because 
it confirms that the political environment, just like the social one, could have 
affected the media discourse (see Dobek-Ostrowska, 2007; McQuail, 2000), even 
if the journalists denied that someone else influenced the selection of topics. It is 
also interesting from the point of view of domestication. Its effectiveness is to a 
large extent based on creating connections between the event and the recipient, 
also by reference to political elements (see Gross and Kopper, 2011; Segev, 2015). 
These are also assumed to affect the functioning of the media system. Therefore, 
showing that journalists, especially from quality media, used these factors when 
writing about the conflict, confirms that they were also transmitters of political 
content. However, it should be noted that this was not always related to political 
sympathies, but was primarily the result of Russia’s involvement in the dispute, 
and secondly its impact on the country. Therefore, while making content about 
the dispute, including comparisons between the Russo-Georgian war and the 
conflict in Ukraine, journalists sought to draw attention to the fact that Russian 
aggression is unacceptable, especially from the point of view of international 
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law. That is why, apart from domesticating the conflict by evoking a general and 
traditional hostility to Russia resulting from fear, journalists made connections 
to Poland being a part of the Western world, mainly through being a member 
of international organizations and through its professed values. Therefore, it can 
be assumed that the recipients consider information about the role of these or-
ganizations in connection to the conflict as important to them. In this way, by 
referencing the so-called Western system of values and, as mentioned earlier, 
international organizations which are connected with the Western world and 
represent it, it is also possible to see similarities to the counter-domestication 
described by Olausson (2013: 715–720). The event is not only subject to a kind 
of extroverted domestication (Olausson, 2013: 715–720) seen through the prism 
of context-oriented factors relating to more regional or neighborly relations, but 
is also presented through a more global perspective.
Some events related to World War II – which the conflict in Ukraine was most 
often compared to – were put in the “other” category. These were for example 
events preceding the outbreak of the war, such as the Anschluss of Austria (see 
Pictures 4.1 and 4.2) and the Munich conference. They were often referred to and 
basically dominated the “other” category.
Picture 4.1: “Anschluss of Crimea 
Annexation of the Ukrainian 
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Comparisons of the annexation of Crimea to Hitler’s occupation of 
Czechoslovakia appeared in both quality newspapers and tabloids. These ar-
ticles are good examples of how the journalists manifested the dispositional 
enemy image of Russia, or the concept of the enemy in general, both through 
personification and through visual frames (see Ottosen, 1995; Epkins, 2016). 
Interestingly, two March articles by Gazeta Wyborcza and Super Express 
even had almost same title – “Anschluss of Crimea” – which shows that the 
journalists often used identical frames. This was also noticeable in the termi-
nology applied. In the articles “Anschluss of Crimea. The annexation of the 
Ukrainian Peninsula by Russia is a fact since yesterday” (Gazeta Wyborcza, 
07/03/2014) and “Putin took Crimea like Hitler Czechoslovakia” (Super 
Express, 04/03/2014) Vladimir Putin was compared to Adolf Hitler. While 
in the case of Gazeta Wyborcza this comparison came from quoting Hillary 
Clinton, in the Super Express material it was the journalist who used this 
wording. Both texts also spoke about the necessity of imposing sanctions on 
Russia and the West taking more decisive action to prevent further expansion 
of the Russian Federation. Then it could be possible to avoid a situation like 
the one that took place after the Munich conference. The similar mechanisms 
used by journalists of both newspapers show that the analyzed media, despite 
the differences in the kind of presented content, sometimes behaved in the 
same way – especially when they wrote about Russia or similar events, like the 
annexation of Crimea. The use of the same frames shows that the media outlets 
were well aware of how to bring the event closer to the public (see Thompson, 
1995). This is obviously because they are also a part of Polish society and know 
the fears and aversions prevailing in it (Tab. 3.13). That is why Putin was com-
pared to Hitler – because the Nazi leader is well known to the Poles, mainly 
due to Poland’s participation in World War II and Germany’s assault on the 
country. Therefore, referencing the actions of this despised actor in the context 
of the conflict in Ukraine could have influenced the reader’s imaginations. It 
can be assumed that both the aforementioned figures and the events to which 
the conflict in Ukraine was compared to have a specific meaning to the Polish 
recipient.
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World War I 7 2 2 1 17 0 4
World War II 47 40 37 35 20 62 41
Cold Wara 0 12 7 8 13 7 8
Communismb 3 2 8 4 3 0 4
Transnistria 
War
3 2 10 4 0 0 5
Russo-
Georgian war
17 21 10 21 0 0 14
Other 23 21 26 27 47 31 24
N= 30 52 88 78 30 13 291
a 1947–1991
b 1944–1989 – it was decided to differentiate the “Cold War” from “Communism” due to the 
nomenclature used by journalists and time. The period of the Communist Party’s ruling in Poland 
was considered to be the “Communism” category. Relations between the satellite states of the USSR 
were also referred to this concept.
Source: Author
The historical frames also served as a reminder of Poland’s relations with the 
parties to the conflict. However, these frames were found in only four percent 
of the analyzed materials, which constitutes 70 research units (see Tab. 4.3). 
The historical references did not apply exclusively to the relation of Poland with 
Russia or Ukraine – the journalists focused more on regional and global conflicts 
when using historical frames (see Tab. 4.2).










Yes 6 8 3 5 1 3 4
No 94 92 97 95 99 97 96
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N= 170 206 438 385 294 233 1726
Source: Author
The most references to the relations between Poland and parties to the 
conflict were presented by Rzeczpospolita, Fakt and Super Express. It should 
be remembered, that tabloids were also the medium that most often wrote 
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about the consequences of the conflict for Poland (see Tab. 3.1). In turn, 
Rzeczpospolita indicated that a Russian invasion was the cause of the conflict in 
Ukraine (see Tab. 3.5), and the dispute itself is not internal but inter-state (see 
Tab. 3.6). Therefore, it could be an important way of strengthening the convic-
tion that this country is once again a threat not only to another country, but 
also to Poland. The general negativity toward the Russian Federation, partly 
through the prism of past events, in fact deepened the conviction that Russia 
should be perceived more like “enemy” than a “friend” of Poland. This was 
expressed in the analyzed materials. The Fakt article entitled “The Russians 
are still lying that they liberate” summarizes what the USSR did in relation to 
Poland during World War II (17/09/2014). The historian that is interviewed 
in this article refers to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the aggression against 
Poland from September 17, the Katyn massacre and the so-called liberation of 
Warsaw. All of these events are in his opinion proof that the USSR and now 
Russia have no qualms about assaulting its neighbors. This is also a fairly clear 
reference to the present conflict between Russia and Ukraine. This strong criti-
cism of Russia, especially on the 75th anniversary of the outbreak of World War 
II, is quite symbolic since it refers to events that are strongly rooted in the Polish 
national consciousness. It also shows that in the opinion of the journalist and also 
his interviewee, Russia and its actions, both in relation to Poland and Ukraine, 
are marked by aggression. Therefore, the frame of the “enemy” and “aggressor”, 
which journalists mostly attributed to Russia, is an element that could be fur-
ther strengthened by reference to historical events. This has been confirmed by 
the in-depth interviews. Some of the journalists with whom I spoke were asked 
about the extent to which history influenced how the conflict was covered by the 
media. The Super Express journalist said it was a key issue. At the same time, the 
respondent pointed out that the situation in Ukraine had been covered in the 
context of possible aggression against Poland and similar situations from the 
past, like World War II:
“These issues of Polish-Soviet, Polish-Russian conflicts were somewhere in the back of 
the head. Besides, there were also materials that, in an emphasized historical context, 
depicted what was happening in Ukraine, and these analogies imposed themselves. 
Indeed, the past defined what was then created.” [R3]
This quote among others shows that the journalists, whether they intended to 
or not, put a kind of ethnocentric filter on the news in order to bring it even 
closer to the audience (see Wolsfeld, 2004; Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Mansell and 
Cammaerts, 2010). Although using this kind of ethnocentric perspective can 
attract interest, according to Nossek (2004) and Gans (1979), it can also limit 
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the content’s objectivity. It could be said that an ethnocentric filter by definition 
constitutes a form of bias, since it limits the perspective to a particular national 
background. The past, especially that which regards conflicts, determined to 
a large extent the way the dispute and the actors involved in it were covered. 
It is also, and perhaps above all, a part of the ethnocentric filter imposed by 
journalists, which allowed recipients to identify actors as belonging to either “us” 
or “them”. This is especially common in war journalism (Galtung, 2006). That is 
why the results of the project “Ukraine 2014 – media war and the war in media” 
showed differences in how the events were framed – also with regards to histor-
ical matters (Nygren and Hök, 2016). The Polish media presented the conflict 
through the prism of Russian aggression experienced in the past (see Głowacki 
and Smolak, 2016) – which is also confirmed in my study. Meanwhile, the Russian 
media filtered messages through the prism of the so-called Russian World and 
Ukraine being overtaken by a “Kiev Junta” (Kiria and Shpyntova, 2016).
A form of ethnocentric filter dedicated to the historical relations between 
Poland and the parties to the conflict was mostly visible in the case of tabloids. 
Quite often, an element of fear was operating, referring to events in which 
Poland was the victim of mainly German or Russian belligerence. It was the fear 
of Russia’s actions in the context of the possibility of the outbreak of another 
World War that was also an element of domestication, which the media, espe-
cially Fakt and Super Express, used quite scrupulously.
In a poll conducted by Fakt (“Poles are afraid of war” 04/03/2014) the public 
was asked if they think that the conflict will cross over to Poland. Most of them 
answered that they are terrified of this prospect and, interestingly enough, some 
of them referred to World War II, which can be confirmation that this event 
generates certain negative emotions in the recipients – mainly fear. One of the 
persons polled stated that in the conflict in Ukraine, “Russia acts like the Third 
Reich [when it attacked Poland]” (Fakt, 04/03/2014). One can see that refer-
encing past disputes in which Poland took part generates strong emotions in 
Poles and is thereby an effective mechanism of domestication. This has also been 
noticed in the case of the content presented by the quality newspapers.
A symbolic reference to World War II and the actions of the USSR was 
noticeable in one Rzeczpospolita article. The article entitled “Green men before 
September 17” (Rzeczpospolita, 17/09/2014) refers, just like the Fakt article, pre-
cisely to the assault on Poland in 1939. Despite the reference to the 75th anniver-
sary of this event, the journalist also wrote about the similarity of the NKVD 
activities to the actions of the so-called “little green men” in Crimea. This spe-
cific analogy, especially concerning the definition of the “victim” (Poland and 
Ukraine), as well as the “enemy” (Russia) is undoubtedly a factor that could 
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affect how the material and the dispute is decoded by the recipients. The jour-
nalist clearly presents certain contexts and how the information should be 
read, triggering national stereotypes and fears – specifically, fears about Russia. 
Using these types of mechanisms has also been done by describing the so-called 
Massacre in Warsaw (Gazeta Wyborcza, “Putin’s Crime”  – 25/03/2014), the 
Polish-Bolshevik war (Fakt, “Russians can drop atomic bomb on Warsaw”– 
02/03/2015) and the expulsion of Poles from the Kremlin (Rzeczpospolita, 
“Moscow holiday with a Polish accent” – 04/11/2014). Referring to events older 
than several dozen years requires recipients to have some specific knowledge. 
However, it seems that journalists assume that the audience has such knowl-
edge, and if not, that certain schemes are passed naturally within given social 
groups, such as families. The Gazeta Wyborcza journalist believes that this is the 
case for Poles. In his opinion, Poles understand well what is happening in the 
East, because “in different families, similar stories exist in the category of several 
decades in the past” [R4]. Therefore, the memories passed down from generation 
to generation can strengthen the feeling of closeness with the described event 
(Goffman, 1974).
Historical relations between Poland and Ukraine have also been referred to 
in the media. For example, references were made to the Volhynia Massacre. This 
was mainly brought up by Rzeczpospolita. However, references to this event usu-
ally did not have a negative overtone, but rather referred to the need to undertake 
dialogue with Ukraine (Rzeczpospolita, “We are extremely grateful to Poles for 
support” 07/03/2014). Poland supported the country in its fight against Russia. 
Therefore, domesticating the coverage by referencing negative historical rela-
tions with Ukraine was not as common as it was in the case of Russia. However, 
while the anti-Ukrainian discourse was not noticeable in the mainstream media, 
as one of the journalists [R11] points out, the situation looked completely dif-
ferent on the internet. According to the journalist, Russians put anti-Ukrainian 
propaganda online which for instance put the Volhynia Massacre back on the 
agenda, even though “until 2013 it was absent in the Polish public debate” [R11].
The differences raised by the respondent [R11] between online and tra-
ditional media discourse are quite interesting. It seems like the mainstream 
media only used references that were anti-Russian. According to Garlicki (2015) 
and the Centre for Public Opinion Research (2017), the internet is perceived 
by Poles, next to television, as their most important source of information. The 
differences in the perception of the parties to the conflict mentioned by the jour-
nalist [R11] show that it is necessary to investigate this issue in the future and 
compare the discourses presented by these two kinds of media. However, Poles 
still consider television as their main source of information (see Garlicki, 2015; 
Róa Norström - 978-3-631-79027-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 12/03/2020 01:06:53PM by A.Gorlikowski@peterlang.com
via Peter Lang AG and Adam Gorlikowski
Impact of historical references 141
Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, 2017), and therefore it can be assumed that 
the anti-Russian views presented by this medium – as shown in my study (see 
Tab. 3.12) – had a stronger impact on Poles. Although Garlicki (2015) points 
out that newspapers are not such an important source of information for the 
Polish people, they still have a strong impact on the agenda of other media 
(Instytut Monitoringu Mediów, 2014 and 2015). Since the press framed Russia as 
the enemy (see Ottosen, 1995; Ottosen and Øvrebø, 2016: 70), this perspective 
might have transferred to other media and in turn to their audience, thereby fur-
ther reinforcing the negative attitudes toward Russia.
The historical coverage was not only connected with events that happened 
many dozens or even hundreds of years ago, but also with those that occurred 
in the last ten years – for example the Smolensk catastrophe and the so-called 
Partition of Ukraine between Poland and Russia. Both issues appeared in the 
media coverage, used as domestication. Referring to these events, by comparing 
certain situations to them, was not the only form of domestication. Journalists 
used this mechanism also when writing about the impact of these issues on polit-
ical actors.
One of the issues that was quite strongly covered by the Polish media  – 
both by tabloid and quality outlets – was the interview with the then Minister 
of Foreign Affairs and later Marshal of the Sejm, Radosław Sikorski, for the 
American portal Politico (Judah, 2014). Sikorski said that during his visit to 
Moscow in 2008 with Prime Minister Tusk, Putin proposed the partition of 
Ukraine (see Pictures 4.3 and 4.4). According to the articles “Radosław Sikorski 
reveals: Putin proposed to Tusk the partition of Ukraine” (Fakt, 21/10/2014) and 
“Putin wanted the partition of Ukraine” (Gazeta Wyborcza, 21/10/2014) similar 
proposals were also made later by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who wanted Poland to 
take western Ukraine and Russia the eastern part. This is interesting, because the 
western areas of Ukraine, including Lviv, in the time of the outbreak of World 
War II belonged to Poland. Referring to issues like these in the media probably 
has a significant impact, at least in increasing the interest of the audience even 
if the information is not entirely true. However, this way of putting the story 
in a Polish context – both by writing about domestic politicians and bringing 
up the fact that a part of Ukraine once belonged to Poland – could certainly 
have constituted an effective instrument of domestication (see Riegert, 2011; 
Thompson, 1995; Clausen, 2004). Moreover, the very use of the word “parti-
tion” could have affected how the information was read, and thereby putting 
the story in a historical framework (see Entman, 1993; Entman, 2004). It is 
a fairly clear reference to the partitions of Poland (1772–1795). Therefore it 
is possible to talk about an attempt to bring back this old phenomenon, but 
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Picture 4.3: “Radosław Sikorski 
revels: Putin proposed to Tusk the 
partition of Ukraine”. 
Source: Fakt, 21/10/2014
in another context, because in the 18th century Poland was the victim and 
Russia was the aggressor. In this new partition being proposed, both coun-
tries would perform the same function. It should be noted that according 
to Sikorski, neither he nor Tusk responded to Putin’s proposal. However, the 
frames used by the media, for example by adding maps showing a possible 
division of Ukraine to the articles, and using historically charged terms in 
titles, could strengthen the level of domestication. In addition, the very fact 
that the words referred to in the materials were spoken by a member of the 
Polish government affects the relevance of the issue for Poles. Interestingly, 
while Sikorsky’s statements were referred to in materials from October, 2014, 
information based on the Zhirinovsky proposal was already published in March. 
In the Super Express article entitled “Poles do not want Lviv” (26/03/2014), 
comments by Polish citizens on the possible joining of Lviv to Poland were 
presented. Everyone unanimously denied the possibility of such a thing. 
Moreover, it was pointed out that if Poland agreed to this type of cooperation, 
it would then itself fall victim to Russia. Therefore, it seems that the context 
of a “partition”, although used in relation to a possible partition of Ukraine by 
Russia together with Poland, was in fact a kind of reminder of Russia’s aggressive 
intentions. Moreover, it strengthened the negative image of this state as a party to 
the dispute.
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In the materials concerning Putin’s proposal to divide Ukraine, the inter-
view given by Sikorski was also treated in a rather negative way. Journalists 
pointed to the fact that Sikorski, despite having been the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs for many years, does not really know what diplomacy is all about. The 
article “Sikorski went mad. Marshal Radosław Sikorski is an object of ridicule. 
Diplo-idiot” (Super Express, 23/10/2014) refers to the biggest mishaps of the 
politician during his career and also quite sarcastically refers to his statement 
in an interview that the alleged proposal to Tusk never actually happened, or 
that he could not remember it. On one Fakt cover – “How was it with Putin? 
Embarrassment! Sikorski to resign!” (22/10/2014)  – a reference was again 
made to this incident and at the same time it was stated that the politician 
should resign from office. That kind of materials was presented mainly by 
tabloids, which may be due to their rather sensational character. But it is worth 
remembering that both Fakt and Super Express are the most widely read dai-
lies in Poland and the views they present reach a big audience. Therefore, the 
level of domestication in these media may be stronger compared to rest of the 
analyzed outlets. In addition, the implication that the situation in Ukraine has 
a real impact on the political situation in the country, for example with the 
possible resignation of Sikorski, makes the recipient recognize that it is also 
“our” dispute. Sikorski did resign from his position in June 2015 and decided 
to withdraw from political life. The media coverage of this issue in 2014 could 
have influenced his decision to some extent, especially since the media gave a 
lot of attention to the opposition and its tough critique. It is a difficult thing 
to prove, but might at least indicate something about the interaction between 
the media and the political system, which is crucial from the point of view of 
domestication.
The media also made comparisons between the MH17 plane crash and the 
Smolensk catastrophe (see Pictures 4.5 and 4.6). Although they took place four 
years apart and in different areas, Russia is a common element for both of them. 
That is why such comparisons appeared in the media. Mainly they took the form 
of quotations rather than the journalists’ own words. However, the appearance 
of this type of content in the media could make the audience relate to the events 
and the presented information.
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Picture 4.5: “Putin declared 
war on us on April 10”. 
Source: Super Express, 10/04/2014 
Materials concerning these two disasters appeared most often in the pages of 
Super Express and Gazeta Wyborcza. In the case of the tabloid, for example, the 
words of the then spokesperson for Law and Justice, Hoffman, was presented, 
who stated that the death of Lech Kaczyński was the result of a coup that Putin 
ordered (Super Express, “Putin declared war on us on April 10”, 10/04/2014) (see 
Picture 4.6). The reason for that was the involvement of the former Polish pres-
ident in resolving the Georgian crisis. Of course, this article was written before 
the MH17 catastrophe had happened. However, the rhetoric in it does refer 
to the information presented in the Gazeta Wyborcza article (“Donbass is not 
Smolensk”, 24/07/2014). The article discusses the Law and Justice party’s call for 
the creation of an international commission to investigate the catastrophes in 
Smolensk and Donbass. The journalist quotes Macierewicz’s statement that “if 
Lech Kaczyński were not killed, the shooting down of the Boeing would not have 
happened” (Gazeta Wyborcza, 24/07/2014). Therefore, strong links between the 
opinions of Hoffman and Macierewicz are noticeable. However, the perspective 
of the Gazeta Wyborcza material is very critical to the opinion of Law and Justice. 
In the interview, which was conducted with the head of the State Commission 
for the Investigation of Accidents, it was found that the only similarity between 
the two events is the death of innocent people. Other than that, the events had 
nothing to do with each other. The comparison of both events also appeared in 
Picture 4.6: “Donbass is not Smolensk” .
Source: Gazeta Wyborcza, 24/07/2014
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another Gazeta Wyborcza material entitled “What links Boeing and Smolensk” 
(04/08/2014). The journalist is quite ironical about how both the separatists 
and Law and Justice tried to explain the MH17 and Smolensk catastrophes. The 
author claims that the events are similar to each other in only this one respect. 
So both the Russian propaganda machine and the Polish right wing party came 
up with explanations that the journalist believed to be lies. Although the com-
parison between the Smolensk and MH17 catastrophes was made to show that 
the events were completely different from each other  – except in one case by 
Super Express – it is still possible to see it as a kind of domestication. Bringing 
up issues like these, even if only for the sake of proving them wrong, may influ-
ence the thinking of the recipients. This is especially the case when the common 
element – the main villain – in both events is Russia, which is itself a form of 
domestication. Furthermore, putting the spotlight on discussions among Polish 
politicians – mainly the Law and Justice party – on this subject could also make 
the MH17 catastrophe as well as the whole conflict perceived by the audience as 
more of a national event. Mostly, because an ethnocentric, national filter is put 
on the information which in the case of news domestication seems to be crucial.
4.1.3  Vladimir Putin compared to historical figures
The analysis of the main coverage perspective (see Tab. 3.12) and how the dom-
inant and secondary actors were presented (see Tab. 3.10 and 3.11) showed 
that Russia was quite often personalized by its president. It was Vladimir Putin 
and not the entire nation that was usually presented as a part of the conflict. 
Therefore, it is assumed that this politician was perceived by the media and the 
audience as the “enemy”. The analysis of the previously presented articles showed 
that Putin’s comparison to certain historical figures was often metaphorical. 
Journalists referred to specific attributes – usually negative – that the persons 
shared. It is assumed that in this way they wanted to show the recipient how the 
actions of the Russian politician should be evaluated.
The Russian president was compared to eleven historical figures, most of 
whom were his predecessors (see Tab. 4.4). Only in two cases, actors from out-
side of Russia were referred to. These were Hitler and Napoleon. It is worth 
noting that the Chancellor of the Third Reich was in fact the one who Putin was 
most often compared to. This is not surprising considering the fact that the most 
often presented historical event by the media was World War II. Therefore, the 
comparisons to Hitler, and Stalin who ranked second place, are quite expected. 
Most of the listed historical figures are known to the Polish audience, both 
through their connection with their country’s history, as well as by reference to 
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the history of Europe. Therefore, the possibility of domestication by referring to 
these people is high, especially through having Putin personify evil (see Epkins, 
2016) with reference to certain historical figures (see Tab. 4.4).





Rzeczpospolita Fakty TVN Total
Hitler 4 3 6 3 3 19
Stalin 2 6 5 3 1 17
Lenin 1 0 0 0 0 1
Ivan the Terrible 0 2 0 1 0 3
Nicholas I 0 0 1 0 0 1
Alexander II 0 0 1 0 0 1
Nicholas II 0 1 0 0 0 1
Napoleon 0 0 0 1 0 1
Brezhnev 0 1 0 0 0 1
Khrushchev 0 1 0 0 0 1
Tsarina Catharine 0 0 0 0 1 1
N= 7 14 13 8 5 47
Source: Author
The list of historical figures to which Vladimir Putin was compared to was 
created on the basis of references that appeared in the coverage. The Russian 
President being compared to historical figures was most common in the 
newspapers – especially in Super Express and Gazeta Wyborcza, which confirms 
the importance of the press in the demonization of the enemy (Ottosen and 
Øvrebø’s, 2016). The comparative articles presented by these two newspapers 
accounted for 57  percent of all collected materials addressing this issue. In 
the case of television materials, only in Fakty TVN a few comparisons of 
Putin appeared to for example Hitler, Stalin and Tsarina Catherine. However, 
these were mainly references to someone’s statements, as in the material 
presenting the opinion of Kowal about the conflict (Fakty TVN, “Russia versus 
Ukraine – the tension lowers, or is it the silence before the storm”, 31/03/2014). 
Interestingly, in this material 60  percent of all indications noticeable in this 
medium’s coverage appeared. On the other hand, Wiadomości TVP1 did not 
do this type of comparison at all. Therefore, it is possible to notice that the use 
of the analyzed mechanism was not as important for TV journalists as for press 
journalists.
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The reference to Hitler’s deeds was the most noticeable comparison (see Tab. 
4.4). References on this subject appeared in Rzeczpospolita and Super Express. 
Interestingly, the titles of a couple of articles from March, 2014 sounded almost 
the same (see Pictures 4.7 and 4.8). In a tabloid article entitled “Putin speaks like 
Hitler” (Super Express, 03/03/2014) the journalist makes comparisons between 
Putin’s and Hitler’s speeches. These were particularly speeches regarding inter-
vention in the Crimea as well as invading Poland. In the case of the first event it 
was said that “Russia reserves the right to (…) defend the Russian-speaking pop-
ulation living in Ukraine” (Super Express, 03/03/2014). When referring to Hitler’s 
words, the so-called Gliwice incident was pointed out – “The Third Reich cannot 
remain passive and will respond with fire to the brutal attack by the Polish army” 
(Super Express, 03/03/2014).
In the Rzeczpospolita article, statements regarding the connection of Crimea 
to Russia and the Sudetes to Germany were compared (“Putin spoke like Hitler”, 
20/03/2014). Under the pictures of Hitler and Putin, which present them in almost 
the same manner, fragments are shown of their statements after the occupations 
of the mentioned areas. Putin was quoted as saying that “Crimea has always been 
and is an inseparable part of Russia” (Rzeczpospolita, 20/03/2014) while Hitler 
said that “the Sudetes were and are German” (Rzeczpospolita, 20/03/2014). At the 
same time, the material compares the collapse of the USSR with the Versailles 
Treaty, stating that these events were difficult to accept for both leaders. The ref-
erence to the breakup of the Soviet Union, including Ukraine’s split from Russia, 
in the opinion of the journalist and Putin, was one of the reasons for the Crimea 
annexation. According to the author, Hitler was acting similarly by annexing 
the Sudetenland. The journalist also saw a similarity between the two actors in 
their rather negative attitude toward the West and its demands. The historical 
references in the Rzeczpospolita and Super Express materials are quite similar to 
each other, which confirms that the journalists while writing about Ukraine used 
the same mechanisms and contexts. In the Super Express article, Hitler’s assault 
on Poland was referred to, which means that the degree of closeness between 
the recipient and the material could have been great. However, in the case of 
the Rzeczpospolita text, the Polish reader would also be able to understand the 
presented analogies without any problem. Therefore, it seems that the level of 
domestication of these issues, through a metaphorical reference to historical fig-
ures and events, could be high in the case of the analyzed units. The journalists 
clearly referred to the statements of Putin and Hitler, pointing to obvious analo-
gies between them.
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The president of the Russian Federation was also often compared to Stalin. 
Seventeen out of 47 references concerned this actor (see Tab. 4.4). Most of the 
materials comparing Stalin’s and Putin’s actions concerned the Soviet attack on 
Poland in September 1939 and the similarities between that and the current sit-
uation in the Crimea. To a large extent, the use of references to World War II 
served to indicate that Russia still has imperialist ambitions today. It was also 
mentioned in Rzeczpospolita’s article “To match Stalin’s fame” (17/03/2015). The 
Ukrainian writer Kurkow says that Putin is aggressive towards Ukraine because 
of complexes that he has to Stalin. Therefore, his actions toward former member 
states of the USSR and so-called satellite states are based on a desire to regain the 
power Russia had in that time. This was also mentioned in the Fakt article entitled 
“Estonians are afraid of Russia” (03/09/2014) as well as materials from Gazeta 
Wyborcza such as “Ukraine is not Finland” (10/03/2014) and “De-escalation, 
do not tease the bear” (04/06/2014). At the same time, in the latter article 
there is also criticism of Western politicians, especially then French president 
Hollande. Similar to his predecessor Sarkozy in Georgia, he was to take part in 
negotiations with Russia on the resolution of the Ukraine conflict. Interestingly, 
besides referring to the mentioned events, the article also brings up the fact 
that the West, including France, acts as British Prime Minister Chamberlain, 
who after the conference in Munich uttered the memorable phrase: “I believe 
it is peace for our time” (Gazeta Wyborcza, “De-escalation, do not tease the 
bear”, 04/06/2014). Although in the last material, references to both Stalin and 
Hitler appear, the previously mentioned articles refer only to the former leader 
of the Soviet Union. They clearly indicate that Putin should be perceived simi-
larly as he. Taking into account that World War II was among the most common 
Picture 4.8: “Putin speaks like Hitler”. 
Source: Super Express, 03/03/2014
Picture 4.7: “Putin spoke like Hitler”. 
Source: Rzeczpospolita, 20/03/2014
  
Róa Norström - 978-3-631-79027-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 12/03/2020 01:06:53PM by A.Gorlikowski@peterlang.com
via Peter Lang AG and Adam Gorlikowski
Consequences of the conflict for Poland 149
comparisons of the situation in Ukraine, especially the USSR’s attack on Poland, 
it can be assumed that references to Stalin could also be used to indicate the 
“enemy”. The same thing goes for Hitler. Additionally, when using this histor-
ical figure while writing about the situation in Ukraine, journalists might have 
aimed at amplifying fear in the audience (see Tab. 3.13). It could have made the 
reader more attached to the described issues and increased interest in it.
In addition to references to Hitler and Stalin  – characters uniquely per-
ceived by Poles  – the articles also include references to Russian tsars such as 
Ivan the Terrible (Rzeczpospolita “Putin on the throne of Ivan the Terrible”, 
14–15/08/2014), Nicholas I  (Gazeta Wyborcza, “The second Crimean war,” 
05/06/2014), Nicholas II (Super Express, “We will sweep Poland from the earth”, 
12/08/2014), Alexander II (Gazeta Wyborcza, “Putin crimes”, 19/07/2014) and 
Tsarina Catherine (Fakty, “Russia versus Ukraine – the tension lowers, or is it 
the silence before the storm”, 31/03/2014) (see Tab. 4.4). In most cases, these 
materials were about Putin’s ambition to regain Russia’s lost power. However, 
issues directly related to Poland’s history were also brought up. For example 
Gazeta Wyborcza wrote about the situation in 1861 when, during the reign of 
tsar Alexander II, the Russian army crushed patriotic demonstrations in the 
Kingdom of Poland (“Putin’s crimes”, 19/07/2014). This material makes a ref-
erence to a letter sent to the tsar, in which he was called a “common murderer”. 
In this way, the author makes a comparison between Alexander II’s actions to 
those of Putin – which in his opinion, by arming the separatists, contributed to 
the MH17 catastrophe. According to the journalist, the words used to describe 
the tsar perfectly fit to Russia’s current leader as well. Referencing this event from 
more than a hundred years ago – from the times when Poland was under Russian 
rule – can create an emotional connection between the described event and the 
recipient. For the Polish reader, the behavior of Alexander II can be seen as crim-
inal. Therefore, the comparison between the Warsaw massacre and the MH17 
catastrophe, and the terms used to describe both the tsar and Putin, could have 
made the audience adopt the perspective presented by the media.
4.2  Consequences of the conflict for Poland
Historical and cultural ties seem to produce the strongest bond between the 
audience and the information it consumes. They facilitate the consumers’ under-
standing and interpretation of the content (see Gurevitch et al., 1991; Taradai, 
2012). On the other hand, connections at the geographical, political and eco-
nomic level  – especially if the described event has a concrete impact on the 
citizens of a country  – also make it possible to talk about domestication of 
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information (see Atad, 2017: 763; Lee at al., 2017). The geographical proximity 
of Ukraine, and Poland’s relations with the parties to the conflict, may affect the 
general public’s interest in the conflict. However, if the media create additional 
bonds it may further strengthen this interest and make it be perceived by the 
audience as “our” event. The involvement of Polish authorities in solving the dis-
pute, and Russia imposing economic sanctions on Poland, raises the question – 
is a domestication of the conflict by Polish media necessary at all? The answer is 
ambiguous. It should be noted, however, that elements that can be considered a 
form of domestication appeared in the coverage, especially when the informa-
tion concerned the consequences of the conflict for Poland. Therefore, paying 
attention to these elements seems interesting from the point of view of how the 
journalists presented the dispute – especially since they did so in an engaged way 
by showing strong support for Ukraine (see Tab. 3.12).










Yes 55 42 20 31 37 35 22
No 45 58 80 69 63 65 78
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N= 170 206 438 385 294 233 1726
Source: Author
The content analysis showed that the topic of consequences for Poland is the 
second most frequent topic in the analyzed media (see Tab. 3.1). This shows that 
the national factor was an important element of the coverage. This was con-
firmed by one of the respondents. The Fakt journalist was asked if he thinks 
that the Polish readers are interested in armed conflicts, and he replied that it 
depends on if they have an influence on the country:
“It seems to me that the majority of Poles do not care about these armed conflicts around 
the world, until they concern them directly. For this reason, everything that happens at 
our Eastern border will interest them.” [R1]
Regionalism of information, understood as an interest in a given event due 
to its geographical or political proximity, is according to the journalist an 
element that affects what the recipients choose to consume (Lee et al., 2017). 
This was also confirmed by one of the respondents [R7], who said that “neigh-
boring relations with a country in which something like this [war] happens, 
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makes Poles interested in it.” At the same time, the respondent recognized that 
“Ukraine was interesting from the point of view of what it would mean to us” 
[R7]. Therefore, despite the fact that Poland’s historical and cultural ties with 
the country may be an important form of domestication (see Tab. 4.1), it was 
not the most significant element of this mechanism. The journalists who cov-
ered the events in Ukraine tried to bring the dispute closer to the Polish audi-
ence mainly through the prism of how the event would come to affect Poland 
(see Tab. 4.5). Even though the event itself and its unique hybrid character 
could have been an interesting factor of the coverage due to its event-oriented 
character, it was mainly domesticated through context-oriented factors (see 
Zerback and Holzleitner, 2018:  367). That is why over 388 research units, 
which constitute 22 percent of the total material, had references to this topic 
(see Tab. 4.5 and 4.6). In the cases when this subject was mentioned in the 
material, but was not the dominant issue, the code book still made it possible 
to indicate that it appeared in the publication, as an additional question was 
created for this purpose (see Appendix no. 1). On this basis, it was possible to 
determine which of the eight categories of consequences appeared most often 
in the materials.












19 34 30 37 24 38 30
Military threatens  
from Russia




5 7 7 7 4 4 6
Economic sanctions
from Russia
8 5 13 5 16 13 10
Deterioration of 
relations with Russia
4 13 3 11 12 7 9
Immigration 0 1 1 5 1 4 2
Threat to Polish 
citizens in Ukraine
9 2 1 2 10 6 6
Other 28 18 16 16 7 12 16
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N = 93 87 87 121 110 82 388
Source: Author
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Among the varieties of consequences for Poland – military, economic, polit-
ical and social factors were distinguished. It was considered that in the case of 
the first two groups of consequences, it is necessary to divide them into general 
factors and those referring directly to Russia’s actions. That made it possible to 
determine if the media were specifying the “threat” and the “enemy”, which was 
noticeable in the case of historical issues. At the same time, it should be noted 
that the selection of consequences was based on a preliminary analysis of the 
media coverage and the fact of Polish authorities showing support for Ukraine. 
According to Qadir and Alasuutari (2013), the media’s emphasis on how an 
international event affects the covering state economically and politically, and 
especially its citizens, increases the likelihood of domestication. Therefore, it 
was decided to check to what extent this factor was presented in the media cov-
erage, and if it could have had a stronger impact on recipients than references to 
historical contexts. On the other hand, maybe both of these mechanisms were 
intertwined, making the national perspective in the coverage even stronger.
The coverage’s most frequently presented consequences for Poland related to 
military factors, but for most of the media these indications were quite general 
(see Tab. 4.6). Fakt and Wiadomości TVP1, more than the other media outlets, 
specified that the military threat came from Russia. In the case of the tabloid, 
this may be related to the fact that it most often wrote about the consequences 
of the dispute for Poland, especially through the military prism (see Picture 3.3). 
Therefore, it is assumed that for the Fakt journalists – partly due to the emotional 
and sensational character of the information – the military threat from Russia 
was an important element of the coverage. In contrast, more than any of the 
other media Wiadomości TVP1 had the fear of Russian expansion as the dom-
inant historical and geopolitical context evident in the materials (see Tab. 3.13). 
That is why it is understandable that the television program pointed to Russia as 
the concrete threat.
The economic consequences were next to military factors the most fre-
quently described issues affecting Poland (see Tab. 4.6). Just as in the case of 
the military factors, it was decided to divide the category into two smaller 
ones. It is worth noting that in the case of economic factors, the media 
wrote most often about economic sanctions from Russia. Gazeta Wyborcza, 
Wiadomości TVP1 and Fakty TVN devoted a lot of attention to these factors. 
Gazeta Wyborcza just after Rzeczpospolita was the medium which most often 
wrote about international political discussion and sanctions (see Tab. 3.1). It 
is assumed that this could have influenced that this newspaper wrote about 
economic consequences more often than the other analyzed media. It is inter-
esting to note that Rzeczpospolita, despite its rather political-economic profile, 
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wrote the most rarely next to Super Express about the economic consequences 
of the dispute for Poland. However, this medium mostly took the view that the 
cause of the conflict was a Russian invasion (see Tab. 3.5) and that the dispute 
is of an interstate nature (see Tab. 3.6). So that is why it is not surprising that 
Rzeczpospolita might have been more interested in the military and political 
consequences of the event (see Tab. 4.6).
Except for military and economic consequences, the list also includes such 
categories as deterioration of relations with Russia, immigration of Ukrainians 
to Poland, threats to Polish citizens living in Ukraine, and more. In the “other” 
category, issues such as deterioration of contact at the artistic level were taken 
into account, which appeared in one of the Wiadomości TVP1 materials entitled 
“National Culture” (24/07/2014). Due to the fact that military and economic is-
sues were the most commonly presented consequences – which verifies the second 
research hypothesis – it was decided that these would be analyzed in detail – espe-
cially in how they were used by the journalists as a mechanism of domestication.
4.2.1  Military threat
Among the most frequently mentioned consequences of the dispute for Poland, 
the military threat (in general) came first. This issue appeared in over one hun-
dred analyzed materials. As the journalist of Gazeta Wyborcza explains, this 
comes from the fact that the conflict in Ukraine could actually affect Poland’s 
security:
“We have to show it, because since 1945 this is the war that has come closest to the Polish 
borders. Never in the Post-Cold War world has any conflict been so close to Poland’s 
borders.” [R5]
The proximity of the conflict, and thus the possibility of it crossing over to 
Polish territory (see Tab. 4.6) could have made Poles and the national media 
show interest in what was going on in the east. The Fakty TVN journalist also 
remarked on this factor. Importantly, this medium and Rzeczpospolita most often 
of all analyzed media outlets published information about the military threat 
(in general) as the most important consequence of the dispute for Poland. The 
respondent stated that it is difficult to not to be interested in the conflict “when 
it takes place literally a few hundred kilometers behind the Polish border” [R8]. 
That is why the transition of the conflict beyond Ukraine and a military threat 
for Poland (see Tab. 4.6) was one of the most often presented scenarios of the 
dispute. At the same time, these issues might have made the audience believe 
that the conflict affected them directly, which is confirmed by the statement of 
one of the respondents:
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“This interest was not the result of what is happening there, but it seems to me that 
people were wondering if it would somehow transfer to Poland. If it will be calm in 
Poland and whether we should be afraid of something or not.” [R8]
The fear of a military threat, which the respondent mentioned, was presented 
especially in materials referring to the need to prepare army and society for the 
possibility of fighting breaking out. In a Fakt material entitled, “Are you not 60 
yet? You can go to the army at any time. Mobilization! When and who will be 
taken to the army” (12/03/2014), the journalist writes about Poland calling in 
reservists (see Picture 4.9). Although the Minister of Defense, as well as mil-
itary subordinates, denies that mobilization is in the plans, there is informa-
tion in the material about who can be called to the army in times of conflict, 
what he is then required to do, and in which way he will be learn about gen-
eral mobilization. A similar tone is also presented in the Super Express article 
“Mother, will they take your son to the army?” (05/03/2014). In the material, 
similar as in Fakt, there is a photo of a uniformed soldier, which is surely put 
there to strengthen the message and illustrate the young men who would be 
called to the army. This kind of visual framing is a confirmation of what Zelizer 
wrote (2004) – that during armed conflicts, images are used as a tool to visually 
identify “victims” and “enemies”. In this case, Poland seems to be the victim. 
Moreover, the author of the Super Express article writes that if the Russian-
Ukrainian conflict transforms into a war then “thousands of sons of the Polish 
land will be called to the army to take up arms and start fighting the enemy” 
(Super Express, 05/03/2014). The dreadful prospect of Poland joining the war 
could be a way to connect the information and the event with the recipient. In 
addition, the journalists’ attention to two possible scenarios – the increase in 
military actions and the military threat for Poland (see Tab. 4.6) – also confirms 
that the dispute could have a significant meaning for the Poles. The security 
threat would require increasing the country’s military potential (see Tab. 4.7), 
partly by calling in people to fight. That is why readers of information about this 
event – although it takes place in another country – could view it as domestic 
information, relevant to them personally. More importantly, the use of the term 
“enemy” by the journalist confirms that the media have clearly defined who the 
enemy is – pointing to Russia, of course. In this way, a distinction was made 
between “enemy” and “victim” (see Carpentier, 2005; Galtung, 2006), with 
Poland included in the last category, which means that Galtung’s (2006) con-
cept of war journalism quite accurately describes how the conflict was covered.
The necessity to modernize the armed forces, along with preparing 
society for dealing with a military threat, was also covered by Fakty TVN 
and Rzeczpospolita, which further points to a war-oriented coverage as well 
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as domestication. One of the Fakty TVN segments (“Army” 17/02/2015) was 
about the situation in Ukraine causing increased spending on armaments for 
the Polish army, as well as the need to modernize troops. Similar factors were 
indicated by the quality newspaper in the article “Modernization of the Polish 
Armed Forces in the context of political events in Ukraine” (Rzeczpospolita, 
06/09/2014). These issues were also mentioned in the article entitled 
“Disturbance in the East forces changes in Poland’s policy,” (Rzeczpospolita, 
17/03/2014) where it was said that the dispute forces Poland to make changes 
within the energy and defense sector. The spokesperson for the Ministry of 
Defense confirmed the need to fasten the implementation of certain defense 
investments, because of the situation behind the eastern border. In an inter-
view with Stanisław Koziej, who was then the head of the National Security 
Bureau, there is also the information that in the longer perspective of the con-
flict, the “strategic threat and also invasion to Poland” cannot be excluded 
(Rzeczpospolita, “Also Poland is at risk” 03/03/2014). Drawing attention to this 
fact confirms that the Polish authorities recognized the dispute in Ukraine as 
an important factor affecting the security of the nation. That is why in the 
media, sometimes in quite a dramatic way, these issues were also addressed. 
Considering that the journalists showed how the conflict had an impact on 
the state of the country, as well as the actions of politicians, the audience could 
likely recognize this dispute as also “theirs”.
Picture 4.10: “Poland threatened. President 
Komorowski is asking NATO for help”. 
Source: Super Express, 03/03/2014
Picture 4.9: “Are you not 60 yet? 
You can go to the army at any time. 
Mobilization! When and who will be 
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Because of the military threat to the country, the conflict in Ukraine was 
also described as making it necessary to strengthen cooperation within the 
international organizations which Poland belongs to. Particular attention was 
paid to the way NATO functions  – recognizing this organization’s strength-
ened military presence in the region as the most important reaction to what 
was happening in Ukraine (see Tab. 4.7). The most information on this sub-
ject appeared in Gazeta Wyborcza, Rzeczpospolita and Super Express. The tab-
loid drew attention to the need for Poland to obtain NATO support due to the 
armed operations carried out in Ukraine. In the article “Poland threatened. 
President Komorowski is asking NATO for help” (Super Express, 03/03/2014) it 
is said that the then President asked NATO to convene an emergency consulta-
tion under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The President pointed out that 
Poland feels threatened by Russia’s alleged use of force on Ukrainian soil. The 
material also shows the location of Poland in relation to Ukraine, Belarus and 
Kaliningrad (a part of Russia) and also indicates the military potential of these 
countries (see Picture 4.10). The graphic attached to the text shows that even if 
the Polish and Ukrainian armies were combined they would still have no chance 
to oppose Russia. That is why cooperating with NATO seems necessary if the 
conflict would expand outside Ukrainian borders, according to political actors 
and media. The coverage marked by fear of the dispute coming to Poland, espe-
cially at the beginning of the conflict, seemed to slightly change character in the 
latter months of the analyzed time period. A good example is an interview with 
the then Minister of Defense by Gazeta Wyborcza (“Minister of Defense: NATO 
troops are already in Poland”, 30–31.08.2014). Siemoniak argued that in the case 
of a real threat to the security of the country, NATO will be able to quickly take 
action to defend Poland. At the same time, he points out that it would not be 
possible for a foreign state to gather its troops at the Polish border without the 
reaction of local authorities or NATO. A similar tone appears in a Rzeczpospolita 
article (“America does not disappoint allies - an interview with Minister Tomasz 
Siemoniak”, 29/09/2014). There, the Minister of Defense confirms what he said 
in the Gazeta Wyborcza interview. Importantly, the greatest amount of materials 
referring to the military threat as one of the possible consequences of the dispute 
for Poland, was published in the first half of the research period – from March to 
the beginning of September 2014. This was directly related to the life cycle of the 
issue (see Fig. 2.2). Therefore, it might be that the level of domestication of the 
dispute was the highest in this period. This is due to the fact that it is important 
in the initial stage of covering an event to somehow connect the recipient to the 
described issue and show why it is relevant. Then it might be possible to maintain 
the audience’s interest in the information presented further on in time.
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Research conducted by the Centre for Public Opinion Research on the as-
sessment of the impact of the conflict on Polish national security, shows that 
the majority of respondents recognized the dispute in Ukraine as a threat to the 
country (see Fig. 4.1). Only in June 2014, the “yes” and “no” responses were sim-
ilar. In the other months, the prevailing opinion was that the conflict in Ukraine 
is dangerous for Poland. Growth phases were especially noticeable in March and 
July 2014, and the same is observable in the life cycle of the analyzed materials 
(see Fig.  2.2). Therefore, it is plausible that the social fear resulting from the 
conflict in Ukraine could be correlated with the amount of content published 
about it. On the other hand, it can also be connected with specific events, such 
as the annexation of Crimea or the MH17 catastrophe. However, it is possible to 
observe some kind of agreement between the public’s opinions and the media’s 
point of view in relation to the perception of the dispute. Of course, it is quite dif-
ficult to clearly determine who actually affected who concerning the perception 
of the conflict – society or the media. The respondents admitted that their origin 
influenced their work. Therefore, it is also possible that the general public’s as-
sessment of the threat to the country, as well as the consequences of the dispute, 
could have been affected by the social affiliation of the journalists.
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Source: Author
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There are many examples, such as the Vietnam War (see Hallin, 1986; Darley, 
2005) and the Iraq War (see Dimitrova and Strömbäck, 2008; Hafez, 2003), 
that show that the media’s influence on public opinion during armed conflicts 
is significant and that the media can shape social discourse. Moreover, ear-
lier research shows that the media – especially traditional ones (see Garlicki, 
2015; Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, 2017) – are an important source 
of information for Poles, and the analyzed media were indeed very popular 
in the research period (see Kurdupski, 2016a; Kurdupski, 2016b). In addition, 
as mentioned earlier, they have a significant impact on the agenda of other 
media (Instytut Monitoringu Mediów, 2014; Instytut Monitoringu Mediów, 
2015). Therefore, their content may reach a large part of Polish society, thus 
influencing people’s opinion on a given topic. The similarities between public 
perceptions and media frames suggest that the domestication of the conflict 
was effective. However, as Dimitrova and Strömbäck (2008) rightly point out, 
using Entman’s (2004) concept of framing, an important element of the media’s 
influence are the frames they produce. The more compatible they are  – for 
example emotionally and culturally – with social frames, the more they can 
influence the opinion of society. Such similarities seem to be noticeable in the 
case of social frames regarding Russia (Taras, 2015) and the media’s framing 
of Russia as the enemy. Therefore, the possibility that there is a flow and cor-
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Fig. 4.1: Do you think the situation in Ukraine threatens the security of Poland or not? (in 
percent) 
Source: Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, 2015.
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The military threat was also directly associated with Russia’s actions, which draws 
further parallels to Galtung’s war journalism concept, such as focusing on “our” suf-
fering and seeing “them” as the cause of it (Galtung, 2006: 1). This kind of informa-
tion was published particularly in Fakt, Gazeta Wyborcza, and Wiadomości TVP1 
(see Tab. 4.3). For example, the tabloid pointed to this element in the materials “The 
Russians practiced an attack on Poland” (Super Express, 05/03/2014) and “Poland 
will be alone” (Super Express, 04/03/2014). In the first article, the journalist writes 
that already in 2009 and 2013 during military exercises with Belarus, the Russians 
were preparing for a possible attack on Poland. Therefore, they are well prepared 
for a possible expansion. The invasion scenario was also described in the material 
“Poland will be alone” (Super Express, 04/03/2014), where referring to the opinions 
of Koziej, Sikorski and Czarnecki, it was recognized that the threat is to be taken 
seriously. It was also found that in case of such an attack, NATO would not be able 
to help Poland, and the national armed forces are not strong enough to deal with the 
Russian army. Military scenarios relating to the Russian threat were also presented 
by Gazeta Wyborcza. In the material “How to defend” (24/06/2014), the journalist 
focused on the fact that the Polish army was in bad shape. Taking into account that 
the conflict has put Poland in the position of a front state, it is necessary, according 
to the author, to modernize the army and acquire new military equipment. Only 
then can “David (Poland) defeat Goliath (Russia)”. It seems that by using this bib-
lical metaphor the journalist means to show that the threat of a Russian attack is real, 
and that it is necessary to take steps to prevent it. Also the article “Putin flexes his 
muscles and threatens neighbors with the vision of an invasion” (Gazeta Wyborcza, 
19/09/2014) makes a reference to the fear of Russian aggression. The article is about 
discussions conducted between Poroshenko and Putin. During the conversation 
with the Ukrainian president, Putin is to have said that “if he would like to then 
in two days the Russian army would not only be in Kiev, but also in Riga, Vilnius, 
Tallinn, Warsaw and Bucharest” (19/09/2014). Although the Kremlin denied that 
these words were ever spoken, the material also relates the view of experts who 
argue that Putin is ready to do these things. The prospect of a Russian invasion 
could affect how the recipients interpret information about the conflict. Research 
has shown that the situation in Ukraine was considered a threat to the security of 
the country by most of Polish society (Fig. 4.1). That is why it seems that the media’s 
framing could have strengthened the audience’s concerns about the conflict.
The specter of a conflict in Poland, due to Russian aggression, could have 
made it difficult for journalists to behave objectively, as the Rzeczpospolita jour-
nalist points out. The respondent said that his understanding of “what the game 
in Ukraine is about” [R6] – also in the context of what it means for Poland – 
largely determined how he perceived the main actors in the dispute:
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“What is happening in Ukraine is a lethal danger to my homeland and the entire region 
over a longer period of time. If this aggression is accepted, we will be sitting on a powder 
keg, and a drunkard will walk around us with a candle. I saw what the war in Yugoslavia was 
like in the 90’s, and it will be more or less something like that. Therefore, it is not a matter of 
emotion, but a matter of very cold thinking and political calculation. We cannot be on any 
other side but Ukraine. That is why all these impulses at the human level appeared.” [R6]
The difficulties of keeping a distance to the described issue meant that the journalist 
might have put his fears and anxieties into his work, which according to Rodgers 
(2012) was also observed for example in the case of American journalists after 9/11. 
The trouble of keeping distance was further confirmed by another interviewee. The 
war correspondent was asked about the most difficult thing he had to cope with 
while covering the analyzed conflict. He said that it was the proximity, both geo-
graphical and cultural with Ukraine – and also the fear of the dispute crossing over 
to Poland. These factors made him think that it was hard for media and society to 
stay distanced from what was happening on the eastern border of the country:
“I went to wars that took place very far away and when I returned from there I had the 
impression that they did not threaten me or my family. The fact that I was returning to a 
geographically and culturally different country, only strengthened my conviction. It was dif-
ferent with Ukraine. Although it looks and is different than Poland, it is also similar to our 
country. Very often I had a reflection, that dear God, it could have happened to us.” [R11]
The journalist’s perception of the Ukrainian conflict as a dispute that could be 
transferred to Poland could have made the materials produced by him more 
involved in the issue than necessary. The respondent said that just a few years 
before the dispute began, he did not see it coming at all. However, just like most 
Poles, he feared that “this war will also go to Poland”. Taking into account that the 
journalists recognized that the dispute in Ukraine is to some extent a threat to 
Poland, it might be that they made content in such a way that the recipients would 
perceive the event in the same way. It seems that they were using mechanisms 
like historical issues and fear of Russia, in order to bring the consumers closer 
to the event and make them consider it more important. A potential threat to 
Poland’s security would likely spark the interest of most Poles.
The fear of Russian expansion and the dispute coming to Poland was also notice-
able in materials where the statements of Polish politicians and military represent-
atives were shown. A good example is an interview by Super Express called “The 
Russians will be in Warsaw in three days” (13/03/2014). General Skrzypczak, who 
was interviewed, stated that “without NATO’s help, Poland would not defend 
itself”(Super Express, 13/03/2014) in the case of a Russian aggression against the 
country. The material also discusses how the Polish armed command would pro-
ceed if information about a planned attack by Russia would be obtained. Issues Róa Norström - 978-3-631-79027-4
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concerning the military doctrine of the Russian Federation are also discussed, as well 
as the need to modernize the Polish army, which according to General Skrzypczak, 
“with such forces as it has, would not be able to do the basic task of defending the 
country” (Super Express, 13/03/2014). Paying attention to these elements, as well as 
giving almost the exact time that the Russian army would need to conquer the Polish 
capital, seem to be something that could influence the recipients’ awareness of a pos-
sible Russian attack. This fear, especially when given support by purported experts, 
could make readers treat the dispute as “their” conflict. The possibility of a real threat 
to the country in the form of Russia, was also presented in the Rzeczpospolita mate-
rial appropriately titled “Poland is also threatened” (03/03/2014).
A particularly important material, due to its official form, and therefore 
it’s elite-oriented character (see Galtung, 2002; Galtung, 2006; Nohrstedt and 
Ottosen, 2014), was the message Prime Minister Tusk gave in connection with 
the annexation of Crimea for Fakty TVN (see Picture 4.11). The seven minute 
message of the politician began with the words that:
“Poland is a strong, safe and mature state, and in such a difficult and historic moment 
as the Ukrainian-Russian crisis and the annexation of Crimea, it is necessary to clearly 
and emphatically speak about it.” (“Donald Tusk: Poland means freedom”, 19/03/2014).
That Tusk’s message was broadcast by a private TV station – although it does 
support his party, the Civic Platform – shows that the conflict in Ukraine, espe-
cially in the context of a potential Russian assault on Poland, was considered 
important by the media.
Picture 4.11: “Donald Tusk: Poland means freedom”. 
Source: Fakty TVN, 19/03/2014
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The Prime Minister refers to the three pillars of Poland’s security, listing 
among them democratic reforms after 1989, the position of Poland in Europe, 
and its membership in NATO. According to Tusk, these elements make Poland 
able to “look at dramatic events in the East with a sense of security” (Fakty 
TVN, 19/03/2014). Poland has strong ties with its western neighbors, as well 
as the experience of sending its army to take part in international military 
missions (see Tab. 4.8). Tusk also points out the fourth pillar of the country’s 
national security, which is a “democratic, prosperous and safe Ukraine” (Fakty 
TVN, 19/03/2014). Therefore, the government, Europe and Polish citizens 
need to support this country, because it is also an investment in Polish secu-
rity (see Tab. 4.7), which, as mentioned earlier, might strengthen the percep-
tion of Ukraine in terms of the “worthy” victim of the coverage (see Herman 
and Chomsky, 1988; Nohrstedt, 2009). This has already been mentioned in 
the case of the historical references and their influence on the coverage. The 
Gazeta Wyborcza journalist [R4] said that in the past, Piłsudski, Giedroyc 
and Mieroszewski have already pointed to the need to ensure Ukraine’s inde-
pendence and security, since this will also make Poland safer. Drawing atten-
tion to the need to support Ukraine in the ongoing conflict, as well as how 
national security is affected by the situation of this state, shows that the dis-
pute, according to Polish authorities, has a direct impact on Poland. That is 
why it should be perceived by citizens as “their” conflict. Furthermore, Tusk 
says that Poland “does not accept and does not agree with Moscow’s aggres-
sive policy towards Ukraine” (Fakty TVN, 19/03/2014). He also points out 
that similar events have already taken place in the past. The Prime Minister 
referred in particular to World War II, but at the same time he tried to as-
sure people that the events in Ukraine would not require present generations 
to take up arms. Seeing how he referred to historical issues, and pointed 
out that the Ukrainian conflict affects the situation of Poland, it is possible 
to say that Russia is once again perceived as the “enemy” of both Poland 
and Ukraine. Although the Prime Minister emphasized that relations with 
Russian citizens are and should remain friendly, the actions of the Kremlin 
are perceived by the authorities as threatening (see Tab. 4.5). The Prime 
Minister’s words confirmed that Russian politicians are a party to the dis-
pute. The fact that Russia’s actions were more referenced than the separatists’ 
gives the impression that Russia was more of a threat to Poland’s security 
than the separatists.
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How the Polish authorities acted in relation to the conflict in Ukraine, espe-
cially in the context of a possible military threat from Russia, was also presented 
by Wiadomości TVP1. The material entitled “Strategy” (Wiadomości TVP1, 
05/04/2014) referred to the President’s approval of the new National Security 
Strategy, which was supposed to be a response to the Ukrainian conflict. According 
to this document, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and particularly Russia’s actions 
in the region is the greatest challenge to Poland’s security (Sobera, 2015). In 
President Komorowski’s opinion, the strategy was based on conclusions “from 
what has changed for the worse to the east of Poland, where an area of instability 
has appeared” (“Strategy”, 05/11/2014). In addition, the then head of the Polish 
state points out that the military threat from Russia calls for more attention and 
money to the Polish army, so that it is ready to react to possible aggression. In 
regards to the proper response by domestic authorities to the dispute, the analyzed 
media most often indicated increased military potential (see Tab. 4.7). It seems that 
the media paying much attention to this factor as well as presenting opinions and 
actions of Polish authorities in response to the conflict, could make the Poles see a 
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clear connection between the event and their own security. According to the Super 
Express journalist, it was precisely the threat to Poland’s national security that ele-
vated people’s interest in what was happening in Ukraine:
“We wondered what the war would mean for Poland. There was a dangerous period where 
it looked like this [Russian] expansion would cross Polish borders. That it would not stop in 
the Crimea or Donbass, but on the western districts of Ukraine. At that time, it would pose 
a direct threat to Poland, and it was certainly crucial when writing about the conflict.” [R3]
The national security issue, in particular the negative perception of Russia’s 
actions in Ukraine, was also considered by Poles to be the greatest threat to 
the independence and sovereignty of the country (Centrum Badania Opinii 
Społecznej, 2014: 22). Fifty-six percent of respondents saw this factor, as well 
as the “imperial policy of Putin’s Russia” as the most serious external threat. 
The survey also included responses such as “the threat of military aggression 
from Russia” (6  %) or the “geopolitical location of Poland” (2  %) (Centrum 
Badania Opinii Społecznej, 2014: 22). Importantly, the survey was conducted in 
November 2014, just after the National Security Strategy was announced, and it 
was also commissioned by the National Security Office. Therefore, it is possible 
that the authorities used it to check whether the threats identified by them in the 
document had any effect on the citizens’ attitudes. Taking into account the state-
ment by President Komorowski, the content of the document itself, as well as the 
views presented by the media and society, it seems that the views of politicians, 
citizens and journalists are almost identical in this case. That is why there was 
a high chance of strengthening the feeling that the conflict in Ukraine was also 
a dispute between Poland and Russia, or more generally between the West and 
the Russia – which is a manifestation of domestication. In this way the strategy 
is once again seen both on the level of extroverted-domestication and also the 
counter-domestication (Olausson, 2013: 715–720).
In the TV and press materials, the statements of politicians were often referred 
to. In this way, close political links were accentuated which, like historical and 
economic connections, could influence the level of domestication. On the other 
hand, only 241 people answered the survey question, and it is not known which 
specific media they consumed (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, 2014: 22). 
That is why it is difficult to say to what degree the views presented in the doc-
ument were then reflected in the opinions prevailing in the society. It is also 
hard to know who in fact influenced whose opinions – if the media influenced 
politicians, or vice versa. In the case of the National Security Strategy, this is prac-
tically impossible to know, especially since it is usually made over several years. 
However, some of the journalists who were asked if they think that their work 
could have influenced the decisions of political actors answered that it is possible. 
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An example of this type of statement comes from the Fakt journalist. He said that 
the reach of his newspaper, which is in fact the most widely read daily in Poland, 
indicates that politicians were reading it and following the coverage as well:
“If we and a couple of millions of Poles are interested in something and they read us 
every day, there is also some pressure on politicians. What exactly? I do not know.” [R2]
The opinion of the journalist seems to be backed up by his colleague, who 
claims that tabloids act as a social barometer, showing politicians how much 
society is interested in a given issue. The respondent adds that by posting spe-
cific comments and questions – “What is Poland’s reaction? Is Poland in some 
way threatened?” – it was possible to exert pressure on politicians, because “this 
subject was still alive for them” [R1]. Therefore, the tabloids devoted a lot of at-
tention to the consequences of the dispute (see Tab. 3.1) and the reactions that 
should be taken by politicians (see Tab. 4.7).
The Gazeta Wyborcza journalist agreed that the media can exert influence on 
political actors. The respondent claims that this can happen by politicians con-
suming specific media, which are addressed to a specific target group. The jour-
nalist believes that politicians in turn can use the context given by the media 
when presenting their message to various types of electorate and thus “soothe 
or stimulate their [Russophobic] fears to influence political elections [choices]” 
[R4]. The respondent thinks that the then presidential administration associated 
with the Civic Platform tried, for example, to spread a message of security, to let 
the Polish society understand that it is “more or less assured” [R4]. Indeed, when 
looking at materials presenting the statements of the then President and Prime 
Minister of the country, as well as other ministers, it is possible to observe that 
these politicians tried to assure the people that they were safe, despite the threat 
posed by Russia. Furthermore, another respondent [R5] notes that the politicians’ 
references to certain roles, quite clearly defined by society, such as “enemy” or 
“threat”, could be transferred by them to the media as well as the political level:
“It happens that we have political debates about this conflict. Politicians try to use it 
when talking about the threat [to the country]. It is [a threat], because the world after 
1989 or 1991, I am talking here about Poland and Europe, was never so close to another 
global conflict.” [R5]
Although the ability to investigate the real impact that the media could exert 
on political actors and vice versa is difficult, and impossible in the case of this 
research, it seems that presenting the government’s opinions could to some degree 
strengthen domestication. The recipients could in this way be made to feel that 
if the conflict requires specific actions by their political representatives, like 
defending the country and supporting Ukraine, it does concern them directly. That 
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in turn makes people want to follow the coverage about the conflict. Furthermore, 
by referring to the military and economic threat to Poland, with Russia as the main 
enemy, the journalists could have effectively domesticated the conflict.
4.2.2  Economic sanctions
Domestication can also be the result of globalization, which manifests itself through 
the existence of for example economy connections at the international level (Lee, 
2005; Held et  al., 1999). These connections were used by the media as a factor 
serving to draw social as well as political attention to the Ukrainian conflict. Similar 
to the military threat of the country, economic sanctions – in particular by Russia – 
were also regarded by journalists as important consequences of the dispute for 
Poland, which confirms the second research hypothesis. Although they accounted 
for 16 percent of all indications, just as the “other” category, the impact of economic 
sanctions on the country could have affected the use of this issue as a part of domes-
tication. The Gazeta Wyborcza journalist was asked if he believes that the Polish 
media’s interest in the Ukrainian conflict is sufficient. He replied that in his opinion 
“it is difficult to find another country where so much attention is devoted to this 
dispute” [R4]. The respondent added that the amount of attention these events were 
given in the media was partly because of their impact on the situation in Poland:
“If you go through the headlines of most newspapers, there are more headlines about 
the situation in Ukraine or situations that are a result of Ukraine. For example, about 
sanctions or the actions of the European Union towards Russia.” [R4]
Economic sanctions, but not only those imposed on Russia, were therefore the 
theme that the journalists had the greatest interest in (see Tab. 3.1). Furthermore, 
economic war was presented by the media just after “increase in military 
actions”, as the most likely further scenario of the dispute (see Tab. 4.7). Also in 
the context of how Polish authorities should react in regards to the situation in 
Ukraine, it was quite often pointed to the need to impose economic sanctions 
on Russia (see Tab. 4.8). It seems that the media’s attention to this factor was 
directly related to the Kremlin’s actions toward Poland. It should be noted that 
economic sanctions from Russia constituted ten percent of all covered conflict 
consequences for Poland (see Tab. 4.6). This issue was most often covered by 
Gazeta Wyborcza, Wiadomości TVP1, Fakty TVN and Fakt.
The “Eat apples to annoy Putin” campaign (The Economist, 2014), which 
referred to the need to support Polish fruit farmers in connection with the 
embargo imposed by Russia on domestic vegetables and fruits, was particu-
larly well-presented. Information on this subject appeared in the Wiadomości 
TVP and Gazeta Wyborcza materials. The campaign to defend native farmers, 
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its popularity in social media, as well as the impact that the Russian embargo 
had on the Polish economy, was described by Gazeta Wyborcza in the article 
entitled “Temporary Russian embargo will not be over soon. Let’s eat apples” 
(01/08/2014) (see Picture 4.12). The journalist writes that “when buying apples 
we support producers of the state budget in their misfortune, and thus ourselves” 
(Gazeta Wyborcza, 01/08/2014). This sentence is a fairly good example of how 
the media tried to bring the dispute closer to the audience by referring to its 
consequences, which in fact had a significant impact on the country during the 
analyzed period. The journalist also points out that although the purpose of the 
campaign is right and that it can certainly help the farmers in reducing their 
losses, it is not really enough. The government and the West need to give support 
as well. National solidarity expressed through this kind of activism may indicate 
that, as in the case of historical and military factors, the perception of Russia as 
an “enemy” and the dispute as “ours” could also be noticed at the economic level.
The symbolism of the dispute, especially in the context of the described 
social action, was also presented in the material “Eat apples!” (Gazeta Wyborcza, 
02–03/08/2014). The author of the article indicates that Poland, and more 
precisely Polish farmers, are the first victim of the sanctions imposed by the 
European Union on Russia. That is why it is necessary to show “consumerism 
patriotism”, which can be seen as a form of retaliation against the Russian author-
ities. It seems that the media when covering these issues, as well as speaking in 
an almost personal way to recipients – as exemplified by the Gazeta Wyborcza 
articles – could have made the Polish audience very interested in the topic of eco-
nomic sanctions. This is due to the fact that, according to Joye, the possibility of 
identifying with the victims – in this case Polish citizens – creates an emotional 
bond that strengthens the efficiency of domestication (2015: 685–687).
The public also felt substantial effects from the sanctions, which they did not 
do from the military threat. The Poles’ attempt to reduce the effects of the Russian 
economic sanctions on fruits and vegetables was also presented by Wiadomości 
TVP1. In one of its segments entitled “Apples in protest” (Wiadomości TVP1, 
01/08/2014), the TV program indicated that the economic sanctions were very 
serious for Poland, since this country is the largest exporter of apples in Europe. 
The material also discusses possible ways to solve the problem, both through the 
campaign “Eat apples to annoy Putin” and decisions by the European Union. 
The then Minister of Agriculture Sawicki, said that he would like to get at least 
some compensation for his country in the crisis “that was not caused by Polish 
producers and Poland” (Wiadomości TVP1, 01/08/2014). Although social ac-
tion is an interesting idea, it will not solve the problem of fruit farmers, said 
Sawicki. The need to fix the problem as quickly and as positively as possible was 
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presented in the material “Apples of discord” (Wiadomości TVP1, 03/08/2014). 
The title of the material is a metaphor that refers both to the conflict at the inter-
national level with Russia, and to the intra-state dispute. In Poland, the Law and 
Justice party thought that the seven years of the Civic Platform and the Polish 
People’s Party coalition government had not prepared Poland for the scenario of 
a Russian embargo on Polish products. That is why the opposition – the Law and 
Justice – demands a quick reaction from the authorities and threatens them with 
a motion to dismiss the Minister of Agriculture. The indication in the television 
materials of Poland as a victim of Russia’s actions, and the transfer of the dispute 
from the international to the state level, could make the audience consider the 
conflict as important and affecting their lives. Changes to the national policy in 
connection with the economic war, or problems concerning the state budget, 
are factors that affect ordinary citizens. Other information regarding the dispute 
could then be received by the audience in a similar manner, due to the previ-
ously created bond resulting from the perception of the dispute as a possible 
threat to the state. Moreover, the frequent reference to the role of Russia can, 
as mentioned earlier, itself be a form of domestication because of the so-called 
Russophobia and the general impression that Poles have of Russia.
Picture 4.13: “Putin declared economic 
war on Poland”. 
Source: Fakt, 08/08/2014
Picture 4.12: “Temporary Russian embargo 
will not over soon. Let’s eat apples!”. 
Source: Gazeta Wyborcza, 01/08/2014
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The negative attitude toward the Russian authorities for their economic 
sanctions on Poland was also presented in the tabloid materials. Fakt referred to 
it in the articles entitled “The president of Russia forbids the import of fruit and 
vegetables from Poland. Putin takes revenge on Polish farmers” (31/07/2014), 
“Putin declared economic war on Poland” (08/08/2014) and “Russia does not 
want our beef ” (02/07/2014). In the first Fakt article, the journalist indicates 
that the consequences of the conflict in Ukraine are not limited to only mili-
tary issues, but also affect the economy. Polish fruit farmers may be particu-
larly affected, and Putin’s decision may put them into bankruptcy, according to 
the journalist. Therefore, the concept of the “worthy” victim (see Herman and 
Chomsky, 1988) also finds its application in the case of the Polish food producers 
and farmers, whose troubles the media took a great interest in.
A similar rhetoric is presented in the publication “Putin declared economic 
war on Poland” (Fakt, 08/08/2014), where the writer also referred to Russia’s 
meat sanctions. The possible losses that Polish producers should bear in con-
nection to the actions of the Kremlin were shown in a table (see Picture 4.13). 
It seems that sketching the real effects of the economic war is done to make 
the recipient realize the great influence that the dispute in Ukraine is having 
on Poland  – especially in the context of the actions of Polish authorities and 
the European Union of which Poland is a member. Journalists point out bluntly 
that the Russian embargo will be felt not only for the producers themselves, 
but also for ordinary citizens, which puts Putin’s economic sanctions directly 
into their life. It is therefore a repetition of the rhetoric presented in the article 
“Temporary Russian embargo will not be over soon. Let’s eat apples” (Gazeta 
Wyborcza, 01/08/2014). It is also a confirmation that although the Polish media 
differ from each other in the nature of content produced and the level of polit-
ical parallelism, they described the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in a similar way, 
developing a kind of consensus – especially in how the parties to the conflict 
were portrayed and the role of Poland in the dispute. Interestingly, in the case 
of the first two Fakt articles, only the actions of the President of Russia were 
mentioned, which makes it possible to notice a kind of negativism shown by 
the journalists in how they portray the actor responsible for the sanctions. This 
was also noticeable in the case of the coverage of the dominant and secondary 
actors (see Tab. 3.10 and 3.11), which showed that the negative perception of 
Russia refers to political actors to a large extent, rather than civilians. It is also 
worth noting that both materials used the same picture of Putin, which could be 
meant as a visualization of how he acted toward Poland (see Picture 4.13). In the 
image, the president looks like he wants to put his hand on someone’s throat, for 
example the Polish producers. It appears that this is a way to emphasize Poland’s 
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role of victim in the story, while Putin’s aggressiveness is not so subtly illustrated. 
This is a kind of duplication of the frames used by journalists when describing 
military threats or referring to historical issues. The media when describing the 
threat associated with the Russian-Ukrainian conflict could refer to its wider 
definitions, but still define Russia as an “enemy.” It seems that in this way the 
media could influence the recipients’ general assessment of the dispute expressed 
in the dominant perspective of the coverage (see Tab. 3.12), as well as deepen 
certain patterns of perception of the parties to the conflict created in the past.
Super Express and Gazeta Wyborcza also referred directly to Putin’s actions. 
The tabloid did it in the article entitled “Putin’s madness will hit you in the pocket” 
(Super Express, 04/03/2014), where economists pointed out that the prolonged 
conflict in Ukraine may lead to a weakening of the zloty, raised taxes and elevated 
prices for fuel and food. Gazeta Wyborcza in the article entitled “Embargo for 
the West. Putin’s retaliation for sanctions” (07/08/2014) also says that Putin has 
decided to introduce annual sanctions on agricultural products and foodstuffs to 
European Union member states. Due to the fact that Poland is a member of the 
European Community, and strongly opted for imposing economic sanctions on 
Russia due to the conflict in Ukraine, Putin made the decision to punish Poland 
directly. This was already indicated in the previously described articles. It is also 
an indication to ties that are important from the point of view of domestication – 
in this case, created at the level of the European Community. The media’s pre-
sentation of the negative effects felt by Poland, because of Russia’s imposition of 
sanctions on the European Union, may strengthen the recipients’ feeling that the 
Kremlin’s activities directly affect the domestic situation. Therefore, it also seems 
that information relating to the European Union’s activities could be treated to a 
certain degree by the audience as something relevant for Poland, which is one of 
the premises of domestication.
Economic issues as general consequences of the dispute were also visible in 
the coverage. In the Gazeta Wyborcza material entitled “This conflict will hit 
Polish companies” (04/03/2014), the impact that the turmoil in Ukraine could 
have on the country’s economic growth was referred to. The writer claims that 
the escalation of the conflict could hit domestic exports and limit the invest-
ment capacity of companies due to uncertainty about their future. Also in the 
Fakty TVN material (“Sanctions”, 08/08/2014) a reference is made to the gen-
eral consequences of economic sanctions – this time for the EU member states, 
which just like Poland will have to deal with the effects of the Kremlin’s decisions. 
The journalist emphasizes in the material that in this situation, it will be difficult 
for Poland to obtain satisfactory compensation for its losses since the European 
Union will have more countries to help. The effect of the situation in Ukraine on 
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the Polish economy was also covered in the Fakt material called “Will war not 
harm gas supplies to Poland?” (12/04/2014). The title in the form of a question 
about the future of Poland’s gas security referred to the statement of the head of 
one of the Polish gas companies, who said he believes the situation in Ukraine 
will not affect Poland’s access to the important resource. At the same time, the 
material presented possible alternatives in case Russia decided to block the gas 
supply to Poland. Drawing attention to possible consequences of the situation 
in Ukraine for Poland, as well as to possible ways of solving the problems that 
might arise, could have made the domestic recipient interested in following the 
coverage of the conflict  – especially since the mentioned effects forces Polish 
authorities and companies to take preventive action. It seems that these factors 
and issues relating to the state of the European Union and the problematic 
sanctions, could have made Polish recipients think that the Ukrainian conflict 
was a concern for them.
Although the difference between how often the military and economic threat 
was brought up was 35 percentage points (see Tab. 4.6), it is difficult to draw 
the conclusion that economic matters were considered unimportant for the 
recipients – especially since the research made by the Centre for Public Opinion 
Research referred to both economic and military threats (see Fig. 4.1). Therefore, 
it seems that the reference to economic sanctions, as a possible mechanism for 
domesticating the conflict, could, as in the case with a military threat, be an ef-
fective solution. In addition, these issues also referred to certain contexts and 
frames – for example the “enemy” and the “victims” – that could allow recipients 
to observe some kind of continuity in the perception of the parties to the conflict 
and Poland or organizations in which the country is a member. Therefore, the 
real impact of the Ukrainian crisis on Poland’s economic situation could have 
made recipients see information about the dispute as domestic information, and 
the event itself as “our” conflict.
Summary
The conflict in Ukraine was domesticated by the Polish media by referring to 
historical issues (see Tab. 4.1 and 4.2) and the military and economic threat 
to the state (see Tab. 4.5). These factors allowed journalists to strengthen and 
create a kind of connection between the recipient and the covered event. This 
was done mainly by reference to the impact of the dispute on Poland, as well 
as by describing the conflict through the prism of events, frames and histor-
ical contexts with certain connotations for Poles. In particular those relating to 
defining the “enemy” (see Tab. 4.4), which in the case of the analyzed conflict 
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was Russia. Although historical references appeared relatively frequently in the 
materials, constituting an important mechanism of domestication and showing 
the audience how to decode the information, the national interest seemed more 
important to journalists. Historical frames were often used, but it was more 
common for the journalists to present information where Poland and Poles 
were “worthy” victims of this dispute in the present (see Herman and Chomsky, 
1988; Nohrstedt, 2009). Therefore, the content analysis results and the interviews 
with journalists showed that the second research hypothesis – that stressing the 
threat to the economic and military security of Poland was the dominant tool of 
domestication of the conflict by the media – was confirmed.
Most of the times that the consequences of the dispute for Poland were 
brought up, the economic and military elements were emphasized (see Tab. 4.6). 
Also the conflict scenarios presented by the media, such as economic war, tran-
sition of the conflict beyond Ukraine and military threat for Poland were directly 
related to these factors, which proves that journalists recognized them as impor-
tant issues (see Tab. 4.7). What also confirms the hypothesis is the data about 
how the Polish authorities should react to the dispute on the eastern border of 
the country – in particular the need to impose economic sanctions on Russia, 
increase the military potential of the state and cooperating with NATO in the 
region (see Tab. 4.8). It seems that Polish media referring to these factors could 
have made domestic recipients – mainly due to the fear of an economic and mili-
tary threat to the country – perceive information about the dispute in Ukraine as 
nationally relevant information. As a result, they could recognize that Poland is 
also a side of the conflict due to the authorities’ commitment to resolving the dis-
pute, Poland’s membership in NATO and the European Union, and the impact of 
Russia’s actions on the security of the country. The media’s references to Russia’s 
negative actions, both in the economic and military context (see Tab. 4.6) could 
therefore make this country recognized as the “enemy”.
The perception of Russia as an “enemy”, often noticeable in materials devoted 
to the consequences of the dispute for Poland, was also strengthened by histor-
ical references (see Tab. 4.1), where the conflict in Ukraine was compared to 
past events where Russia participated, and sometimes was an aggressor toward 
Poland. One example of that is World War II (see Tab. 4.2). References were 
also made to events such as the Russo-Georgian war, where Polish political ac-
tors were strongly involved, and which were also considered a possible threat 
to the country. The comparisons to both World War II and the Russo-Georgian 
war showed that the media tried to indicate that the element linking Poland and 
Ukraine was that they were both “victims” of Russian actions. This factor, apart 
from the economic and military threat described in the materials, could have 
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caused the Ukrainian conflict to be presented by journalists as an event con-
cerning Poland directly. In regards to the dominant and secondary actor (see Tab. 
3.10 and 3.11), as well as historical issues (see Tab. 4.4) and the consequences of 
the dispute for Poland (see Picture 4.13), Putin was often in the spotlight. In the 
case of historical frames, the “enemy” was demonized and personified through 
comparisons to figures such as Hitler and Stalin, which are very negatively asso-
ciated by society. At the same time, it seems that references to historical figures 
and events could be a manifestation of domestication. Historical and cultural 
references, mainly due to their durability, help recipients decode information in 
a specific way. Therefore, the perception by the media of Russia as the “enemy” 
of Poland was presented through an historical, economic and military prism, 
and also by reference to the threat to Ukraine – a country whose security and 
independence, according to journalists and politicians, has a great influence on 
Polish security. In the research made by the Centre for Public Opinion Research, 
it was possible to observe that the Polish society also perceived the conflict in 
Ukraine as a threat to the country (see Fig. 4.1). It can therefore be seen that 
the media discourse coincided to a certain extent with social and government 
discourse. It is important to keep in mind that, as shown by research done by 
Garlicki (2015) and other reports from the Centre for Public Opinion Research 
(2017), the media – especially traditional ones – is an important source of infor-
mation for Polish people. Therefore, it seems that the journalists’ references to 
certain contexts – especially the context of the “enemy” – that can have a strong 
effect on people’s consciousness, could have made the domestication of the con-
flict effective. It is also possible that the content presented by the analyzed media 
could have influenced the public’s views regarding the dispute.
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Conclusion
This book aimed to describe how the Russian-Ukrainian conflict was covered 
and domesticated by different Polish media outlets in 2014 and 2015. Taking into 
account the impact of the conflict on the security of Poland, broadly understood, 
as well as the extent to which historical and cultural factors can shape the mutual 
perceptions of Poland and the parties to the conflict, it was decided to study 
what perspective – pro-Russian or pro-Ukrainian – characterized the media cov-
erage. The purpose was also to check whether the negative consequences of the 
dispute – the military and economic threat to Poland – were used as tools for 
domestication.
Two research hypotheses were formulated in the study:
H1: An anti-Russian perspective is dominant in the Polish media coverage of the 
Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
H2:  Stressing the threat to the economic and military security of Poland was 
the dominant tool of domestication of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict by the 
Polish media.
Both research hypotheses have been confirmed. The first research hypothesis 
has been proven correct both by the content analysis and the interviews with 
journalists. Seventy five percent of all material had a pro-Ukrainian perspective. 
This in turn is the sum of the support for Ukraine in general (45 %), Ukrainian 
authorities (21 %), and Ukrainian army (9 %). The largest support for Ukraine 
was expressed by Super Express (96  %) and Wiadomości TVP1 (79  %). Fakt 
(39 %) and Fakty TVN (40 %) most often among the analyzed media covered the 
conflict neutrally. Only Gazeta Wyborcza expressed any support for the Russian 
authorities, but it was only in one percent of all articles and it was rather the result 
of quoting others than the opinion of the journalist. The anti-Russian attitude 
was also evident in the case of the dominant and the secondary actor. Although 
the rebels were covered the most negatively (81 % as the dominant actor and 
69 % as the secondary actor), taking into account the amount of materials where 
the Russian authorities were the dominant (69 %) and secondary actor (61 %) 
it can be seen that these were presented in the most negative way by the media. 
Negativism was also expressed toward the Russian military (68 % as the dom-
inant actor and 66 % as the secondary actor), as well as Russian citizens (25 % 
as the dominant actor and 50 % as the secondary actor). However, Russian cit-
izens were also often presented in a neutral way, which shows that journalists 
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did not recognize them as a side of the war. Furthermore, Ukrainian actors were 
presented neutrally. Only three percent of news stories on the Ukrainian author-
ities (2 % as the dominant actor and 1 % as the secondary actor) and two percent 
of stories on the Ukrainian army (secondary actor) had a negative slant. The 
Ukrainian side (20 % in total) was quoted more often than the Russian (12 % 
in total) which seems to further confirm the hypothesis. This is due to the fact 
that Russian politicians and media (73 %) were regarded as most responsible for 
spreading disinformation and fake news, which was confirmed by the interviewed 
journalists. This also seems to relate to the propaganda-oriented function of war 
journalism described by Galtung (2006), where exposing the enemy’s lies is 
important – and Russia is seen as the enemy by Poles (Taras, 2015). The recogni-
tion that the conflict’s main causes were “Russian support for separatists” (53 %) 
and “Russian invasion” (34  %), and the conflict being a “dispute between the 
state and non-state actors supported by other state” (46 %) and “between states” 
(44 %) also confirms that the Polish media clearly thought that Russia played 
a role in the events. Calling the events in Ukraine a “war” (46 %), and the pro-
Russian side for example “Russians” (26 %), confirms the anti-Russian attitude of 
the journalists, as well as the predominance of this perspective in the media cov-
erage. It also shows quite clearly that the media, while covering Russia’s actions 
and supporting Ukraine, acted according to Hallin’s sphere of consensus (1986), 
for example taking it for granted that Russia was the aggressor that should be 
condemned. Some of the interviewed journalists also pointed to the role of 
social factors such as Russophobia, the influence of their origin on relations with 
parties to the conflict, national interest and historical relations expressed by the 
fear of Russian expansion (38 %), which confirms that they acted in a partisan 
way (see Russ-Mohl, 2013; Sreedharan, 2013). Compassion for Ukraine was also 
an important factor which originated, inter alia, in Poland’s negative historical 
experiences with Russia, as well as being able to relate to Ukraine’s situation. 
This allowed journalists to assess the event through the prism of “us/victims” – 
Ukraine and Poland, versus “them/aggressor” – Russia.
The second research hypothesis was also confirmed, which shows that the 
conflict was domesticated by the media, because they pointed to economic and 
political connections between Poland, the parties to the conflict and the European 
Union (see Lee, 2005; Qadir and Alasuutari, 2013). Pointing to negative eco-
nomic (16 %) and military (51 %) consequences of the dispute for Poland, under-
stood as a threat to national security, were the most frequently used tools of the 
strategy. The consequences of the conflict were also the second most frequently 
covered topic (12 %), which confirms that the journalists actually addressed this 
issue, trying to show the recipient that there was a Polish angle to the story. It 
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was the most often covered topic by tabloids (36 %), which may have to do with 
sensationalism and the fear of Russia’s actions, which the journalists from these 
media emphasized. Fakt (27 %), just after Gazeta Wyborcza (29 %) wrote about 
these issues most often. Although the military threat in general (30 %) outweighs 
the military threat from Russia (21 %), when it comes to the economic threat 
the situation is slightly different (economic consequences in general – 6 %; eco-
nomic sanctions from Russia  – 10  %). It can then be noted that Russia’s role 
in the domestication of the conflict was significant, which was also reflected in 
Poland’s possible reactions to the events in Ukraine – for example, “economic 
sanctions on Russia” (12 %), “military presence of NATO in the region” (24 %) 
and “increasing military potential” (9 %). The two last reactions may be related 
to the most commonly presented dispute scenario, which was an “increase in 
military action” (52 %), but also to “economic war” (22 %) which came second. 
The materials often specified that these reactions followed from Russia’s actions 
and fears of them. Historical factors that appeared in 14 percent of the materials 
strengthened this feeling, which may be related to the anti-Russian perspec-
tive of the coverage. The journalists referred, for example, to World War II and 
compared Putin to Hitler and Stalin, and thus demonized Russia (see Ottosen, 
1995; Wolsfeld, 2004; Galtung, 2006). The most historical references were – once 
again – found in the tabloids (36 %), which may have something to do with the 
fact that the journalists admitted their task is to simplify reality for the audience. 
Firstly, by focusing on the Polish angle in foreign news stories, secondly by refer-
ring to issues that can easily be understood by Poles (see Clausen, 2004; Taradai, 
2012), so that they are decoded in an unambiguous way. Historical contexts seem 
to exemplify such issues (Gurevitch et al., 1991), and most of the interviewees 
said that they played an important role in the coverage. They pointed to the prox-
imity of Poland and Ukraine, and that they have similar experiences of Russian 
aggression. The coverage also made reference to Ukraine’s security being a 
guarantee of Poland’s security, which was what journalists and politicians were 
saying at the time. Polish politicians were the most often quoted source by the 
media (13 %), which also is a manifestation of domestication, especially since 
discussions on the situation in Ukraine and its impact on the country were held 
at the national level. Covering Poland’s actions within the European Union and 
NATO is also a kind of domestication, because in this way journalists referred to 
a universal, or at least Western, system of values (Olausson, 2013), which brings 
the audience closer to understanding the dispute and its parties in terms of “us” 
and “them”.
Verifying the hypotheses has not been without its issues. I  based my work 
on research tools created for the international research project “Ukraine 
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2014 – media war and the war in media”, but due to the necessity of making some 
changes, especially to the code book, the research materials had to be coded once 
again. I am also aware that the code book had some limitations, including, for 
example, detailed questions regarding the MH17 catastrophe which were used 
for a case study in the aforementioned research project but had no such pur-
pose in my research. It seems, however, that the data obtained can be used in 
subsequent analyzes, if it has not already found its application. It is also prob-
lematic to assess qualitative issues, such as the perspective of the coverage, and 
the contexts visible in the materials, without adding a substantial dose of the 
researcher’s subjectivity.
The sequence of research tasks began with the content analysis of the collected 
materials, and continued with in-depth interviews with journalists who covered 
the conflict.
I could easily access the newspapers through the library, but access to tele-
vision materials  – especially to the Polish Television  – required a number of 
permissions from the company’s administration. The waiting period for those 
materials lasted longer than expected. Talking to journalists also had its difficul-
ties, because as mainstream media employees they did not always have time to 
talk. Some of the journalists also declined to be interviewed, and I realize that the 
research sample may be in some sense insufficient and that it would be prefer-
able to conduct more interviews. Furthermore, some of the questions asked – for 
example those relating to the role of journalists in conflicts, the impact of his-
torical factors on the coverage and possible difficulties in accessing the parties to 
the conflict resulting from the journalists’ origin – seemed difficult and at times 
sensitive, which is why some of the obtained answers were unsatisfactory. I tried 
to solve this problem by asking follow-up questions to get honest and truthful 
responses.
Certain problems are also posed by defining domestication, which is a part 
of the second research hypothesis and which is hardly described at all in Polish 
scientific literature. It was therefore difficult to refer to similar studies, especially 
on the national level, that addressed this issue. I tried to adopt the definitions 
used by foreign researchers, for example Hjarvard (2001), Taradai (2014) and 
Joye (2015), who pointed to elements that were studied closely for this book. 
Moreover, the relatively low number of national publications on the coverage 
of armed conflicts, in particular the role of journalists in presenting such phe-
nomena, constituted a certain limitation. Of course, several studies on the cov-
erage of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict by the Polish media have been done 
(see Głowacki and Smolak, 2016; Szostok et  al., 2016; Laboratorium Badań 
Medioznawczych, 2017a; Smolak, 2017), but, as mentioned earlier, most of these 
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studies often only analyze one type of medium, without including interviews 
with journalists. Furthermore, often only a short fragment of the dispute was 
examined. It would probably have been easier to make the study if there had been 
more previous research to compare the results to. Then I could have compared 
the ways in which Polish media and journalists operate in this area, especially 
since according to Russ-Mohl (2013), social factors and national culture strongly 
affect the behavior of journalists covering conflict (2013). Sreedharan (2013) and 
Wolsfeld (2004) also pointed to the importance of ethnocentrism in covering 
wars – including external ones. Therefore, if there would have been an opportu-
nity to refer to Polish analyzes taking into account these factors more broadly, 
the analysis of the described phenomenon could have been more complete.
The research techniques and methods used in the study made it possible to 
answer the formulated research questions and verify the hypotheses. I am aware, 
however, that the qualitative elements of the content analysis, as well as the results 
of the in-depth interviews, are marked by a certain amount of subjectivism – 
both the researcher’s and the respondents’. This could be used as a point of criti-
cism against this study. In the case of the content analysis, coding certain frames 
and contexts in the materials depended largely on the researcher’s knowledge of 
prejudices and social beliefs, and what is also particularly important in the case 
of my research – history. However, knowing about these factors was necessary in 
order for me to be able to identify them. Furthermore, I realize that the very fact 
of my nationality can also be seen as a limitation. I could, although unintention-
ally, perceive certain events and actors through the prism of prejudices present 
in Polish society. Also, as mentioned earlier, the sample of respondents could be 
considered low, especially since the number of interviewed journalists from each 
media outlet was not the same. Therefore, it is possible to talk about an under-
representation of some of the outlets. I tried to solve this problem by searching 
for respondents from outside the analyzed media, who could talk about their 
work and also give opinions on the coverage of the event by the six analyzed 
media. It seems that in this way the perspective of the research could be broad-
ened. Finally, using reports from the Centre for Public Opinion Research (2014 
and 2015), although they presented the general opinion of the public and not 
the recipients of particular media, was helpful in understanding why journalists 
used specific mechanisms to cover and domesticate the conflict in Ukraine. 
I am aware that these reports probably do not fully reflect reality – because the 
research sample only covers a part of society – but the tendencies presented seem 
to reflect a certain general trend.
The research goals set for the study have been met. I have managed to present 
how the Russian-Ukrainian conflict was covered by the Polish media – different 
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in terms of political parallelism, business model and type of content presented – 
which is an undeniable advantage of the study. In this way it is possible to make 
an addition to both the domestic and international state of research on this sub-
ject. Earlier research focused mainly on one type of media, while ignoring the 
viewpoint of journalists, which seems to be a limitation. This work can therefore 
complement some of the shortcomings in this area. Some differences in the cov-
erage could be noticed – for example, the most frequently presented topics and 
the sources quoted, as well as domestication mechanisms. However, it was also 
observed that in the situation of the conflict in Ukraine, these differences were not 
so significant, and to a large degree the Polish media spoke with one voice. This 
shows that the shared national perspective and some kind of national prejudices 
might be stronger than the individual differences between the media – some-
thing that could be observed in the main coverage perspective. Paying attention 
to the influence of context-oriented factors on the coverage, it is also impor-
tant that the studied media are, and certainly were in the research period, the 
most popular media outlets in Poland (see Kurdupski, 2016a; Kurdupski 2016b), 
which influenced the agenda of other media (see Instytut Monitoringu Mediów, 
2014; Instytut Monitoringu Mediów, 2015). In this way their content could reach 
more recipients and further influence people’s perception of the event. It was 
also noticed that the proximity of the dispute and the fear of it spreading to 
Poland, as well as historical and cultural patterns, indeed had an impact on the 
coverage and an effect on the journalists’ behavior. The use of these elements 
in the coverage also confirms that the dispute was domesticated by the Polish 
media. The domestication mechanisms used by Polish journalists were found 
and characterized, as well as their impact on the general, pro-Ukrainian per-
spective of the coverage, which the analysis also found. It therefore confirms that 
this goal of the study has been achieved. It seems that the detailed discussion of 
the mechanisms of domestication used by journalists, as well as the references to 
the interviews where journalists talked, for instance, about Russophobia and a 
general fear of the dispute spreading to Poland, is also an advantage of the study. 
Although many papers have been written about the role of journalists, as well 
as the impact of media-politics relations, there are not many analyzes that are 
directly about conflict reporting in Poland. Describing to what extent the hybrid 
nature of the dispute influenced the work of journalists is also helpful when it 
comes to understanding how the media works when presenting such an event 
compared to other kinds of disputes.
In the future, it would be worth expanding on the comparable research that 
has already been done and refining the analyzed issues. In my opinion, it could be 
better to use the criteria of political parallelism when choosing media to analyze, 
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and not only popularity. In this way, it would be possible to check whether the 
one national perspective is also reflected in the case of media that are different 
in this regard. Half of the analyzed media outlets had a rather neutral attitude 
toward the former government, while Gazeta Wyborcza, Wiadomości TVP1 
and Fakty TVN showed strong support for the Civic Platform in the research 
period (see Mielczarek, 2007; Bajomi-Lazar, 2014:  110), so perhaps the more 
hardline right-wing media perspective was lacking. Although the research of the 
Laboratory of Media Studies (2017a) included press titles that varied in terms of 
their support for political forces, the main factor in the selection of these media 
was their popularity. Therefore, the newspapers that were characterized by a 
strong political profile might have been omitted because they were not the most 
widely read newspapers in Poland. This is also reflected in the lack of interviews 
with journalists representing politically diverse views. A certain research gap can 
therefore be identified, which future analyzes can fill.
Future research could also supplement my analysis with an analysis of 
materials from 2015 to 2018, since the conflict in Ukraine continued in this time 
period. Although the coverage of the dispute by the Polish media intensified 
during the period analyzed in this study, the so-called Kerch Strait Incident from 
November 2018 and its repercussions was one of the most important topics in 
the Polish media agenda for some time. Therefore, extending the research period 
and carrying out additional analyzes could help determine how the situation in 
Ukraine has been presented by the Polish media over time, and if any changes 
have occurred.
In my opinion, it would also be interesting to extend the analysis to the 
internet, for example by analyzing web portals, to see if the perspective of the 
conflict visible in that media coverage was similar to that presented by traditional 
media. It is true that the preliminary analyzes carried out by me showed that 
the three most popular web portals in Poland – Wp.pl, Onet.pl, and Gazeta.pl – 
covered the dispute in accordance with the pro-Ukrainian perspective (Smolak, 
2017). However, only the period from February to April 2014 was examined. It 
is possible that this perspective could have changed somewhat in time. It would 
be necessary to carry out analyzes over a longer research period, as well as taking 
into account the diversity of portals, for instance political. In addition, the nature 
of these media, as well as the mechanisms used by them, is different from those 
noticeable in the press or television. To investigate whether the coverage of the 
dispute had a war-oriented character – like in the traditional media – or not, 
therefore seems interesting. It would also be interesting to test the function-
ality of the model developed by Nygren, which is based on traditional media, on 
“new” media (Nygren and Hök, 2016: 261). In the case of the internet, it is also 
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important to define and investigate who creates the content presented by portals. 
It could for example be professional journalists, but also the audience itself – 
so-called citizen journalists. Furthermore, extending the analysis to web portals 
could allow – more than in the case of traditional media – to examine social 
responses expressed in the form of comments below the content. The journalist’s 
ability to engage with the audience  – for instance through the comment sec-
tion – is also interesting. It would be possible to observe the interaction between 
these entities, and at the same time see how the media is affected by society when 
reporting on armed conflicts.
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Appendix no. 1: Code book
General Information:
 1. Medium
 1.1. Gazeta Wyborcza
 1.2. Rzeczpospolita
 1.3. Fakt
 1.4. Super Express
 1.5. Wiadomości TVP1
 1.6. Fakty TVN
 2. Date:
 2.1. March 2014
 2.2. April 2014
 2.3. May 2014
 2.4. June 2014
 2.5. July 2014
 2.6. August 2014
 2.7. September 2014
 2.8. October 2014
 2.9. November 2014
 2.10. December 2014
 2.11. January 2015
 2.12. February 2015
 2.13. March 2015
 3. Place
 3.1. Front page
 3.2. Inside – biggest story on the page
 3.3. Inside – minor on the page
 4. Space
 4.1. Full page
 4.2. Half page
 4.3. Quarter of a page
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 5. Genre
 5.1. News report
 5.2. Background/analysis
 5.3. Feature reporting
 5.4. Interview
 5.5. Column
 5.6. Vox pop
 5.7. Quote (not related to any article)
Analysis
 6. General theme of the story
 6.1. International political discussion and sanctions
 6.2. NATO intervention
 6.3. Military actions in the conflict area
 6.4. Consequences for civilians in the conflict area
 6.5. Pro-Russian rebels and their actions
 6.6. Russian involvement (in general)
 6.7. Russian military involvement in the conflict
 6.8. Military support for Ukraine from Poland
 6.9. Economic and political support for Ukraine from Poland
 6.10. MH17
 6.11. Consequences of the conflict for Poland
 6.12. Relations between Poland and parties to the conflict
 6.13. Negotiations and peace agreements
 6.14. Russian Humanitarian convoy
 6.15. Stories on Ukrainian military (not fighting)
 6.16. Annexation of Crimea and its consequences
 6.17. Stories on the Ukrainian government
 6.18. Other
 7. What kind of consequences for Poland are described in the material?
 7.1. Military threat (in general)
 7.2. Military threatens from Russia
 7.3. Economic consequences (in general)
 7.4. Economic sanctions from Russia
 7.5. Deterioration of relations with Russia
 7.6. Immigration
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    7.7. Threat to Polish citizens living in Ukraine
    7.8.        Other
    7.9.    No consequences described
 8. How should Poland react to the events in Ukraine?
8.1. Improving relations with Russia
8.2. Military presence of NATO in the region
8.3. Increasing military potential
8.4. Economic sanctions on Russia
8.5. Political isolation of Russia
8.6. Military support for Ukraine
8.7. Economic and poltical support for Ukraine
8.8. Cooparte with EU
8.9. Ukraine’s approach to Europe
8.10. Other
8.11. No reactions described
 9.     Main perspective on the article
9.1. Support for Ukraine in general
9.2. Support for Ukrainian authorities
9.3. Support for Ukrainian army
9.4. Support for Russian authorities
9.5. Support for Russian army
9.6. Support for separatists
9.7. Neutral
9.8. Other
 10. Dominant actor in the article
 10.1. Polish authorities
 10.2. Polish citizens
 10.3. Ukrainian authorities
 10.4. Ukrainian military
 10.5. Ukrainian citizens
 10.6. Civilians in the conflict area
 10.7. Rebels
 10.8. Russian authorities
 10.9. Russian military
 10.10. Russian citizens
 10.11. International politicians
 10.12. Other foreign actors in the conflict
 10.13. Other
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 11. Main international actors
 11.1. EU politicians




 11.6. Red Cross
 11.7. WNP/CIS
 11.8. Other




 13.  Secondary actor in the article
13.1. Polish authorities
 13.2. Polish citizens
 13.3. Ukrainian authorities
 13.4. Ukrainian military
 13.5. Ukrainian citizens
 13.6. Civilians in the conflict area
 13.7. Rebels
 13.8. Russian authorities
 13.9. Russian military
 13.10. Vladimir Putin
 13.11. International politicians
 13.12. Other foreign actors in the conflict
 13.13. Other
 14. Secondary international actors
 14.1. EU politicians




 14.6. Red Cross
 14.7. CIS
 14.8. Other
 15. How is the secondary actor portrayed?
 15.1. Positively
 15.2. Neutral
 15.3. Negatively Róa Norström - 978-3-631-79027-4
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 16. What kind of sources of information are visible in the article?
 16.1. Press agency
 16.2. Foreign media
 16.3. Journalist in the conflict area
 16.4. Social media
 16.5. Ukrainian politicians
 16.6. Ukrainian military
 16.7. Ukrainian citizens
 16.8. Russian politicians
 16.9. Russian military
 16.10. Russian citizens
 16.11. Separatists
 16.12. Polish politicians
 16.13. Polish military
 16.14. Polish citizens
 16.15. Polish experts
 16.16. Russian experts
 16.17. Ukrainian experts
 16.18. International experts
 16.19. EU – politicians
 16.20. US – politicians
 16.21. NATO
 16.22. Civilians in and from conflict area
 16.23. Other
 17.  Is there any kind of criticism expressed by the journalist towards 
sources?
 17.1. Yes or no
 18. What kind of criticism is expressed toward sources in the text?
 18.1. Partiality
 18.2. Not the complete picture
 18.3. False facts
 18.4. Other
 19.  Is des-information and fake news discussed openly in the article/
news story?
 19.1. Yes or no
 20. Is any side accused of des-information/fake news?
 20.1. Russia (politicians + media)
 20.2. Russian rebels in conflict area
 20.3. Ukraine (politicians + media)
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 20.4. Ukraine (military)
 20.5. International pro-western sources
 20.6. International pro-Russian sources
 20.7. National sources
 21. Was the material related to historical issues/context?
 21.1. Yes
 21.2. No
 22. What historical events have been referred to in the material?
22.1. World War I
 22.2. World War II
 22.3. Cold War
 22.4. Communism
 22.5. Transnistrian conflict
 22.6. The Russo-Georgian War
 22.7. Other (which one?)
 23. To what historical events were the events in Ukraine compared?
23.1. World War I
 23.2. World War II
 23.3. Cold War
 23.4. Communism
 23.5. Transnistrian conflict
 23.6. The Russo-Georgian War
 23.7. Other (which one?)
 24. Are there any information about historical relations between Poland 
and parties to the conflict?
Comment: If this type of information appeared it should be written to which 
events they relate
 25. What scenario of the conflict is presented in the material?
 25.1. No scenario
 25.2. NATO intervention
 25.3. Economic war
 25.4. Freezing the conflict
 25.5. Increase in military action
 25.6. Transition of the conflict beyond Ukraine
 25.7. A military threat to Poland
 25.8. Other
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MH17:
 26.  If the story relates to MH17: Is there any claims about responsibility for 
the downing of the plane:
 26.1. Russia-supported rebels was responsible
 26.2. Russian military was responsible
 26.3. Ukrainian military was responsible
 26.4. West was responsible
 26.5. It is unclear and not possible to say
 26.6. No responsibility discussed
 27. Is the item referring to any proofs for the claim? (yes/no on every option)
 27.1. Witnesses/interviews
 27.2. Intelligence information
 27.3. Social media/blogs
 27.4. Technical proofs
 27.5. Photos
 27.6. Other
 28. How is the investigation described?
 28.1. Neutrally
 28.2. Rebels helping investigation
 28.3. Rebels make difficulties for investigation
 28.4. Ukraine helping investigation
 28.5. Ukraine make difficulties for investigation
Russian Troops
 29. How is the question of Russian troops in Ukraine described?
 29.1. Russian regular troops in Ukraine
 29.2. Russian volunteers in Ukraine
 29.3. Russian support for rebels
 29.4. Unclear situation
 29.5. No Russian involvement
 29.6. Other
 30.  Are there any indications of Russian presence described in the item? 
(yes/no on every option)
 30.1. Witnesses
 30.2. Intelligence information
 30.3. Social media/blogs
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Framing
31. How is the conflict described?
 31.1. Between states
 31.2. Between the state and non-state actors within the state
 31.3. Between the state and non-state actors supported by another state
 31.4. As a civil war
 31.5. Between the East and West
 31.6. Other
32. How are the causes of the conflict described?
 32.1. No causes of the conflict described
 32.2. Other
 32.3. Ukrainian nationalism suppressing Russians in Ukraine
 32.4. Western interference in Ukraine
 32.5. As a result of divided country (language/culture)
 32.6. As a result of Russian support for separatists
 32.7. As a Russian invasion/aggression
33. How is Poland’s role in the conflict described?
 33.1. Defender of Ukraine in the international arena
 33.2. Side of the war
 33.3. Victim of the Russians actions (economical and military sanctions)
 33.4. Victim of the western countries actions
 33.5. Peacemaker
 33.6. Neutral observer
 33.7. No role described
 33.8. Other
34. Historical and geopolitical context used in the story
 34.1. Fear of Russian expansion
 34.2. Fear of lack of NATO reaction
 34.3. Contemporary Ukrainian struggle for belonging to Europe
 34.4. Historical struggle for national independence of Ukraine
 34.5. Struggle for Russian power, values and culture in history
 34.6. Struggle for Russian power, values and culture today
 34.7. Struggle against fascism during World War II
 34.8. War between West and East
 35. To what historical entities was Vladimir Putin compared?
Comment: If a comparison appears, then the entity being compared to Vladimir 
Putin should be determined
 
Róa Norström - 978-3-631-79027-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 12/03/2020 01:06:53PM by A.Gorlikowski@peterlang.com
via Peter Lang AG and Adam Gorlikowski
Appendix 191
Language




 36.4. Civil war
 36.5. Russian invasion/aggression
 36.6. Crisis
 36.7. Protests










 37.6. People militia
 37.7. Mercenaries
 37.8. Militants
 37.9. Illegal armed groups











 38.7. Security forces
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Appendix no. 2: Code book: “Ukraine 2014 – media  
war and the war in media”
General information
 1. CoderID
 1.1. Write the initial of the coder
 2. Unit nr
 3. Medium
 3.1. Aftonbladet
 3.2. Dagens Nyheter
 3.3. SVT-Rapport 19.30
 3.4. Komsomolskaja Pravda
 3.5. Kommersant
 3.6. Channel 1
 3.7. Den
 3.8. Segodnya
 3.9. Channel 1+1
 3.10. Fakt
 3.11. Gazeta Wyborcza
 3.12. Wiadomości TVP
Comment: Each value is only the last  figure – Aftonbladet=1, Dagens Nyheter =2, 
etc The same is for all values in this code scheme – don’t write the first figure in 
the coding. Not 3.15 – write only 15. This is the same for all coding on every 
variable!
 4. Date
 4.1. July 10
 4.2. July 11
 4.3. July 12
 4.4. July 13
 4.5. July 14
 4.6. July 15
 4.7. July 16
 4.8. July 17
 4.9. July 18
 4.10. July 19
 4.11. July 20
 4.12. July 21
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 4.13. July 22
 4.14. July 23
 4.15. July 24
 4.16. July 25
 4.17. July 26
 4.18. July 27
 4.19. July 28
 4.20. July 29
 4.21. July 30
 4.22. July 31
 4.23. Aug 1
 4.24. Aug 2
 4.25. Aug 3
 4.26. Aug 4
 4.27. Aug 5
 4.28. Aug 6
 4.29. Aug 7
 4.30. Aug 8
 4.31. Aug 9
 4.32. Aug 10
 4.33. Aug 11
 4.34. Aug 12
 4.35. Aug 13
 4.36. Aug 14
 4.37. Aug 15
 4.38. Aug 16
 4.39. Aug 17
 4.40. Aug 18
 4.41. Aug 19
 4.42. Aug 20
 4.43. Aug 21
 4.44. Aug 22
 4.45. Aug 23
 4.46. Aug 24
 4.47. Aug 25
 4.48. Aug 26
 4.49. Aug 27
 4.50. Aug 28
 4.51. Aug 29
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 4.52. Aug 30
 4.53. Aug 31
 4.54. Sept 1
 4.55. Sept 2
 4.56. Sept 3
 4.57. Sept 4
 4.58. Sept 5
 4.59. Sept 6
 4.60. Sept 7
5.     Title – headline – lead intro (in TV) (One sentence)
6.     Place
 6.1. Front page/ first news in television
 6.2. Inside – biggest story the page/second-third news
 6.3. Inside – minor on the page/from 4th item in TV
7.     Space – papers (tabloid format)
 7.1. Full page
 7.2. Half page
 7.3. Quarter of a page
 7.4. Less than quarter
8.       Space – papers (broadsheet format)
 8.1. Full page
 8.2. Half page
 8.3. Quarter of a page
 8.4. Less than quarter
9.     Time (in TV)
Comment: Time should be given in seconds only. This makes it easier to export 
and import between SPSS and Excel.





10.5. Column (related to news)
10.6. Vox pop
10.7. Quote (not related to any other article)
Comment: Column is in the selected material when it is placed in the news sec-
tion.Content analysis:
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 11. General theme of the story (in headline and introduction)
 11.1. International political discussion and sanctions
 11.2. National political discussion a sanctions
 11.3. Actions involving weapons in the conflict area
 11.4. Consequences for civilians in the conflict area (refugees or staying)
 11.5. Pro-Russian rebels and their actions
 11.6. Russian involvement in conflict area (support in general)
 11.7. Russian military involvement in the conflict area
 11.8. Military support for Ukraine
 11.9. Popular support for one side
 11.10. Popular support for civilians
 11.11. Consequences of the conflict sanctions and economy
 11.12. Other consequences of the conflict
 11.13. Negotiations Ukraine-separatists-Russia
 11.14. Stories on Ukrainian military (not military actions)
 11.15. Stories on separatists (not military actions)
 11.16. MH 17
 11.17. Russian humanitarian convoy (trucks)
 11.18. Other
 12. Main perspective on the article (in headline and introduction)
 12.1. Support for the Ukrainian government
 12.2. Support for Ukrainian military
 12.3. Support for the civilians in conflict area
 12.4. Support for Russian government
 12.5. Support for separatists
 12.6. Neutral – popular perspective
 12.7. Neutral – power perspective
 12.8. Support for Ukrainians in general
 12.9. Neutral – no special perspective
Comment: This variable shall be coded on the basis of the general impression 
in headline, lead and choice of pictures. Articles criticizing one side shall be 
regarded to be supportive of the opposite perspective, For example - an article 
putting responsibility for the conflict on Kremlin and Putin, is supporting the 
Ukrainian perspective.
In many cases it is difficult to separate between the values in the variable, for 
example support for rebels or support for Russia. In these cases choose the most 
likely. In the analysis we perhaps have to reduce the number of values in the var-
iable, for example calculate all support for Russian perspective in one category 
(because it is difficult to judge what value is correct)
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13. Dominant actor in the article/news story
 13.1. Ukrainian political actors
 13.2. Ukrainian authorities/officials
 13.3. Ukrainian military
 13.4. Ukrainian civil society and organisations
 13.5. Civilians in conflict area
 13.6. Rebels in conflict area
 13.7. Russian military
 13.8. Political actors in Russia
 13.9. Russian civil society
 13.10. International politicians
 13.11. Other foreign actors in the conflict
 13.12. Civil society in other countries
 13.13. Other
Comment: What is actor? A  broader notion than source  –it is a person or a 
group of persons described and/or taken as a source. The dominant actor is the 
one taking most place, dominating the lead and pictures.












 15.4. Not possible to say
Comment: Positively or negatively for the actor. In headline and introduction. 
This variable concern both the event described and how it is described. Is it pos-
itive/negative for the dominant actor that this news is published, and is it pro-
duced in a way positive or negative for the actor?
16. Second actor in the article/news story
 16.1. Ukrainian political actors
 16.2. Ukrainian authorities/officials
 16.3. Ukrainian military
 16.4. Ukrainian civil society and organisations
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 16.5. Civilians in conflict area
 16.6. Rebels in conflict area
 16.7. Russian military
 16.8. Political actors in Russia
 16.9. Russian civil society
 16.10. International politicians
 16.11. Other foreign actors in the conflict
 16.12. Civil society in other countries
 16.13. Other
Comment: The second actor is clearly visible but not as much as the dominant 
one. Not all news stories have a second actor. In that case these variables are 
left empty




 17.4. Not possible to say
Comment: Positively or negatively for the actor. In headline and introduction
Sources and des-information
18.  Is the journalist behind the story on place in? (if many, the first mentioned)
 18.1. Kiev
 18.2. Other places in Ukraine (except Donbass)
 18.3. Conflict area
 18.4. Crimea
 18.5. Moscow




 18.10. Other EU-countries
 18.11. Other CIS-countries
 18.12. Other
 18.13. Not possible to answer
19.  Is the story referring to news agencies? (in case of many, give the first 
mentioned):
 19.1. No references to news agencies
 19.2. Reuters
 
Róa Norström - 978-3-631-79027-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 12/03/2020 01:06:53PM by A.Gorlikowski@peterlang.com






 19.7. Russian news agencies (RIA Novosti, Interfax etc)




20. Is the story referring to other media?
 20.1. Ukrainian national media
 20.2. Kyiv Post (English)
 20.3. Russian national media
 20.4. Russia Today
 20.5. BBC
 20.6. CNN
 20.7. Other satellite TV-channels
 20.8. Other European media
 20.9. Other US media
 20.10. Other
Comment:  If more than one media is mentioned, choose the one given the 
largest space in the item. If no other media is mentioned, leave it blank.
21. Is social media or blogs mentioned as a source?
 21.1. No
 21.2. Yes – Facebook
 21.3. Yes – Twitter
 21.4. Yes – blogs
 21.5. Yes – Vkontakte
 21.6. Yes - other
22. What kind of sources are visible in the article (yes/no on every option)
 22.1. Ukrainian government
 22.2. Other Ukrainian political actors
 22.3. Ukrainian experts
 22.4. Ukrainian military
 22.5. Ukrainian civil society
 22.6. Ukrainian civilians in general (outside conflict area)
 22.7. Civilians in and from conflict area
 22.8. Russian politicians (connected to government)
 22.9. Russian opposition
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 22.10. Russian experts
 22.11. Russian rebels in conflict area
 22.12. Russian military
 22.13. Journalists/media in the conflict area
 22.14. International experts (UN, OSSE, NGOs etc.)
 22.15. EU-politicians
 22.16. Politicians connected to US
 22.17. NATO-officials
 22.18. People outside Ukraine/Russia
 22.19. Other
Comment: A source is any person/institution mentioned in the item as a source, 
even if he/she is not quoted.
23.  Is any kind of criticism expressed by the journalist towards sources 
(reliability, disinformation etc)
 23.1. (yes/no)
Comment:  If yes, specify in question 28 what kind of actor is accused of 
disinformation.
24. What kind of criticism is expressed towards the sources in the text:
 24.1. Partiality
 24.2. Not the complete picture
 24.3. False facts
 24.4. Other
25.  Is des-information and fake news discussed openly in the article/
news story?
 25.1. Yes/no
26. Is any side accused of des-information/fake news?
 26.1. Russia (politicians + media)
 26.2. Russian rebels in conflict area
 26.3. Ukraine (politicians + media)
 26.4. Ukraine (military)
 26.5. International pro-western sources
 26.6. International pro-Russian sources
MH17
27.  If the story relates to MH17: Is there any claims about responsibility for 
the downing of the plane:
 27.1. Russia-supported rebels was responsible
 27.2. Russian military was responsible
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 27.3. Ukrainian military was responsible
 27.4. West was responsible
 27.5. It is unclear and not possible to say
 27.6. No responsibility discussed
Comment: Generally for all variables - the coding is to be done based on the gen-
eral impression in headline, lead, pictures and text. For example - responsibility 
for MH17 is evaluated from what facts are given most attention and visibility?
28.  Is the item referring to any proofs for the claim? (yes/no on every option)
 28.1. Witnesses/interviews
 28.2. Intelligence information
 28.3. Social media/blogs
 28.4. Technical proofs
 28.5. Photos
 28.6. Other
29. How is the investigation described?
 29.1. Neutrally
 29.2. Rebels helping investigation
 29.3. Rebels make difficulties for investigation
 29.4. Ukraine helping investigation
 29.5. Ukraine make difficulties for investigation
Russian Troops
30. How is the question of Russian troops in Ukraine described?
 30.1. Russian regular troops in Ukraine
 30.2. Russian volunteers in Ukraine
 30.3. Russian support for rebels
 30.4. Unclear situation
 30.5. No Russian involvement
 30.6. Other
31.  Are there any indications of Russian presence described in the item? 
(yes/no on every option)
 31.1. Witnesses
 31.2. Intelligence information
 31.3. Social media/blogs
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Framing
32. How is the conflict described? As a conflict…
 32.1. between states
 32.2. between the state and nonstate actors within the state
 32.3. between the state and nonstate actors supported by another state
 32.4. As a civil war
 32.5. Other
33. How are the causes of the conflict described (yes/no on all options)
 33.1. Ukrainian nationalism surpressing Russians in Ukraine
 33.2. Western interference in Ukraine
 33.3. As a result of a divided country (language/culture)
 33.4. As a result of Russian support for separatists
 33.5. As a Russian invasion/Russian aggression
 33.6. Other causes
 33.7. No causes described
Comment: The causes are defined as the origins of the conflict, how it started.
34. Historical and geopolitical context used in the story (yes and no on 
every option)
 34.1. Historical struggle for national independence of Ukraine
 34.2. Contemporary Ukrainian struggle for belonging to Europe
 34.3. Struggle against fascism during Second World War
 34.4. Struggle for Russian power, values and culture in history
 34.5. Struggle for Russian power, values and culture today
 34.6. Fear for Russian expansion
 34.7. Fear of Nato expansion
Comment: Here we code the manifest content of the item, references made to 
these areas in the story.
Language
35.  Is any kind of these word used to describe the events in Eastern Ukraine? 
(yes/no on every option)
 35.1. Protests
 35.2. Terrorist actions
 35.3. Anti-terrorist operation (ATO)
 35.4. Punitive operation
 35.5. Situation
 35.6. Conflict
 35.7. Civil war
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 35.8. Russian invasion/aggression
 35.9. War
 35.10. Crisis
 35.11. Uprising, rebellion







 36.6. People militia
 36.7. Mercenaries
 36.8. Militants
 36.9. Illegal armed groups




37.  What notions are used to describe the Ukrainian side in the conflict 







 37.7. Security forces




Comment:  If more than one of these words are used, give the most frequent 
description.
Appendix no. 3: In-depth interviews
The following areas should be covered in the interviews. The exact questions is 
formulated by the researcher.
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 • Personal data – age, experience as a journalist – especially as foreign and war 
correspondent
 • Background knowledge about the conflict?
 • What parts of the conflict has IP covered?
 • Experiences from coverage – for example conditions of the work, time pres-
sure and rules from military limiting reporting?
 • Security and threat during the work?
 • Character of the conflict – for example the influence of the conflict’s hybridity 
on the coverage, differences between covering this conflict and other 
military events
 • Ethical dilemmas
 • Source criticism/disinformation/fake news?  – how did the journalists deal 
with it?
 • Role of the journalist – to be a neutral observer or an activist taking stand 
supporting one side? Where are the borders between different roles? What is 
possible for IP to do?
 • History and inter-state relations – the influence of these factors on the cov-
erage and the relations with parties to the conflict
 • Domestication – how did the journalists try to bring this conflict closer to the 
audience?
 • Autonomy in the work  – pressure from above (owners, political influence, 
editors, etc.)
 • Autonomy – pressure from audience and society? – for example the influence 
of national stereotypes and prejudices on the coverage
 • Other questions?
Appendix no. 4: In-depth interviews: “Ukraine 2014 – media  
war and the war in media”
The following areas should be covered in the interviews. The exact questions is 
formulated by the researcher.
 • Personal data – age, experience as a journalist
 • Background knowledge about the conflict?
 • What parts of the conflict has IP covered?
 • Experiences from coverage – for example conditions of the work, time pres-
sure and rules from military limiting reporting?
 • Security and threat during the work?
 • Ethical dilemmas
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 • Source criticism/disinformation/fake news?
 • Role of the journalist – to be a neutral observer or an activist taking stand 
supporting one side? Where are the borders between different roles? What is 
possible for IP to do?
 • Autonomy in the work  – pressure from above (owners, political influence, 
editors etc.)
 • Autonomy – pressure from audience and society?
 • Other questions?
Appendix no. 5: List of respondents
Code Sex Age Media outlet Function/role
R1 M 35–50 Fakt journalist/editor
R2 M 35< Fakt journalist/editor
R3 M 35–50 Super Express journalist/editor
R4 M 35–55 Gazeta Wyborcza journalist/opinion writer
R5 M 35–55 Gazeta Wyborcza correspondent/opinion 
writer
R6 M 55 Rzeczpospolita journalist/opinion writer
R7 M 35< Rzeczpospolita/Super 
Express
journalist/commentator
R8 M 35–50 Fakty TVN reporter/editor
R9 W 35–55 Wiadomości TVP1 reporter/editor
R10 M 35–50 Wiadomości TVP1 reporter/editor
R11 M 35–50 Interia.pl journalist/editor
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